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Why isn’t infosec
working?
Did you turn it off and back on again?
By mubix “Rob” Fuller
root@localhost~#: kinit mubix@BruCon
- Internal Red Team for large companies (General Electric, IBM X-Force Red)
- US Government Contractor (Pentagon, Senate)
- US Military SOC Analyst (USMC)
- Small Startup (R5 Industries)
- Large Startup (Uber, Cruise)
- Pentest/Red Team Consultant (Rapid 7, Cisco)
- Bug Hunter (Syn Ack, H1, Bug Crowd)
- TV Show Consultant (HBO’s Silicon Valley)
- Security Consultant (UN Initiatives in Ukraine and Syria)
- Security Meetup Founder (NoVA Hackers)
- Security Contest CTO (MACCDC)
root@localhost~#: kinit mubix@BruCon
- Internal Red Team for large companies (General Electric, IBM X-Force Red)
- US Government Contractor (Pentagon, Senate)
- US Military SOC Analyst (USMC)
- Small Startup (R5 Industries)
- Large Startup (Uber, Cruise)
- Pentest/Red Team Consultant (Rapid 7, Cisco)
- Bug Hunter (Syn Ack, H1, Bug Crowd)
- TV Show Consultant (HBO’s Silicon Valley)
- Security Consultant (UN Initiatives in Ukraine and Syria)
- Security Meetup Founder (NoVA Hackers)
- Security Contest CTO (MACCDC)
B.S in Cyber Security
krbtgt
The
InfoSec
Echo
Chamber
Top 10 Complaints Echos in InfoSec
1. Users are dumb.
2. Passwords will never get better, don’t write them down, just use 2FA/PMs
3. No one ever listens to hackers/us/infosec/nerds/etc
4. Open Wifi == Bad
5. Antivirus is useless!
6. Roll your own crypto / software is stupid vs Blinky Boxes don’t fix anything!
7. It’s “Legacy”... ugh...
8. Just [Sanitize Input, Disable NTLM Auth, WPAD, LLMNR, NetBIOS, Macros]
9. You can’t measure security!
10. I.T. sucks at Asset Management!
Users are dumb.
The Problem
● Computer Users, Employees, Non-security people don’t
tend to follow security best practices
● One of the biggest targets for organizations is it’s users
● Phishing is the #1 cause of breach for that last X years.
The Simple Truths
● Users will continue to click links, use random / sketchy
software, open documents with macros in them
● User awareness training can help decrease these numbers
but is like taking Vitamin C for a cold.
● User awareness training just another corporate training
that EVERYONE tries to get through as quickly as possible
with the least amount of effort.
● Incentivizing security is a far better answer
Vitamin C
For the average person, taking vitamin C does not reduce the number of colds
you get, or the severity of your cold.
In terms of how long your cold lasts, some studies have looked at people taking
vitamin C every day, while others have focused on participants taking it once they
develop a cold. In 30 studies comparing the length of colds in people regularly
taking at least 200 milligrams of vitamin C daily, there was a consistent reduction in
the duration of common cold symptoms. However, the effect was small and
equates to about half a day less in adults, and half to one day less in children.
These types of studies also found a very minor reduction in the amount of time
needed off work or school.
Source: https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-08-vitamin-supplements-cold.html
Steve, can you believe that the idiots that live
here don’t know the first thing about self
defense?
I know, right? They
asked me to quit
bothering them with
teaching them knife
awareness drills.
Don’t they know
they could get
mugged just
walking down the
street?
Amateurs...
I’ve been doing this for 10
years. Of course they
need knife fighting skills.
InfoSec
Users
APT
The Hard Truth
It’s not their job.
It’s ours!
Passwords will never
get better, don’t write
them down, use MFA /
Password Managers
The Problem
● Most people pick bad passwords for things.. You do too.
Don’t deny it. I’ve seen security professional’s passwords.
● Password managers aren’t supported in many places
(either you can’t copy/paste or install software/sync)
● We keep feeding the media stories about how 2FA via
SMS is horrible, but the nuance that not all 2FA is SMS is
lost on non-tech people.
The Simple Truths
● Password managers are difficult to use. Apple is actually
starting to fix with with their iCloud keychain (as scary as
that sounds)
● 2FA/MFA is also difficult to use and near impossible to
migrate between devices.
● We tell people not to write down their passwords even
though 99.9% of the threats are digital.
The Hard Truth
Stop making fun of this:
Making security tools
user friendly is the key
to adoption.
No one ever listens to
hackers / us / infosec/
nerds / etc
The Problem
● Management buy-in on security projects / budget is hard
● Security programs are sometimes undervalued
● We regularly deliver advice in condescending, expensive,
full of friction and hard to follow ways.
The Simple Truths
● Companies survive and pay salaries based on revenue
● Security doesn’t have direct return on investment
● Security keeps getting more expensive.
The Hard Truth
We are a bunch of jerks...
● We complain constantly
when we don’t get our
way.
● We extort companies who
don’t do things we want
them to do
● We lord our “power” over
others and flaunt it
regularly at conferences.
● We have to be forced to
talk in business terms
instead of hacker terms
Open Wifi == Bad
The Problem
● Open Wireless is pervasive, from hotels and airlines, to
ISPs (xfinitywifi for example)
● Evil Twin / Wifi MTIM is easy to perform
Let’s play a game..
The Simple Truths
● Most websites use SSL/TLS now (Thanks LetsEncrypt!)
● Chrome changes so often it’s actually harder to exploit just
due to code change speed.
● Host based firewalls have been on by default since
Windows Vista (especially for “Public” networks)
The Hard Truth
It’s just not that big of a deal anymore.
Time to fix the problem (insecure
transports and websites) and not the
symptom (Open WIFI == bad).
Antivirus is useless!
The Problem
● Signatures are horrible at detecting new attacks
● Signature based security is easily bypassed
● Very few companies EVER look at the AV logs
The Simple Truths
● Low hanging fruit is the bread and butter of AV
● These signatures are sometimes the best indicators of
compromise you could hope for. Like finding PWDUMP on
a Domain Controller
● Getting every piece of tooling past AV is actually pretty
hard.
The Hard Truth
Stop bagging on AV. It’s actually much
more valuable than you might think.
If it does happen to be junk, remove it.
Roll your own crypto /
software is stupid
vs
Blinky Boxes don’t fix
anything!
The Problem
● Blinky Boxes from $Vendor rarely do any good
● Building your own software to do what the Blinky Boxes do
rarely results in a finished product
● Building your own authentication and cryptography is hard
to do well, and usually best left to frameworks
The Simple Truths
● We are telling companies that they can’t really do either,
buy the solution, or build it. This results in
miscommunications of capabilities and project timelines.
The Hard Truth
Blinky Boxes actually can have solid
results
IF
infosec people actually invest the time in
configuring and using them as intended
It’s “Legacy”... ugh...
The Problem
● Legacy devices, IoT, all seem to get a “pass” when it comes
to security policy and regulations.
● Legacy devices and software are the results of the natural
churn of a company and should be planned for and if
possible, mitigated.
The Simple Truths
● Legacy systems and software should not be given security
exceptions, they should be mitigated in other ways.
● Infosec professionals need to be advocates for this
change and not lay responsibilities elsewhere.
The Hard Truth
Legacy systems or software have security
solutions, we need to work with the maintainers
and developers to find them and stop screaming
and whining that it’s not a 100% solution.
Just [Sanitize Input,
Disable NTLM Auth,
WPAD, LLMNR,
NetBIOS, Macros]
The Problem
● InfoSec Professionals love to say “just” do this, or “just” do
that. Lack of experience in performing (and/or scaling) the
fix is usually the cause.
The Simple Truths
● Disabling NetBIOS, WPAD, or LLMNR is difficult because
the settings are per-user, per-device on Windows.
● Sanitizing input isn’t always easy to do, depending on the
framework used. Especially if the original developer no
longer maintains the code.
● Office Macros are widely used for legitimate purposes, and
are regularly tied to finance.
The Hard Truth
Swallowing our own medicine is hard. “Just”
because you can implement a fix on your test lab
or last job, doesn’t mean it scales or even works
at a company level for this one.
You can’t measure
security!
The Problem
- “Security is a Feeling” -- Chris Nickerson
- It’s very hard to measure feelings as they are arbitrary and
change constantly.
- It’s hard to derive how many breaches were prevented
(proving a negative isn’t easy)
The Simple Truths
- We need to start performing actions in a measurable way
- No, you can’t measure a lack of “breach”, but you can
measure:
- How many new rules were created
- Asset coverage (% servers forwarding logs)
- What coverage of the ATT&CK framework you have
- Time to detection (with sophistication modifiers)
- Time to eradication (with sophistication modifiers)
- A phishing domain that was found BEFORE the attack
- Weird behavior on a workstation before the attackers made it to prod
- Malicious insiders detected before they stole something
The Hard Truth
We need to start measuring failures as
well as successes.
Oh and hey Red Teams/Pentest Teams..
Please remember that getting caught is
SUCCESS.
I.T. sucks at Asset
Management!
The Problem
- Asset management has been I.T.’s domain for ages
- Usually it’s focused around the procurement and
de-commissioning processes.
- Cloud based assets can appear and then disappear from
networks in minutes.
- Wireless networks can make tracking of new assets
difficult.
The Simple Truths
- Tracking assets outside of physical hardware is not a
priority for I.T.
- The security teams usually have all the logs needed to
track down assets in multiple ways once an incident occurs
The Hard Truth
Why isn’t it InfoSec’s job to perform asset
management? Why do we keep passing
the blame to those who our priorities
aren’t shared with?
“Other”
Things that didn’t make the list
but are just as in need of introspection...
1. There aren’t enough infosec people (because we only want senior people)
2. We don’t have enough time (because we can’t hire / afford enough people)
3. No one else cares about security (yup, that’s our job)
4. Infosec Sales people are charlatans (nope, they are sales, not security)
5. Infosec has so much drama (drama only works with an audience)
6. Laser focus on edge cases when the basics is what every sucks at (the basics
are actually pretty hard because they are so general)
7. AI / ML is the end of the world (yup, i’m with you, F#$% fighting Terminator)
8. General apathy (ya.. not sure how to fix this one)
9. Perfection required vs Good enough (Perfectionists are just wasting time)
The End.
THANK YOU!
Rob Fuller
@mubix on Twitter
mubix@hak5.org
THANK YOU BRUCON!!!

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Why isn't infosec working? Did you turn it off and back on again?

  • 1. Why isn’t infosec working? Did you turn it off and back on again? By mubix “Rob” Fuller
  • 2. root@localhost~#: kinit mubix@BruCon - Internal Red Team for large companies (General Electric, IBM X-Force Red) - US Government Contractor (Pentagon, Senate) - US Military SOC Analyst (USMC) - Small Startup (R5 Industries) - Large Startup (Uber, Cruise) - Pentest/Red Team Consultant (Rapid 7, Cisco) - Bug Hunter (Syn Ack, H1, Bug Crowd) - TV Show Consultant (HBO’s Silicon Valley) - Security Consultant (UN Initiatives in Ukraine and Syria) - Security Meetup Founder (NoVA Hackers) - Security Contest CTO (MACCDC)
  • 3. root@localhost~#: kinit mubix@BruCon - Internal Red Team for large companies (General Electric, IBM X-Force Red) - US Government Contractor (Pentagon, Senate) - US Military SOC Analyst (USMC) - Small Startup (R5 Industries) - Large Startup (Uber, Cruise) - Pentest/Red Team Consultant (Rapid 7, Cisco) - Bug Hunter (Syn Ack, H1, Bug Crowd) - TV Show Consultant (HBO’s Silicon Valley) - Security Consultant (UN Initiatives in Ukraine and Syria) - Security Meetup Founder (NoVA Hackers) - Security Contest CTO (MACCDC) B.S in Cyber Security
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 8. Top 10 Complaints Echos in InfoSec 1. Users are dumb. 2. Passwords will never get better, don’t write them down, just use 2FA/PMs 3. No one ever listens to hackers/us/infosec/nerds/etc 4. Open Wifi == Bad 5. Antivirus is useless! 6. Roll your own crypto / software is stupid vs Blinky Boxes don’t fix anything! 7. It’s “Legacy”... ugh... 8. Just [Sanitize Input, Disable NTLM Auth, WPAD, LLMNR, NetBIOS, Macros] 9. You can’t measure security! 10. I.T. sucks at Asset Management!
  • 10. The Problem ● Computer Users, Employees, Non-security people don’t tend to follow security best practices ● One of the biggest targets for organizations is it’s users ● Phishing is the #1 cause of breach for that last X years.
  • 11. The Simple Truths ● Users will continue to click links, use random / sketchy software, open documents with macros in them ● User awareness training can help decrease these numbers but is like taking Vitamin C for a cold. ● User awareness training just another corporate training that EVERYONE tries to get through as quickly as possible with the least amount of effort. ● Incentivizing security is a far better answer
  • 12. Vitamin C For the average person, taking vitamin C does not reduce the number of colds you get, or the severity of your cold. In terms of how long your cold lasts, some studies have looked at people taking vitamin C every day, while others have focused on participants taking it once they develop a cold. In 30 studies comparing the length of colds in people regularly taking at least 200 milligrams of vitamin C daily, there was a consistent reduction in the duration of common cold symptoms. However, the effect was small and equates to about half a day less in adults, and half to one day less in children. These types of studies also found a very minor reduction in the amount of time needed off work or school. Source: https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-08-vitamin-supplements-cold.html
  • 13. Steve, can you believe that the idiots that live here don’t know the first thing about self defense?
  • 14. I know, right? They asked me to quit bothering them with teaching them knife awareness drills. Don’t they know they could get mugged just walking down the street?
  • 15. Amateurs... I’ve been doing this for 10 years. Of course they need knife fighting skills.
  • 16.
  • 18. The Hard Truth It’s not their job. It’s ours!
  • 19. Passwords will never get better, don’t write them down, use MFA / Password Managers
  • 20. The Problem ● Most people pick bad passwords for things.. You do too. Don’t deny it. I’ve seen security professional’s passwords. ● Password managers aren’t supported in many places (either you can’t copy/paste or install software/sync) ● We keep feeding the media stories about how 2FA via SMS is horrible, but the nuance that not all 2FA is SMS is lost on non-tech people.
  • 21. The Simple Truths ● Password managers are difficult to use. Apple is actually starting to fix with with their iCloud keychain (as scary as that sounds) ● 2FA/MFA is also difficult to use and near impossible to migrate between devices. ● We tell people not to write down their passwords even though 99.9% of the threats are digital.
  • 22. The Hard Truth Stop making fun of this: Making security tools user friendly is the key to adoption.
  • 23. No one ever listens to hackers / us / infosec/ nerds / etc
  • 24. The Problem ● Management buy-in on security projects / budget is hard ● Security programs are sometimes undervalued ● We regularly deliver advice in condescending, expensive, full of friction and hard to follow ways.
  • 25. The Simple Truths ● Companies survive and pay salaries based on revenue ● Security doesn’t have direct return on investment ● Security keeps getting more expensive.
  • 26. The Hard Truth We are a bunch of jerks... ● We complain constantly when we don’t get our way. ● We extort companies who don’t do things we want them to do ● We lord our “power” over others and flaunt it regularly at conferences. ● We have to be forced to talk in business terms instead of hacker terms
  • 28. The Problem ● Open Wireless is pervasive, from hotels and airlines, to ISPs (xfinitywifi for example) ● Evil Twin / Wifi MTIM is easy to perform
  • 29. Let’s play a game..
  • 30.
  • 31. The Simple Truths ● Most websites use SSL/TLS now (Thanks LetsEncrypt!) ● Chrome changes so often it’s actually harder to exploit just due to code change speed. ● Host based firewalls have been on by default since Windows Vista (especially for “Public” networks)
  • 32. The Hard Truth It’s just not that big of a deal anymore. Time to fix the problem (insecure transports and websites) and not the symptom (Open WIFI == bad).
  • 34. The Problem ● Signatures are horrible at detecting new attacks ● Signature based security is easily bypassed ● Very few companies EVER look at the AV logs
  • 35. The Simple Truths ● Low hanging fruit is the bread and butter of AV ● These signatures are sometimes the best indicators of compromise you could hope for. Like finding PWDUMP on a Domain Controller ● Getting every piece of tooling past AV is actually pretty hard.
  • 36. The Hard Truth Stop bagging on AV. It’s actually much more valuable than you might think. If it does happen to be junk, remove it.
  • 37. Roll your own crypto / software is stupid vs Blinky Boxes don’t fix anything!
  • 38. The Problem ● Blinky Boxes from $Vendor rarely do any good ● Building your own software to do what the Blinky Boxes do rarely results in a finished product ● Building your own authentication and cryptography is hard to do well, and usually best left to frameworks
  • 39. The Simple Truths ● We are telling companies that they can’t really do either, buy the solution, or build it. This results in miscommunications of capabilities and project timelines.
  • 40. The Hard Truth Blinky Boxes actually can have solid results IF infosec people actually invest the time in configuring and using them as intended
  • 42. The Problem ● Legacy devices, IoT, all seem to get a “pass” when it comes to security policy and regulations. ● Legacy devices and software are the results of the natural churn of a company and should be planned for and if possible, mitigated.
  • 43. The Simple Truths ● Legacy systems and software should not be given security exceptions, they should be mitigated in other ways. ● Infosec professionals need to be advocates for this change and not lay responsibilities elsewhere.
  • 44. The Hard Truth Legacy systems or software have security solutions, we need to work with the maintainers and developers to find them and stop screaming and whining that it’s not a 100% solution.
  • 45. Just [Sanitize Input, Disable NTLM Auth, WPAD, LLMNR, NetBIOS, Macros]
  • 46. The Problem ● InfoSec Professionals love to say “just” do this, or “just” do that. Lack of experience in performing (and/or scaling) the fix is usually the cause.
  • 47. The Simple Truths ● Disabling NetBIOS, WPAD, or LLMNR is difficult because the settings are per-user, per-device on Windows. ● Sanitizing input isn’t always easy to do, depending on the framework used. Especially if the original developer no longer maintains the code. ● Office Macros are widely used for legitimate purposes, and are regularly tied to finance.
  • 48. The Hard Truth Swallowing our own medicine is hard. “Just” because you can implement a fix on your test lab or last job, doesn’t mean it scales or even works at a company level for this one.
  • 50. The Problem - “Security is a Feeling” -- Chris Nickerson - It’s very hard to measure feelings as they are arbitrary and change constantly. - It’s hard to derive how many breaches were prevented (proving a negative isn’t easy)
  • 51. The Simple Truths - We need to start performing actions in a measurable way - No, you can’t measure a lack of “breach”, but you can measure: - How many new rules were created - Asset coverage (% servers forwarding logs) - What coverage of the ATT&CK framework you have - Time to detection (with sophistication modifiers) - Time to eradication (with sophistication modifiers) - A phishing domain that was found BEFORE the attack - Weird behavior on a workstation before the attackers made it to prod - Malicious insiders detected before they stole something
  • 52. The Hard Truth We need to start measuring failures as well as successes. Oh and hey Red Teams/Pentest Teams.. Please remember that getting caught is SUCCESS.
  • 53. I.T. sucks at Asset Management!
  • 54. The Problem - Asset management has been I.T.’s domain for ages - Usually it’s focused around the procurement and de-commissioning processes. - Cloud based assets can appear and then disappear from networks in minutes. - Wireless networks can make tracking of new assets difficult.
  • 55. The Simple Truths - Tracking assets outside of physical hardware is not a priority for I.T. - The security teams usually have all the logs needed to track down assets in multiple ways once an incident occurs
  • 56. The Hard Truth Why isn’t it InfoSec’s job to perform asset management? Why do we keep passing the blame to those who our priorities aren’t shared with?
  • 58. Things that didn’t make the list but are just as in need of introspection... 1. There aren’t enough infosec people (because we only want senior people) 2. We don’t have enough time (because we can’t hire / afford enough people) 3. No one else cares about security (yup, that’s our job) 4. Infosec Sales people are charlatans (nope, they are sales, not security) 5. Infosec has so much drama (drama only works with an audience) 6. Laser focus on edge cases when the basics is what every sucks at (the basics are actually pretty hard because they are so general) 7. AI / ML is the end of the world (yup, i’m with you, F#$% fighting Terminator) 8. General apathy (ya.. not sure how to fix this one) 9. Perfection required vs Good enough (Perfectionists are just wasting time)
  • 59. The End. THANK YOU! Rob Fuller @mubix on Twitter mubix@hak5.org THANK YOU BRUCON!!!