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OpenDNS Security Talk
The Role of DNS in Botnet Command & Control (C&C)

Please Watch the Recording via the Link Posted in
the Comment Section Below for Context!
Topics   DNS REFRESHER.
Domain Name System
     Refresher
How It Works?



     STUB       RECURSIVE       AUTHORITATIVE
     CLIENTS     NAME SERVERS     NAME SERVERS

                                         root

                                          tld

                                       domain.tld
So It’s a Protocol? Or a Database? No, It’s Both!

           REQUEST                 DISTRIBUTED
          PROTOCOL	

               DATABASE	

              	

            QUERY	

                 RESOURCE
           domain name	

                                     RECORDS	

           RESPONSE	

              e.g. domain name
                                       = IP address	

           e.g. IP address	





            ANY DEVICE          RECURSIVE & AUTHORIATIVE
          ANY APPLICATION            NAME SERVERS
Role of DNS in
Internet Threats
(including Botnet C&C)
IRC, P2P
and 100s more

                Infected
                device
                “phones
                home”.



                Without user
                interaction,
                confidential
                data leaked to
                p2p.botnet.cn.


                Hacker collects
                data via botnet
                controller
                or bot peers.




DATA THEFT
Hackers Add Threat Mobility via DNS to Thwart Reactive Defenses

         IP FLUX via DNS RECORDS                                      DOMAIN FLUX via DGA
       SAME QUERY, DIFFERENT RESPONSES                          DIFFERENT QUERIES, SAME RESPONSE

   paypalz.com   ad.malware.cn     p2p.botnet.com            paypalz.com     maltesefalcon.cn      kjasdfsdfsaa.com
     = 1.1.1.1      = 2.2.2.2         = 3.3.3.3                = 1.1.1.1         = 2.2.2.2             = 3.3.3.3

   paypalz.com   ad.malware.cn     p2p.botnet.com            paypals.com         visitmalta.cn     kjasdfaasdf.com
     = 1.1.1.2      = 2.2.2.3         = 3.3.3.4                = 1.1.1.1           = 2.2.2.2           = 3.3.3.3

   paypalz.com   ad.malware.cn     p2p.botnet.com            paypall.com         maltwhisky.cn     ijiewfsfsjst.com
     = 1.1.1.3      = 2.2.2.4         = 3.3.3.5                = 1.1.1.1           = 2.2.2.2           = 3.3.3.3




                                                                                                 Must Shutdown or
                                                                                                 Block All…
                                                                                                 •  Content Servers.
                                                                                                 •  Name Servers.
                          ns.botnet.com       ns.bonet.com        ns.bonet.com                   … via DNS Records.
                             = 4.4.4.4          = 4.4.4.5           = 4.4.4.6

                            DOUBLE IP FLUX via DNS RECORDS
                            SAME NAME SERVER, DIFFERENT RESPONSES
Hackers Distribute Botnet’s Architecture via DNS to Thwart Takedown
Hackers Distribute Botnet’s Architecture via DNS to Thwart Takedown
(continued…)
Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling
to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies
(build 1)




 An Infected Device
 within On-Premises
 Network is Just
 One Vector
                                   ISP



                                         PROXY




                             PROXY


                      FIREWALL
Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling
to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies
(build 2)




 An Infected Device
 within On-Premises
 Network is Just
 One Vector
                                           ISP



                                                 PROXY




                where is
                11010.
                      where is
                cnc.tld?
                      00110.where is   PROXY
                      cnc.tld?
                            01010.
                            cnc.tld?



                          FIREWALL
Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling
to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies
(build 3)




                                         where is
 An Infected Device                      11010.
                                               where is
 within On-Premises                      cnc.tld?
                                               00110.where is
                                               cnc.tld?
 Network is Just                                     01010.
                                                     cnc.tld?
 One Vector
                                   ISP



                                                                PROXY




                             PROXY


                      FIREWALL
Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling
to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies
(build 4)




 An Infected Device                       11010.
                                         cnc.tld is
                                                  11010.
 within On-Premises                             cnc.tld is11010.
                                         at 01110
                                                at 11100 cnc.tld is
 Network is Just                                         at 11011
 One Vector
                                   ISP



                                                                  PROXY




                             PROXY


                      FIREWALL
Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling
to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies
(build 5)




 DNS TUNNELING
 An Infected Device TXT records.
 •  Bi-directional ~110kbps using
 within On-Premises
 1998 -- Concept published.
 Network is community discussed.
                     Just
 2004 -- Security
 One--Vectorcommunity created exploit.
 2008 Security
  2011 -- 1st documented botnet to exploit it.              ISP



                                                                  PROXY




                            11010.
                           cnc.tld is
                                    11010.
                                  cnc.tld is11010.
                           at 01110
                                           cnc.tld is
                                                        PROXY
                                  at 11100
                                           at 11011




                                         FIREWALL
If Hackers Have Evolved,
So Should Your Defense-in-Depth Strategy!

   PAST                                PRESENT
                                        & FUTURE
              Hackers seek                         Cybercriminals seek
              fame & glory.                        fortune & politics.



              Malware disrupts                     Botnets penetrate
              your business.                       your networks.
                                                   And roaming & mobile
                                                   devices enter your networks.

              Your highest costs are               Your highest costs are
              lost productivity                    leaked data &
              & IT remediation time.               legal audit fees.


              After detection,                     After preventing as much
              you attempt to                       as reasonable since 100%
              prevent 100%.                        is no longer realizable,
              There’s a lot of                     you contain the rest.
              vectors, so a lot
              of solutions.
Role of DNS in
Internet-Wide Security
Visualize Threats & Characterize Patterns in Big Data
Visualizing
One Day’s
Worth of
Blocked
Malware,
Botnet, or
Phishing
Domain
Requests
What’s Next for DNS-based Security?
•  More domain names to track.

   »  Internet still exponentially growing.

   »  ICANN received 2000+ applications for new TLDs (Top-Level Domains).

•  Bigger and more complex DNS packets.

   »  DNS tunneling by botnets.

   »  DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail).

   »  AAAA records for IPv6 addresses.

•  More DNS traffic.

   »  More persistent threats due to DIY (do-it-yourself) kits for cybercriminals.

   »  Browsers predictively pre-caching DNS requests.
Thank You for Attending!
Continue the discussion:




              Email: david@opendns.com
              Twitter: @davidu

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Role of DNS in Botnet Command and Control

  • 1. OpenDNS Security Talk The Role of DNS in Botnet Command & Control (C&C) Please Watch the Recording via the Link Posted in the Comment Section Below for Context!
  • 2. Topics DNS REFRESHER.
  • 3. Domain Name System Refresher
  • 4. How It Works? STUB RECURSIVE AUTHORITATIVE CLIENTS NAME SERVERS NAME SERVERS root tld domain.tld
  • 5. So It’s a Protocol? Or a Database? No, It’s Both! REQUEST DISTRIBUTED PROTOCOL DATABASE QUERY RESOURCE domain name RECORDS RESPONSE e.g. domain name = IP address e.g. IP address ANY DEVICE RECURSIVE & AUTHORIATIVE ANY APPLICATION NAME SERVERS
  • 6.
  • 7. Role of DNS in Internet Threats (including Botnet C&C)
  • 8. IRC, P2P and 100s more Infected device “phones home”. Without user interaction, confidential data leaked to p2p.botnet.cn. Hacker collects data via botnet controller or bot peers. DATA THEFT
  • 9. Hackers Add Threat Mobility via DNS to Thwart Reactive Defenses IP FLUX via DNS RECORDS DOMAIN FLUX via DGA SAME QUERY, DIFFERENT RESPONSES DIFFERENT QUERIES, SAME RESPONSE paypalz.com ad.malware.cn p2p.botnet.com paypalz.com maltesefalcon.cn kjasdfsdfsaa.com = 1.1.1.1 = 2.2.2.2 = 3.3.3.3 = 1.1.1.1 = 2.2.2.2 = 3.3.3.3 paypalz.com ad.malware.cn p2p.botnet.com paypals.com visitmalta.cn kjasdfaasdf.com = 1.1.1.2 = 2.2.2.3 = 3.3.3.4 = 1.1.1.1 = 2.2.2.2 = 3.3.3.3 paypalz.com ad.malware.cn p2p.botnet.com paypall.com maltwhisky.cn ijiewfsfsjst.com = 1.1.1.3 = 2.2.2.4 = 3.3.3.5 = 1.1.1.1 = 2.2.2.2 = 3.3.3.3 Must Shutdown or Block All… •  Content Servers. •  Name Servers. ns.botnet.com ns.bonet.com ns.bonet.com … via DNS Records. = 4.4.4.4 = 4.4.4.5 = 4.4.4.6 DOUBLE IP FLUX via DNS RECORDS SAME NAME SERVER, DIFFERENT RESPONSES
  • 10. Hackers Distribute Botnet’s Architecture via DNS to Thwart Takedown
  • 11. Hackers Distribute Botnet’s Architecture via DNS to Thwart Takedown (continued…)
  • 12. Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies (build 1) An Infected Device within On-Premises Network is Just One Vector ISP PROXY PROXY FIREWALL
  • 13. Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies (build 2) An Infected Device within On-Premises Network is Just One Vector ISP PROXY where is 11010. where is cnc.tld? 00110.where is PROXY cnc.tld? 01010. cnc.tld? FIREWALL
  • 14. Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies (build 3) where is An Infected Device 11010. where is within On-Premises cnc.tld? 00110.where is cnc.tld? Network is Just 01010. cnc.tld? One Vector ISP PROXY PROXY FIREWALL
  • 15. Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies (build 4) An Infected Device 11010. cnc.tld is 11010. within On-Premises cnc.tld is11010. at 01110 at 11100 cnc.tld is Network is Just at 11011 One Vector ISP PROXY PROXY FIREWALL
  • 16. Hackers Add Stealth via DNS Tunneling to Thwart Firewalls & Proxies (build 5) DNS TUNNELING An Infected Device TXT records. •  Bi-directional ~110kbps using within On-Premises 1998 -- Concept published. Network is community discussed. Just 2004 -- Security One--Vectorcommunity created exploit. 2008 Security 2011 -- 1st documented botnet to exploit it. ISP PROXY 11010. cnc.tld is 11010. cnc.tld is11010. at 01110 cnc.tld is PROXY at 11100 at 11011 FIREWALL
  • 17. If Hackers Have Evolved, So Should Your Defense-in-Depth Strategy! PAST PRESENT & FUTURE Hackers seek Cybercriminals seek fame & glory. fortune & politics. Malware disrupts Botnets penetrate your business. your networks. And roaming & mobile devices enter your networks. Your highest costs are Your highest costs are lost productivity leaked data & & IT remediation time. legal audit fees. After detection, After preventing as much you attempt to as reasonable since 100% prevent 100%. is no longer realizable, There’s a lot of you contain the rest. vectors, so a lot of solutions.
  • 18. Role of DNS in Internet-Wide Security
  • 19.
  • 20. Visualize Threats & Characterize Patterns in Big Data
  • 22.
  • 23. What’s Next for DNS-based Security? •  More domain names to track. »  Internet still exponentially growing. »  ICANN received 2000+ applications for new TLDs (Top-Level Domains). •  Bigger and more complex DNS packets. »  DNS tunneling by botnets. »  DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail). »  AAAA records for IPv6 addresses. •  More DNS traffic. »  More persistent threats due to DIY (do-it-yourself) kits for cybercriminals. »  Browsers predictively pre-caching DNS requests.
  • 24. Thank You for Attending! Continue the discussion: Email: david@opendns.com Twitter: @davidu