Short Transitive Signatures For Directed Trees
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This document summarizes a research paper presented at a conference from February 27-March 2, 2012 in San Francisco. The paper introduces a new efficient transitive signature scheme for directed trees. It builds on previous work on transitive signatures and proposes a new primitive called Hashing with Common Prefix Proofs (HCPP) to avoid recomputing signatures when elements are inserted. The construction provides a balance between the time to compute and verify signatures and proofs. Some open problems are also identified, such as improving the tradeoff and developing stateless transitive signatures for directed trees.
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Short Transitive Signatures For Directed Trees
- 1. San Francisco, Feb 27-Mar 2 2012 Short Transitive Signatures for Directed Trees Philippe Camacho and Alejandro Hevia University of Chile
- 2. How do we sign a graph? a b
- 4. Transitive signature schemes [MR02,BN05,SMJ05] Combiner
- 5. Landscape
- 6. Transitive Signatures for Directed Trees
- 8. Our Results Examples Time tosignedge / verifypathsignature Time to compute a pathsignature Size of pathsignature
- 9. Security [MR02] σBC E
- 11. Pre/Post Order Tree Traversal a b h d i j k c e f g Pre order: a b c d e f g h i j k Post order: c e f g d b i j k h a
- 12. Property of Pre/Post order Traversal • Proposition [Dietz82] a b h d c i j k e f g Pre order: a b c d e f g h i j k Post order: c e f g d b i j k h a
- 13. Idea a b h d c i j k e f g How do we avoid Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 recomputing a lot of Pre a b c d e f g h h i i j j k k signatures when an element is inserted? Post c e f g d d b b i i j j k k h h a a
- 15. Trivial Order Data Structure A Toy Example Elements -∞ d a e b c +∞ 0 250 1000 500 675 750 875 Labels
- 16. a b d c Pre a b c d +∞ -∞ 0 500 750 875 937 1000 Post c d b a +∞ -∞ 0 125 187 250 500 1000
- 17. Trivial Order Data Structure -∞ d a b c +∞ 0 250 500 750 875 1000 New CRHF! It allows to: • compress the strings • efficiently compare them from their hashes
- 18. HASHING WITH COMMON PREFIX PROOFS
- 19. The Idea
- 20. Security
- 23. Generating & Verifying Proofs
- 24. Generating & Verifying Proofs
- 25. Security • Proposition: If the n-BDHI assumption holds then the previous construction is a secure HCPP family. • Proof (idea)
- 29. Trivial Order Data Structure d a b c 0 250 500 750 875 1000
- 30. New Order Data Structure d e a b c Use a binary tree to obtain a 1 an «incremental» order data structure d 0 b 1 1 e c
- 31. a b d c ODPre ODPost a a 1 0 b b 1 0 c c 1 1 d d
- 32. Trade off
- 33. Conclusion and Open Problems • Efficient transitive signature scheme for directed trees • Possible to balance the time to compute and to verify the proof • Based on a general new primitive HCPP • New constructions / applications for HCPP • Can we improve the trade off? • Stateless transitive signatures for directed trees
Editor's Notes
- IDEAThisisjointworkwith Alejandro HeviaTODODetailsintroDetailsResultsDetailsTradeoffDetails IDEA (construction, slide 13)
- IdeasSign a graphGraphishugeGraphisdynamic
- IDEASExplore trivial solutions (usingstandard digital signatures)1st solutionThesignersignseachedge => O(nk) bits => OK forsignerbutunefficientforverifier2nd solutionSignersignseachpath => worst case mayhaveto compute $n$ signatureswhenadding a node (think of a treewith a new root)OK forverifierbutunefficientforthesignerCan we do better?
- IDEAYes we canMicali / Rivest introducedthe concept of transitivesignaturesCombine edgesignaturewithoutsecretBest of bothworldsSignersignsonlytheedgesPathsignatureremain of constantsizethankstotheCombiner
- IDEAHowever, thisworksonlyforundirectedgraphsDTSisstill open[Hohn03] : DTS => TrapdoorGroupswithInfeasibleinversion (also open)
- IDEAWhat can we do?Give upTrytotackle a simplerproblemlikesigning a directedtreeWhy? Stillinteresting (theory) and can lead tosomeapplicationsmilitarychain of command: provesomeofficerisundertheorders of a general
- IDEAFirstworkbyYiSize of signature: n log (n log n) bits =>improves trivial solutionsSecurity basedonspecial RSA relatedassumptionNevenReduces thesizeto n log n bitsSimplersolution and complexityassumption
- IDEATrade offTime measuredcryptographicoperations (groupmultiplications, groupexponentiation, bilinearmapapplication)Sign: multiplicationsVerify: bilinearmapapplication (4) and groupexponentiation (2)Compute pathsignature: groupmultiplication and groupexponentiationProceedings:imprecision lambda n^(1/lambda) => lambda (n/k)^(1/lambda)ExampleLambda=1 signingedges/verifyingisconstant ; compute pathsignatureisexpensiveLambda = 2 signingedges/verifyingisconstant ; compute pathsignaturesignificativelyreducedLambda = log n allcomplexitiesbecomelogarithmic
- IDEAAdversaryasksthesignertoinsert and signdynamically new edgeonthegraphExampleAdversarywinsif he can output a validsignaturefor a paththatisoutsidethetransitiveclosureHerethetransitiveclosureis in blue (edge in plain and dots). A winsif (B,E) has a validsignaturebecause (B,E) isoutside G*
- OJO! DIFICILOurconstructionreliesonthe pre/post ordertreetraversal. In a preodertreetraversalwevisitfirsttherootthenwetraverserecursivelythefirstchild, and thenwetraversetheotherchildren. In a post ordertreetraversalwetraversethefirstchild, thentheotherchildren and finallywevisittheroot at theend.IDEADepthfirsttraversalFirstgodownthetree, thenvisitthesiblingsSeveralways of doingthat: pre order / post orderDepthfirsttraversal pre ordertraversalVisittheroot and thenrecursively, traversethefirstchild, secondchild and so onDepthfirsttraversalbutwritedownthenodewhenvisitedforthefirst timeDepthfirsttraversak post orderTraverse (recursively) thefirstchild, thesecondchild and so on and thenvisittherootDepthfirsttraversalbutwritedownthenodewhenvisitedforthelast timeExample
- IDEADietzpropertycharacterizestheexistence of a path in thetreegiventhe pre/post orderlistEg: b <(pre) g and g<(post) b
- Notes(O) So thepreviouspropertymaygiveusan idea(1) Whynotconsiderthe pre and post orderlist as tocheckfortheexistence of a pathForexamplewecouldsign a messageformedbythename of thenode, its position in the pre-orderlist and its position in the post orderlist. Thenwepublishthesesignervalues and a verifierwillconvinceherselfthatindeedthereis a pathifthesignature are valid and Dietzconditionissatisfied.Howeversomethingbadhappenswhenweinsert a new edge (2). A lot of positions forthenodeshavechanged. (3) This mean thesigner has still a lot of work and thismayalsoraisesomesecurityissues as thecombinercould replay someoldmessages.Theotherremainingoperations (4) (lookingforsignedmessage) , (5) checkingsignatures and Dietzcondition are fineSo howtoweavoidrecomputing a lot of signatureswhenanelementisinserted?
- NotesThepreviousissueissolvedbywhatwecallanorder data structureThe idea of such data structureissimplytoallowdynamicinsertion of elements and efficientcomparison of thoseelementsItwasalsoproposedbyDietz in thesamepaper.Assumethereis a total orderontheelementsthere are twooperationsODInsert(X,Y) thatreturnsanelement Z whichlies in between X and YCompare(X,Y) returs True iff X islowerthan Y wrtthe total order.
- NotesExampleInsert a right in the middle of –inf and +infInsert b between a and +inf…N successive insertions may lead to cut size of the universe by a half each time. Our universe must be of size 2^n => n bits to encode each label for an element
- NotesGiventhis simple ODDatastructurewe are readyto describe thebasicconstruction…
- NotesTosummarizeWestill use standard digital signaturesWeimprovedNeven’ssignaturesizefor a pathby a factor of (log n)In thefollowingwewillseehowtoshrinkthesize of thesignatureusing a new CRHF whichwillallowusto compare efficientlystringsthroughtheir hashes
- Thisiswhat I will describe next: hash functionsthatenableproofsforcommonprefix
- Hereisthe ideaA and B share a commonprefixuntil position 4Alice wantstocheckifthisis true (1)Butfirstthestrings are hashed (2)So whatwewantis (3)A CRHF withproof so thatbysendingthe hash values and somecertificate (4) Alice can be convincedthat A and B are equal up to position 4 (5) byrunning a verificationalgorithm
- Thesecuritydefinitionis quite straightforwardAdvisgiventhepublickeywhichcorrespondsto a randomrepresentant of the hash familyAdvwinsif he can compute strings A,B anindex i and a proof Pi suchthattheverificationpassesdespitethat A and B are differentuntil position i.Observe thisdefinitionimpliescollisionresistance: just set i=n in thedefinition.
- Ourconstruction uses bilinearmaps and itssecurityreliesonthe n-BDHI assumptionintroducedbyBoneh and Boyen.Thisassumptionsaysthatgiven (g,g^s, g^(s^2),…,g^(s^n)) where g is a generator of group G and s israndom in Z_p, it’shardto compute e(g,g)^(1/s).
- Let’s describe our hash functionSetup => generatestheparameterforthe n-BDHIassumption. Thisparameteristhepublickey (implicitdescription of our hash function)Evaluatingthe hash function of a binarystring M consists of multiplyingallthe g^(s^i) wherethereis a one in theith position of string ME.g: M = 1001 then H(M) = g^s g^{s^4}
- Let’sseehowto compute and checkproofsAssumestrings A and B are equal up to position 5.Firstwe compute Delta, thequotient of H(A) and H(B). We note thatthe factor until s^5 cancelsout so we can interpret Delta as theproduct of theg^s^jC[j] where C isanarrayfilledbyzeros, 1s and -1s and suchthatthefivefirstvalues are zeros.
- So hereisour Delta againThe idea to compute theproofistoshiftthisarraybackwards in $i$ positionsConcretelywe do itbycomputing Delta^{s^{i+1}} whcih can be done withoutthesecret $s$ becausethe $i$ firstvalues of $C$ are $0$.So in thisexamplewehave Pi = ….Tochecktheproofweshift forwards Pi usingthebilinearmap and checkthatweobtain back Delta
- I’llgivesomeintuitionaboutthesecurityproofAssumeAdvmanagestoprove A,B share a commonprefixuntil position 3, althoughthesestringsdiffer at thissame position. As theproofgivenbytheadversary leads to a successfulverificationthismeansimplicitlythat Pi isequalto Delta^(1/s^4). We can seethatfromthisvalue g^{-1/s}g^sg^{s^2} we can break the n-BDHI assumption.
- This hashfunction has anadditionalinterestingproperty: itis incremental. Thismeanswe can updateefficiently hash valueswithouthavingto hash thewholepreimage. Forexampleifwehave A=1000 and B=10001, I can compute H(B) using H(A) and a groupmultplication.
- Recallthatwewantto be ableto compare stringsorvaluesthroughtheir hashes. So howtowe compare strings once we are abletocheckthewhethertwostrings share a commonprefixuntil a given position? Simplybyobservingthat A<B …..E.g.: …
- Solet’sseenowhowwe can makeeverythingworktogether.
- Indeedwe are almost done, butthereisstill a technicaldetail. Ifwe use the trivial orderdatastructurewiththe new hash function, the time thesignerwillneedwheninserting a new nodewill be O(n). Thereasonisthatthe new labelreturnedbytheODDatastructurewill be quite differentfromalreadycomputedones.So in ordertosolvethisissuewe are goingto use a new orderdatastructure so that a new label Z correspondingtoaninsertionbetween X and Y will share every bit exceptonewith X or Y.ARG!!!
- HereishowthisODStructureworks. We use a binarytreewiththefollowingconvention. Given a node, allthenodesbelongingtotheleftsubtree are smallerthan X and allthenodesbelongingtotherightsubtree are biggerthan X. Thenweassociatethe symbol $0$ for a leftedge and $1$ for a rightedge. And a labelfor a nodewill be theconcatenation of the 0 and 1 fromroottothenode. Comparingtwolabelswillconsistssimply in comparingthemthroughthelexicographicalorder.Hereisanexample.You can convinceyourselfitis incremental
- Justtoclarify a bit let’sseethe full construction at work.
- BeforeconcludingI’llgive a fewwordsaboutthetradeoff.First idea: use analphabet of size 2^k instead of $0,1$. Reduce thenumber of cryptographicoperationsby a factor of kDivide initialstring in chunks of size (n/k)^(1/lambda).Hash thesechunks, obtain a new symbol foreachchunk => new stringreducedby a factor of (n/k)^(1/lambda) (symbols). After lambda levelsweget a constantsize hash value.Provingcommonprefixonlyinvolves a chunk of size (n/k)^(1/lambda) at eachlevelbecausethepreviouschunks are implicitlyequals.Do notmentiondetailsAlphabetChunksOnlyneedto compute theproofforonechunk