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OWASP – Ajax Security Roberto Suggi Liverani Security Consultant Security-Assessment.com 5 December 2007
Who am I? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Agenda ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Introduction ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax Components  (cont.) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax Components ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax Components – Simple Diagram
Let’s define Ajax: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Traditional Web Model vs Ajax Web Model
Classic Web Model – Usability/Time
Ajax Web Model – Usability/Time
Why Ajax is used? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Who is using Ajax? And many others…
Let’s talk about Ajax and security… ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax and Security – Server of origin policy ,[object Object],URLs Cross – Scripting allowed? Comments http://www.example.com:8080/script1.js No Port number doesn’t match. http://www.example.com/script2.js http://www.example.com/script1.js No Protocol type doesn’t match. https://www.example.com/script2.js http://www.example.com/script1.js No Browser will not perform domain name resolution. http://192.168.0.10/script2.js http://sub.example.com/script1.js No Subdomains treated as separate domains. http://www.example.com/script2.js http://www.example.com/hello/script1.js YES Domain name is the same. http://www.example.com/bye/script.2.js http://www.example2.com/script1.js NO Different domain names. http://www.example1.com/script2.js
Ajax and Security – Server of origin policy ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Real attacks examples ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax Security – Case Study – Samy worm ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax – Case Study – Samy worm  (cont) ,[object Object]
Screenshot showing list of Myspace profiles infected by Samy Worm
And today there are still Myspace accounts with Samy as a hero! 532 results with live.com
Ajax – Case Study – Samy worm ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax – Case Study – Yamanner worm ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax – Case Study – Yamanner worm ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax – Case Study – Nduja - Webmail XSS worm ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Ajax Security – Case Study – Nduja - Webmail XSS Worm ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Nduja - Webmail XSS Worm Demo
Web worms – Comparison So the question is: Can you think about the impact of the next cross domain web worm? Worm Target Domain(s) Cross Domain? Impact Samy worm Myspace.com No 1 million of users affected Yannamer worm Yahoo.com No Unknown number of yahoo users affected Nduja worm Tiscali.it Libero.it Lycos.it Excite.com Yes N/A – This is a PoC
Questions/Conclusion ,[object Object],[object Object]
References – Misc. ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
References – Misc. ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
References – Books ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Table of Figures ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

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Ajax Security

  • 1. OWASP – Ajax Security Roberto Suggi Liverani Security Consultant Security-Assessment.com 5 December 2007
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7. Ajax Components – Simple Diagram
  • 8.
  • 9. Traditional Web Model vs Ajax Web Model
  • 10. Classic Web Model – Usability/Time
  • 11. Ajax Web Model – Usability/Time
  • 12.
  • 13. Who is using Ajax? And many others…
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20. Screenshot showing list of Myspace profiles infected by Samy Worm
  • 21. And today there are still Myspace accounts with Samy as a hero! 532 results with live.com
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 27. Nduja - Webmail XSS Worm Demo
  • 28. Web worms – Comparison So the question is: Can you think about the impact of the next cross domain web worm? Worm Target Domain(s) Cross Domain? Impact Samy worm Myspace.com No 1 million of users affected Yannamer worm Yahoo.com No Unknown number of yahoo users affected Nduja worm Tiscali.it Libero.it Lycos.it Excite.com Yes N/A – This is a PoC
  • 29.
  • 30.
  • 31.
  • 32.
  • 33.