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Explore adventures in the underland:
Forensic techniques against hackers evading the hook
Paula Januszkiewicz
CQURE: CEO, Penetration Tester / Security Expert
CQURE Academy: Trainer
MVP: Enterprise Security, MCT
Contact: paula@cqure.us | http://cqure.us
@paulacqure
@CQUREAcademy
Disk
Demo: Data on Disk
Analysis
Demo: Data Recovery
Memory
Handles
Processes
Hidden Processes (ActiveProcessLinks)
Files that can be extracted
Threads
Modules
Registry
API Hooks
Services
UserAssist
Shellbags
ShimCache
Event Logs
Timeline
Demo: Extracting Logs from Memory
Demo: Dump Analysis
Entry Information
Allows to build an attack timeline
Allows to define an entry point and anomalies
Collects and records system events to the Windows event log
It is free and easy to set up
Good practices
Filter out uninteresting events (image loads etc.)
Make sure event log is big enough
Centralize the events in a separate server
You can download Sysmon from Sysinternals.com
Demo: Sysmon in Action
Filtering Rules
Include thread injections into lsass:
<CreateRemoteThread onmatch="include">
<TargetImage condition="image">lsass.exe</TargetImage>
</CreateRemoteThread >
Exclude all Microsoft-signed image loads:
<ImageLoad onmatch="exclude">
<Signature condition="contains">Microsoft</Signature>
<Signature condition="contains">Windows</Signature>
</ImageLoad>
Recorded Events
Event ID 1: Process creation
Event ID 2: A process changed a file creation time
Event ID 3: Network connection
Event ID 4: Sysmon service state changed
Event ID 5: Process terminated
Event ID 6: Driver loaded
Event ID 7: Image loaded
Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread
Event ID 9: RawAccessRead
Event ID 10: ProcessAccess
Demo: Sysmon Customized
Demo: Sysmon and Network
+ getting info about the IP addresses
 Make sure all tracing features
on the drive and in the system
are enabled: USN, Prefech etc.
 Image first then play
 Create Incident Response
Procedure (most of the
Customers we start the
adventure with do not have it…)
NIC 2017 conference session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techniques against hackers evading the hook

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NIC 2017 conference session: Explore adventures in the underland: forensic techniques against hackers evading the hook

  • 1.
  • 2. Explore adventures in the underland: Forensic techniques against hackers evading the hook Paula Januszkiewicz CQURE: CEO, Penetration Tester / Security Expert CQURE Academy: Trainer MVP: Enterprise Security, MCT Contact: paula@cqure.us | http://cqure.us @paulacqure @CQUREAcademy
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 7. Demo: Data on Disk Analysis
  • 8.
  • 10. Memory Handles Processes Hidden Processes (ActiveProcessLinks) Files that can be extracted Threads Modules Registry API Hooks Services UserAssist Shellbags ShimCache Event Logs Timeline
  • 11. Demo: Extracting Logs from Memory
  • 13.
  • 14. Entry Information Allows to build an attack timeline Allows to define an entry point and anomalies Collects and records system events to the Windows event log It is free and easy to set up Good practices Filter out uninteresting events (image loads etc.) Make sure event log is big enough Centralize the events in a separate server You can download Sysmon from Sysinternals.com
  • 15. Demo: Sysmon in Action
  • 16. Filtering Rules Include thread injections into lsass: <CreateRemoteThread onmatch="include"> <TargetImage condition="image">lsass.exe</TargetImage> </CreateRemoteThread > Exclude all Microsoft-signed image loads: <ImageLoad onmatch="exclude"> <Signature condition="contains">Microsoft</Signature> <Signature condition="contains">Windows</Signature> </ImageLoad> Recorded Events Event ID 1: Process creation Event ID 2: A process changed a file creation time Event ID 3: Network connection Event ID 4: Sysmon service state changed Event ID 5: Process terminated Event ID 6: Driver loaded Event ID 7: Image loaded Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread Event ID 9: RawAccessRead Event ID 10: ProcessAccess
  • 18. Demo: Sysmon and Network + getting info about the IP addresses
  • 19.  Make sure all tracing features on the drive and in the system are enabled: USN, Prefech etc.  Image first then play  Create Incident Response Procedure (most of the Customers we start the adventure with do not have it…)

Editor's Notes

  1. [60] Normalnie takie rzczy sa po patchowaniu. Skrypt – informacja – RDP Operational Prefetch – mimikatz.
  2. [50]How can we use MSDCC2 within the attack? Is it really useless for bad guys? 1. Indexing service
  3. [50]How can we use MSDCC2 within the attack? Is it really useless for bad guys?
  4. [50]How can we use MSDCC2 within the attack? Is it really useless for bad guys?
  5. [50]How can we use MSDCC2 within the attack? Is it really useless for bad guys?
  6. [50]How can we use MSDCC2 within the attack? Is it really useless for bad guys?
  7. [30]
  8. [50]How can we use MSDCC2 within the attack? Is it really useless for bad guys?
  9. [50]How can we use MSDCC2 within the attack? Is it really useless for bad guys?
  10. [50]How can we use MSDCC2 within the attack? Is it really useless for bad guys?
  11. Licence: Common