1. Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems, such as those connected
w ith reality, existence, know ledge, values,reason, mind, and language.[1][2]
Philosophy is distinguished from other w ays of
addressing such problems by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational argument.[3]
In more
casual speech, by extension, "philosophy" can refer to "the most basic beliefs, concepts, and attitudes of an individual or
group"
The original meaning of the word philosophy comes from the Greek roots philo- meaning "love" and -
sophos, or "wisdom." When someone studies philosophy they want to understand how and why
people do certain things and how to live a good life. In other words, they want to know the meaning
of life. Add the suffix -er to philosophy, and you get a word for someone whose job it is to think these
big thoughts. w ww.vocabulary.com/dictionary/philosophy
Critical examination of the rational grounds of our most fundamental beliefs and logical analysis of the basic
concepts employed in the expression of such beliefs. Philosophy may also be defined as reflection on the varieties
of human experience, or as the rational, methodical, and systematic consideration of the topics that are of greatest
concern to humanity. Philosophical inquiry is a central element in the intellectual history of many civilizations.
Difficulty in achieving a consensus about the definition of the discipline partly reflects the fact that philosophers
have frequently come to it from different fields and have preferred to reflect on different areas of experience
philosophy
[fi-los-uh-fee] Spell Syllables
 Examples
 Word Origin
noun, plural philosophies.
1.
the rational investigation of the truths and principles of being,knowledge, or conduct.
2.
any of the three branches, namely natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and metaphysical
philosophy, that are accepted ascomposing this study.
3.
a particular system of thought based on such study or investigation:
the philosophy of Spinoza.
4.
the critical study of the basic principles and concepts of a particularbranch of knowledge, especially with a vi
ew to improving orreconstituting them:
the philosophy of science.
5.
a system of principles for guidance in practical affairs.
6.
an attitude of rationality, patience, composure, and calm in thepresence of troubles or annoyances.
Epistimology
Epistemology (ἐπιστήμη, episteme-knowledge, understanding; λόγος, logos-studyof) is the branch of philosophy concernedwith
the nature and scope of know ledge[1][2]
and is also referred to as "theory of know ledge". It questions w hat knowledge is and how it
can be acquired, and the extent to w hich know ledge pertinent to any given subject or entity can be acquired. Much of the debate in
this field has focused on the philosophical analysis of the nature of know ledge and how it relates to connected notions such

2. as truth,belief, and justification. The term "epistemology" w as introduced by the Scottish philosopher James FrederickFerrier (1808–
1864).
a branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, methods,and limits of human knowledge.
ipistemology, thestudy of the nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge. Theterm is derived from the
Greekepistēmē (“knowledge”) and logos (“reason”), and accordingly the field is sometimes referred to as the theory of
knowledge. Epistemology has a long history, beginning with theancient Greeks and continuing to the present. Along
with metaphysics, logic, and ethics, it is one of the four main branches of philosophy, and nearly every great philosopher has
contributed to it.
metaphysics, the philosophical studywhose objectis to determine the real nature of things—to determine the
meaning,structure,and principles ofwhatever is insofar as it is.Although this study is popularlyconceived as
referring to anything excessively subtle and highlytheoretical and although it has been subjected to many criticisms,
it is presented by metaphysicians as the mostfundamental and mostcomprehensive of inquiries,inasmuch as itis
concerned with reality as a whole.
Origin of the term
Etymologicallythe term metaphysics is unenlightening.Itmeans “whatcomes after physics”;it was the phrase used
by early students of Aristotle to refer to the contents of Aristotle’s treatise on whathe himselfcalled “firstphilosophy,”
and was used as the title of this treatise by Andronicus ofRhodes,one of the first of Aristotle’s editors.Aristotle had
distinguished two tasks for the philosopher:first,to investigate the nature and properties ofwhat exists in the natural,
or sensible,world,and second,to explore the characteristics of“Being as such” and to inquire into the character of
“the substance thatis free from movement,” or the mostreal of all things,the intelligible realityon which everything in
the world of nature was thought to be causallydependent.The first constituted “second philosophy” and was carried
out primarilyin the Aristotelian treatise now known as the Physica; the second,which Aristotle had also referred to as
“theology” (because God was the unmoved mover in his system),is roughlythe subject matterofhis Metaphysica.
Modern readers ofAristotle are inclined to take both the Physica and theMetaphysica as philosophical treatises;the
distinction their titles suggestbetween an empirical and a conceptual inquiryhas little foundation.Aristotle was not
indifferentto factual material either in natural or in metaphysical philosophy,butequally he was notconcerned in
either case to frame theories for empirical testing.Itseems clear,nevertheless,thatif the two works had to be
distinguished,the Physica would have to be described as the more empirical,justbecause itdeals with things that
are objects ofthe senses,whatAristotle himselfcalled “sensible substance”;the subjectmatter of the Metaphysica,
“that which is eternal, free of movement,and separatelyexistent,” is on any account more remote.It is also evident
that the connection marked in the original titles is a genuine one:the inquiries aboutnature carried outin
thePhysica lead on naturally to the more fundamental inquiries aboutBeing as such thatare taken up in
the Metaphysica and indeed go along with the latter to make up a single philosophical discipline.
The background to Aristotle’s divisions is to be found in the thought of Plato, with whom Aristotle had many
disagreements butwhose basic ideas provided a framework within which much ofhis own thinking was
conducted. Plato, following the early Greek philosopherParmenides,who is known as the father of metaphysics,had
soughtto distinguish opinion,orbelief,from knowledge and to assign distinctobjects to each.Opinion,for Plato, was
a form of apprehension thatwas shifting and unclear,similar to seeing things in a dream or only through their
shadows;its objects were correspondinglyunstable.Knowledge,bycontrast, was whollylucid; it carried its own
guarantee againsterror,and the objects with which it was concerned were eternallywhat they were, and so were
exempt from change and the deceptive power to appear to be what they were not. Plato called the objects of
opinion phenomena,orappearances;he referred to the objects of knowledge as noumena (objects ofthe intelligence)
or quite simplyas realities.Much of the burden of his philosophical message was to call men’s attentions to these
contrasts and to impress them with the necessityto turn away from concern with mere phenomena to the
investigation oftrue reality. The education of the Platonic philosopher consisted preciselyin effecting this transition:

3. he was taughtto recognize the contradictions involved in appearances and to fix his gaze on the realities thatlay
behind them,the realities thatPlato himselfcalled Form s,or Ideas.Philosophyfor Plato was thus a call to recognize
the existence and overwhelming importance ofa setof higher realities thatordinarymen—even those,like the
Sophists ofthe time,who professed to be enlightened—entirelyignored.That there were such realities,or at least
that there was a serious case for thinking that there were,was a fundamental tenetin the discipline thatlater became
known as metaphysics.Conversely,much ofthe subsequentcontroversyaboutthe very possibilityof metaphysics
has turned on the acceptabilityof this tenet and on whether,if it is rejected,some alternative foundation can be
discovered on which the metaphysician can stand.
 QUIZZES
The nature of epistemology
Epistemology as a discipline
Why should there be a discipline such as epistemology? Aristotle(384–322 BCE) provided theanswer when he said that
philosophy begins in a kind of wonder or puzzlement. Nearly all human beings wish to comprehend the world they live in, and
many of them construct theories of various kinds to help them make sense of it. Because many aspects of the world defy easy
explanation, however, most peopleare likely to cease their efforts at some point and to content themselves with whatever degree
of understanding they have managed to achieve.
Unlike most people, philosophers are captivated—some would say obsessed—by theidea of understanding the world in the most
general terms possible. Accordingly, they attempt to construct theories that are synoptic, descriptively accurate, explanatorily
powerful, and in all other respects rationally defensible. In doing so, they carry the process of inquiry further than other people
tend to do, and this is what is meant by saying that they develop a philosophy about thesematters.
Like most people, epistemologists often begin their speculations with the assumption that they have a great deal of knowledge.
As they reflect upon what they presumably know, however, they discover that it is much less secure than they realized, and
indeed they come to think that many of what had been their firmest beliefs are dubious or even false. Such doubts arise from
certain anomalies in our experience of theworld. Although several of theseanomalies are discussed below in the section on the
history of epistemology, two in particular will be described in detail here in order to illustrate how they call into question our
common claims to knowledge about the world.
Two epistemological problems
KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
Most peoplehavenoticed that vision can play tricks. A straight stick submerged in water looks bent, though it is not; railroad
tracks seem to converge in the distance, but they do not; and a page of English-language print reflected in a mirror cannot be read
from left to right, though in all other circumstances it can. Each of these phenomena is misleading in some way. Anyonewho
believes that the stick is bent, that the railroad tracks converge, and so on is mistaken about how theworld really is.
Although these anomalies may seem simple and unproblematic at first, deeper consideration of them shows that just theopposite
is true. How does one know that the stick is not really bent and that the tracks do not really converge? Supposeone says that one
knows that the stick is not really bent because, when it is removed from the water, one can see that it is straight. But does seeing a
straight stick out of water providea good reason for thinking that, when it is in water, it is not bent? Supposeone says that the
tracks do not really converge because the train passes over them at thepoint where they seem to converge. But how does one
know that thewheels on thetrain do not converge at that point also? What justifies our preferring some of these beliefs to others,
especially when all of them are based upon what is seen? What one sees is that the stick in water is bent and that thestick out of
water is straight. Why then is thestick declared really to be straight? Why in effect is priority given to one perception over
another?
One possibleanswer is to say that vision is not sufficient to give knowledge of how things are. Vision needs to be “corrected”
with information derived from the other senses. Supposethen that a person asserts that his reason for believing that the stick in
water is straight is that, when thestick is in water, he can feel with his hands that it is straight. But what justifies him in believing
that his sense of touch is more reliable than his vision? After all, touch gives rise to misperceptions just as vision does. For
example, if a person chills one hand and warms the other and then puts both in a tub of lukewarm water, thewater will feel warm
to the cold hand and cold to the warm hand. Thus, thedifficulty cannot be resolved by appealing to input from the other senses.
Another possible responsewould begin by granting that none of thesenses is guaranteed to present things as they really are.
The belief that the stick is really straight, therefore, must be justified on the basis of some other form of awareness,
perhaps reason. But why should reason be accepted as infallible? It is often used imperfectly, as when one forgets, miscalculates,

4. or jumps to conclusions. Moreover, why should one trust reason if its conclusions run counter to those derived from sensation,
considering that sense experience is obviously the basis of much of what is known about the world?
Clearly, there is a network of difficulties here, and one will have to think hard in order to arrive at a compelling defense of the
apparently simpleclaim that the stick is truly straight. A person who accepts this challenge will, in effect, be addressing the larger
philosophical problem of our knowledge of the external world. That problem consists of two issues: how one can know whether
there is a reality that exists independently of sense experience, given that sense experience is ultimately theonly evidence one has
for the existence of anything, and how one can know what anything is really like, given that different kinds of sensory evidence
often conflict with each other.
I take "philosophy" to be an English word referring to a certain kind of thinking, a
certain kind of approach to a certain kind of problem. To explain those "certain kind
of"s would take a book; perhaps the best I can do here is gesture at what it is that
English-language philosophers do.
The main point, though, is that philosophy isn't distinguished so much by what it's
about as by the nature of the activity. The presentation of opinions, theories, or advice
isn't philosophy, no matter what the content. Doing philosophy involves thinking
about things in a certain (rigorous, questioning) way, offering arguments for one's
ideas, meeting arguments against them, and being prepared to change one's mind.
In most languages there are words that are translated into English as 'philosophy' -- in
European languages, those words often share the same Greek roots as the English
word. The activities to which such words refer have a history shared with philosophy,
but at some point after Kant there was a parting of the ways. The activities referred to
by `philosophy' are different in various ways from the activities referred to by words
like `philosophie', `Philosophie', `filosofia', etc.
When we come to non-European cultures, matters are even more complex. When
Europeans encountered other cultures, they attempted to understand them by
identifying aspects of those cultures with aspects of their own. If an activity or object
shared some of the attributes of European religion, or philosophy, or gods, or saints,
then those words were applied. Thus deeply different cultures were forced into the
European conceptual mould. (One of the initial problems for, say, the philosophy of
religion, is to see how terms like `faith', `god', or `prayer' mean very different things in
different cultures.) So again, I prefer not to use the English word `philosophy' to refer
to activities in such different cultures.
This isn't evaluative. When I say that something isn't really philosophy, I'm not
necessarily saying that it's inferior, only that it's different. Philosophy, in this central
English sense, and other disciplines may well have things in common, and there may
be people whose work draws on both - but that's true of philosophy and many other

5. academic disciplines. As an English word, I prefer to use `philosophy' to refer to
what's done in English, to its antecedents, and to sufficiently similar activities in other
cultures (for example, to certain thinking and writing in China and India over the
centuries).
All this is really meant to explain why the resources I list are overwhelmingly
concerned with what is generally called `analytic' or `Anglo-American' philosophy.
The main exceptions are the Sites Devoted to Individual Philosophers, the Philosophy
by Region, the Directory of Philosophers on the Web, and, of course, the Continental
Philosophy section of my Philosophy by Topic pages.
Actually, my position is slipping - very pleasant people ask me to include links to
pages relating to one or another writer or school that doesn't fit what I say above, and
I just can't say no. My policy has now become: I actively seek out resources in
philosophy as (loosely) defined above, and use my skill and judgement (and weakness
of will) to decide on resources brought to my attention by others.
If you're interested in any of the `fausses amies', you'll find links to relevant resources
at some of the sites I give links to. If you'd like concrete examples of what I do when I
do philosophy, I've included some of my own work. Also, my African
Philosophy page includes material that might make my position clearer.