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P2P Security ThreatsP2P Security Threats
And TheirAnd Their
CountermeasuresCountermeasures
Chittaranjan Hota, PhD
Associate Professor, Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering
Birla Institute of Technology & Science-Pilani, Hyderabad Campus
Shameerpet, Hyderabad, AP, India
hota@hyderabad.bits-pilani.ac.in
3rd
August 2013
Workshop on Cyber Security, Bharti School, IIT, Delhi
[Source: Privacy & Security, Eric Byres, Communications of the ACM, August 2013]
Air gap MythAir gap Myth
GenesisGenesis
P2P appsP2P apps
running onrunning on
BITS campusBITS campus
detected…detected…
Power of InternetPower of Internet
Source: Cisco VNI Global Forecast, 2011-2016 Source: Envisional: Internet bandwidth usage estimation report,
2011
Source: http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/peertopeer
Attack examplesAttack examples
Tiversa Inc., 2011
SC Magazine, March 2009
"lol is this your new profile pic?"
Times of India, Oct 2012
What is a P2P NetworkWhat is a P2P Network
(BYOR)(BYOR)
A
D
E F
G
H
F
H
GA
E
C
C
B
P2P overlay
layer
Native
IP layer
D
B
AS1
AS2
AS3
AS4
AS5
AS6
DC++
TorrentsTorrents
Threads: 186,123, Posts: 2,383,449,
Members: 546,944
Seeders: 56668, Leechers: 8246,
Peers: 64914, Torrents: 19197
 
[Source: desitorrents.com, 31st
July 2013 (3.00pm)]
P2P Traffic ControlP2P Traffic Control
Security Gap in P2PSecurity Gap in P2P
Internet
Peer A
Peer B
Malicious Peer C
Protected
Network
Peer X
Firewall
A TCP Port
Effect of NATing on P2PEffect of NATing on P2P
Private IP Addresses Public IP Addresses
Server
P2P Application
Internet
NAT
NAT TraversalNAT Traversal
Private IP Addresses Public IP Addresses
Internet
Private IP Addresses
Application
Relay
Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P
192.168.100.220:80
(target)
Query: “star”
QueryHit
“star”,” 192.168.100.220:80”
Query: “pop”
Query: “star”
QueryHit
“pop”, ” 192.168.100.220:80”
“star”,” 192.168.100.220:80”
Query: “pop”
Query: “star”
Malicious
Peer
192.168.100.40:4442
QueryHit: “star”,” 192.168.100.220:80”
QueryHit: “pop”, ” 192.168.100.220:80”
1
2
3 P1
P2
P3
A
GET /index.html HTTP/1.0
File sharing
network
Alice
Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P
Bob
index
title location
file1 120.18.89.100
file2 46.100.80.23
file3 234.8.98.20
file4 111.22.22.22
file sharing network
120.18.89.100
46.100.80.23
234.8.98.20
Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P
Poisoning
Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P
Attacker
Genuine Blocks
2.FakeBitMap
4.FakeBlock
3.BlockRequest
Victim Peer
5. Hash Fail
Genuine Blocks
Genuine Blocks
1.TCPConnection
Victim
Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P
Sybil
Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P
Tracker
Seeder
Free RiderFree Rider
Testbed at BITS HyderabadTestbed at BITS Hyderabad
Botnet traffic generation
InternetInfo.
Sec. Lab
Dist. Sys.
Lab Multimedia
Lab
Hostels
Wing
Firewall/Router
Core
Switch 6509
Distribution
Switch 4500
Access
Switch 2500
Content
Mgmt.
Application
Servers
DB
Cluster
Intrusion
Detection Sys.
Ethernet
Data collection for P2P and
web traffic
Traffic Anonymization
(Anon tool)
Classifier, and
IDS for botnet
detection
Privacy aware P2P ClassifierPrivacy aware P2P Classifier
public Conversation(String sender, String receiver, Int src, int dst, boolean
tcp){
sender_ip = sender;
receiver_ip = receiver;
this.setSender(new Flow(sender, receiver, src, dst, tcp));
this.setReceiver(new Flow(receiver,sender, dst, src, tcp));
sndr_port = src;
rcvr_port = dst;
set =false;
last = 0;
first = 0;
timestamps = new TreeSet<Long>();
}
for(Packet p : plist){
if(p.isTcp() && !p.getTcp_flag()[7] && !p.getTcp_flag()[6]
&& !p.getTcp_flag()[5]){
++nonsyn_count;
}else if(!p.isTcp()){
++nonsyn_count;
}if(p.isTcp()&&p.getTcp_flag()[4]){
++psh_count;
}++count;
hdr_size_total = hdr_size_total + p.getHdr_size();
pkt_size_total = pkt_size_total + p.getPacket_size();
pktsize.add(p.getPacket_size());}
Categories Application
Number of
Flows
Web mail, http, https, ftp 23,014
p2p
BitTorrent, AntsP2P,
Gnutella, Mute, eMule
2,76,093
[ Ref: 34]
Experimental ResultsExperimental Results






+++
+
=
FNTNFPTP
TNTP
Accuracy
Identifying FrostWire trafficIdentifying FrostWire traffic
Botnet DetectionBotnet Detection
P2P Botnet TracesP2P Botnet Traces
Botnet name What it does? Size of data Source of data
Kelihos-Hlux Email spam, DoS, steal Bitcoin
wallets
5 MB Generated on testbed + obtained form
online sources [35]
Waledac Email spam, password stealing 25 MB ISOT dataset [36]
ZeuS Steals banking information by
MITM key logging and form
grabbing
5 MB Generated on testbed
TRAINING DATA TEST DATA
ZeuS Steals banking information by
MITM key logging and form
grabbing
25 MB ISOT dataset [36]
Storm Email spam 30 MB ISOT dataset [36]
Conficker Disables important system services
and security products
50 GB Obtained from CAIDA [37]
Bayesian Regularized NNBayesian Regularized NN
•  Bayesian Regularized Neural Network based Real-time Peer-to-Peer Botnet Detection, Pratik Narang, Sharat Chandra, Chittaranjan Hota,
Accepted in IEEE P2P 2013, Trento, Italy (Sept 2013)
• 23 features extracted from
flows.
• Information Gain with
ranking used to rank the
features .
• Top 16 features chosen.
Output Correct
Classification
Incorrect
Classification
Malicious samples 25898 276
Percentage 98.9455% 1.0545%
Feature SelectionFeature Selection
• 23 features extracted from flows
Large Botnet TracesLarge Botnet Traces
Botnet
name
What it does? Type of data/Size
of data
Source of data
Sality Infects executable files,
 attempts to disable
security software.
Binary (.exe) file Generated on testbed
Storm Email Spam .pcap file/ 4.8 GB Obtained from Uni. of
Georgia [34]
Waledac Email spam, password
stealing
.pcap file/ 68 GB Obtained from Uni. of
Georgia [34]
ZeuS Steals banking
information by MITM
key logging and form
grabbing
.pcap file/ 105 MB Obtained from Uni. of
Georgia [34] +
Generated on test bed
Experimental ResultsExperimental Results
Distributed Data collectionDistributed Data collection
and processingand processing
Botnet traffic generation
InternetInfo. Sec. Lab
Dist. Sys.
Lab Multimedia
Lab
Hostels
Wing
Firewall/Router
Core
Switch 6509
Distribution
Switch 4500
Access
Switch 2500
Content
Mgmt.
Application
Servers
DB
Cluster
Intrusion
Detection Sys.
Ethernet
Data collection for P2P and
web traffic
Classifier, and
IDS for botnet
detection
Traffic Anonymization
(Anon tool)
Hadoop
Name node
Hadoop
Data nodes
Hadoop setup running atHadoop setup running at
BITS HydBITS Hyd
ReferencesReferences1. http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2007/05/23/p2p_networks_hijacked_for_ddos_attacks.htm
2. S Mcbride, and G A Flower, Estimate of Film-piracy cost soars: Hollywood loss is put at $6.1b a year, The Wall Street Journal Europe, may 4th
, 2006.
3. Thomas Karagiannis, Andre Broido, Michalis Faloutsos, Kc claffy, Transport Layer Identification of P2P Traffic, in Proc. 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, pp. 121-134, 2004.
4. Subhabrata Sen, Oliver Spatscheck, and Dongmei Wang, Accurate, Scalable InNetwork Identification of P2P Traffic Using Application Signatures, WWW 2004, May 2004.
5. S Sen, Jia Wang, Analyzing Peer-To-Peer Traffic Across Large Networks, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2004.
6. Thuy T T N, and G Armitage, A survey of Techniques for Internet Traffic Classification using Machine Learning, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008.
7. Hassan Khan, S A Khayam, L Golubchik, M. Rajarajan, and Michael Orr, Wirespeed, Privacy-Preserving P2P Traffic Detection on Commodity Switches, Available Online at www.xflowresearch.com
8. Intrusion detection system: At: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system.
9. P. Garcia-Teodoroa, J. Diaz-Verdejo, G.Macia-Fernandeza, and E. Vazquezb, Anomaly-based network intrusion detection: Techniques, systems and challenges, Computers and Security, vol. 28, Issue: 1-2, pp. 18-28, 2009.
10. Gupta R, and Somani A K, Game theory as a tool to strategize as well as predict node’s behavior in peer-to-peer networks , International conf. on PDS, 2005, pp. 244-249.
11. Roberto G Cascella, 2nd ENISA Workshop on Authentication Interoperability Languages held at the ENISA/EEMA European eIdentity conference, Paris, France, June 12-13, 2007.
12. C Wang, Li Chen, H Chen, and K Zhou, Incentive Mechanism Based on Game Theory in P2P Networks, ITCS 2010, pp. 190-193.
13. Sarraute, C., et al., Simulation of Computer Network Attacks, CoreLabs, Core Security Technologies, 2010.
14. http://www.metasploit.com/
15. www.metasploit.com/modules/exploit/multi/browser/java_atomicreferencearray
16. www.metasploit.com/modules/auxiliary/dos/windows/rdp/ms12_020_maxchannelids
17. http://www.metasploit.com/modules/exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi
18. Quinlan, J. R, C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1993.
19. http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
20. http://pytbull.sourceforge.net/
21. http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy
22. Massicotte, F. and Labiche, Y, An analysis of signature overlaps in Intrusion Detection Systems, Dependable Systems & Networks (DSN) IEEE/IFIP 41st International Conference, pp. 109-120, 2011.
23. Cheng-Yuan Ho, Yuan-Cheng Lai, I-Wei Chen, Fu-Yu Wang, and Wei-Hsuan Tai, Statistical analysis of false positives and false negatives from real traffic with intrusion detection/prevention systems, Communication Magazine,
IEEE, pp.146-154, 2012.
24. Sardar Ali, Hassan Khan, and Syed Ali Khayam, What is the Impact of P2P Traffic on Anomaly Detection?, Proceeding of 13th International symposium, Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID) 2010, pp. 1-7, 2010. 
25. Jeffrey Erman, et al. Identifying and Discriminating Between Web and Peer-to-Peer in the Network Core, WWW 2007, ACM, pp. 883-892.
26. Genevieve B, et al., Estimating P2P traffic volume at USC, Technical Report, USC, June 2007.
27. Alok Madhukar, Carey W, A Longitudinal Study of P2P Traffic Classification, IEEE International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation, CA, 2006, pp. 179-188.
28. Hongwei C, et al., A SVM method for P2P traffic identification based on multiple traffic mode, Journal of Networks, Nov 2010, pp. 1381-1388.
29. K Ilgun, et al, State transition analysis: A rule based intrusion detection approach, IEEE transactions on software engineering, Vol 21, 1995.
30. F Jemili, et al, A framework for an adaptive intrusion detection system using bayesian network, IEEE Intelligence and Security Informatics, May 2007, pp.66-70.
31. Soysal, Murat, and Ece Guran Schmidt. "Machine learning algorithms for accurate flow-based network traffic classification: Evaluation and comparison." Performance Evaluation 67.6 (2010): 451-467.
32. Williams, Nigel, Sebastian Zander, and Grenville Armitage. "A preliminary performance comparison of five machine learning algorithms for practical IP traffic flow classification." ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review36.5 (2006): 5-16.
33. Berg, Peter Ekstrand. "Behavior-based Classification of Botnet Malware." Thesis Report 2011, Gjovik University College, Norway.
34. Rahbarinia, Babak, Roberto Perdisci1 Andrea Lanzi, and Kang Li. "PeerRush: Mining for Unwanted P2P Traffic.“ DIMVA 2013
35. www.contagiodump.blogspot.in
36. Saad, Sherif, et al. "Detecting P2P botnets through network behavior analysis and machine learning." Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), 2011 Ninth Annual International Conference on. IEEE, 2011.
37. CAIDA, UCSD. "Network Telescope" Three Days Of Conficker“ 21st Nov. 2008."Paul Hick, Emile Aben, Dan Andersen and kcclaffy http://www. caida. org/data/passive/telescope-3days-conficker_dataset. xml.
38. Abbes, Tarek, Adel Bouhoula, and Michaël Rusinowitch. "Protocol analysis in intrusion detection using decision tree." Information Technology: Coding and Computing, 2004. Proceedings. ITCC 2004. International Conference
on. Vol. 1. IEEE, 2004.
39. S. Chebrolu, A. Abraham, and J. P. Thomas. Feature deduction and ensemble design of intrusion detection systems. Computers & Security, 24(4):295–307, 2005.
40. A.H.Sung and S. Mukkamala. The feature selection and intrusion detection problems. In Advances in Computer Science-ASIAN 2004. Higher-Level Decision Making, pages 468–482. Springer, 2005.
41. McHugh, John. "Testing intrusion detection systems: a critique of the 1998 and 1999 DARPA intrusion detection system evaluations as performed by Lincoln Laboratory." ACM transactions on Information and system Security 3.4
(2000): 262-294.
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Architecting Cloud Native Applications
 

P2P Security

  • 1. P2P Security ThreatsP2P Security Threats And TheirAnd Their CountermeasuresCountermeasures Chittaranjan Hota, PhD Associate Professor, Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering Birla Institute of Technology & Science-Pilani, Hyderabad Campus Shameerpet, Hyderabad, AP, India hota@hyderabad.bits-pilani.ac.in 3rd August 2013 Workshop on Cyber Security, Bharti School, IIT, Delhi
  • 2. [Source: Privacy & Security, Eric Byres, Communications of the ACM, August 2013] Air gap MythAir gap Myth
  • 3. GenesisGenesis P2P appsP2P apps running onrunning on BITS campusBITS campus detected…detected…
  • 4. Power of InternetPower of Internet Source: Cisco VNI Global Forecast, 2011-2016 Source: Envisional: Internet bandwidth usage estimation report, 2011
  • 6. Attack examplesAttack examples Tiversa Inc., 2011 SC Magazine, March 2009 "lol is this your new profile pic?" Times of India, Oct 2012
  • 7. What is a P2P NetworkWhat is a P2P Network (BYOR)(BYOR) A D E F G H F H GA E C C B P2P overlay layer Native IP layer D B AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS6
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  • 11. TorrentsTorrents Threads: 186,123, Posts: 2,383,449, Members: 546,944 Seeders: 56668, Leechers: 8246, Peers: 64914, Torrents: 19197   [Source: desitorrents.com, 31st July 2013 (3.00pm)]
  • 12. P2P Traffic ControlP2P Traffic Control
  • 13. Security Gap in P2PSecurity Gap in P2P Internet Peer A Peer B Malicious Peer C Protected Network Peer X Firewall A TCP Port
  • 14. Effect of NATing on P2PEffect of NATing on P2P Private IP Addresses Public IP Addresses Server P2P Application Internet NAT
  • 15. NAT TraversalNAT Traversal Private IP Addresses Public IP Addresses Internet Private IP Addresses Application Relay
  • 16. Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P 192.168.100.220:80 (target) Query: “star” QueryHit “star”,” 192.168.100.220:80” Query: “pop” Query: “star” QueryHit “pop”, ” 192.168.100.220:80” “star”,” 192.168.100.220:80” Query: “pop” Query: “star” Malicious Peer 192.168.100.40:4442 QueryHit: “star”,” 192.168.100.220:80” QueryHit: “pop”, ” 192.168.100.220:80” 1 2 3 P1 P2 P3 A GET /index.html HTTP/1.0
  • 17. File sharing network Alice Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P Bob
  • 18. index title location file1 120.18.89.100 file2 46.100.80.23 file3 234.8.98.20 file4 111.22.22.22 file sharing network 120.18.89.100 46.100.80.23 234.8.98.20 Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P Poisoning
  • 19. Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P Attacker Genuine Blocks 2.FakeBitMap 4.FakeBlock 3.BlockRequest Victim Peer 5. Hash Fail Genuine Blocks Genuine Blocks 1.TCPConnection
  • 20. Victim Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P Sybil
  • 21. Possible Attacks on P2PPossible Attacks on P2P Tracker Seeder Free RiderFree Rider
  • 22. Testbed at BITS HyderabadTestbed at BITS Hyderabad Botnet traffic generation InternetInfo. Sec. Lab Dist. Sys. Lab Multimedia Lab Hostels Wing Firewall/Router Core Switch 6509 Distribution Switch 4500 Access Switch 2500 Content Mgmt. Application Servers DB Cluster Intrusion Detection Sys. Ethernet Data collection for P2P and web traffic Traffic Anonymization (Anon tool) Classifier, and IDS for botnet detection
  • 23. Privacy aware P2P ClassifierPrivacy aware P2P Classifier public Conversation(String sender, String receiver, Int src, int dst, boolean tcp){ sender_ip = sender; receiver_ip = receiver; this.setSender(new Flow(sender, receiver, src, dst, tcp)); this.setReceiver(new Flow(receiver,sender, dst, src, tcp)); sndr_port = src; rcvr_port = dst; set =false; last = 0; first = 0; timestamps = new TreeSet<Long>(); } for(Packet p : plist){ if(p.isTcp() && !p.getTcp_flag()[7] && !p.getTcp_flag()[6] && !p.getTcp_flag()[5]){ ++nonsyn_count; }else if(!p.isTcp()){ ++nonsyn_count; }if(p.isTcp()&&p.getTcp_flag()[4]){ ++psh_count; }++count; hdr_size_total = hdr_size_total + p.getHdr_size(); pkt_size_total = pkt_size_total + p.getPacket_size(); pktsize.add(p.getPacket_size());} Categories Application Number of Flows Web mail, http, https, ftp 23,014 p2p BitTorrent, AntsP2P, Gnutella, Mute, eMule 2,76,093 [ Ref: 34]
  • 27. P2P Botnet TracesP2P Botnet Traces Botnet name What it does? Size of data Source of data Kelihos-Hlux Email spam, DoS, steal Bitcoin wallets 5 MB Generated on testbed + obtained form online sources [35] Waledac Email spam, password stealing 25 MB ISOT dataset [36] ZeuS Steals banking information by MITM key logging and form grabbing 5 MB Generated on testbed TRAINING DATA TEST DATA ZeuS Steals banking information by MITM key logging and form grabbing 25 MB ISOT dataset [36] Storm Email spam 30 MB ISOT dataset [36] Conficker Disables important system services and security products 50 GB Obtained from CAIDA [37]
  • 28. Bayesian Regularized NNBayesian Regularized NN •  Bayesian Regularized Neural Network based Real-time Peer-to-Peer Botnet Detection, Pratik Narang, Sharat Chandra, Chittaranjan Hota, Accepted in IEEE P2P 2013, Trento, Italy (Sept 2013) • 23 features extracted from flows. • Information Gain with ranking used to rank the features . • Top 16 features chosen. Output Correct Classification Incorrect Classification Malicious samples 25898 276 Percentage 98.9455% 1.0545%
  • 29. Feature SelectionFeature Selection • 23 features extracted from flows
  • 30. Large Botnet TracesLarge Botnet Traces Botnet name What it does? Type of data/Size of data Source of data Sality Infects executable files,  attempts to disable security software. Binary (.exe) file Generated on testbed Storm Email Spam .pcap file/ 4.8 GB Obtained from Uni. of Georgia [34] Waledac Email spam, password stealing .pcap file/ 68 GB Obtained from Uni. of Georgia [34] ZeuS Steals banking information by MITM key logging and form grabbing .pcap file/ 105 MB Obtained from Uni. of Georgia [34] + Generated on test bed
  • 32. Distributed Data collectionDistributed Data collection and processingand processing Botnet traffic generation InternetInfo. Sec. Lab Dist. Sys. Lab Multimedia Lab Hostels Wing Firewall/Router Core Switch 6509 Distribution Switch 4500 Access Switch 2500 Content Mgmt. Application Servers DB Cluster Intrusion Detection Sys. Ethernet Data collection for P2P and web traffic Classifier, and IDS for botnet detection Traffic Anonymization (Anon tool) Hadoop Name node Hadoop Data nodes
  • 33. Hadoop setup running atHadoop setup running at BITS HydBITS Hyd
  • 34. ReferencesReferences1. http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2007/05/23/p2p_networks_hijacked_for_ddos_attacks.htm 2. S Mcbride, and G A Flower, Estimate of Film-piracy cost soars: Hollywood loss is put at $6.1b a year, The Wall Street Journal Europe, may 4th , 2006. 3. Thomas Karagiannis, Andre Broido, Michalis Faloutsos, Kc claffy, Transport Layer Identification of P2P Traffic, in Proc. 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, pp. 121-134, 2004. 4. Subhabrata Sen, Oliver Spatscheck, and Dongmei Wang, Accurate, Scalable InNetwork Identification of P2P Traffic Using Application Signatures, WWW 2004, May 2004. 5. S Sen, Jia Wang, Analyzing Peer-To-Peer Traffic Across Large Networks, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2004. 6. Thuy T T N, and G Armitage, A survey of Techniques for Internet Traffic Classification using Machine Learning, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008. 7. Hassan Khan, S A Khayam, L Golubchik, M. Rajarajan, and Michael Orr, Wirespeed, Privacy-Preserving P2P Traffic Detection on Commodity Switches, Available Online at www.xflowresearch.com 8. Intrusion detection system: At: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system. 9. P. Garcia-Teodoroa, J. Diaz-Verdejo, G.Macia-Fernandeza, and E. Vazquezb, Anomaly-based network intrusion detection: Techniques, systems and challenges, Computers and Security, vol. 28, Issue: 1-2, pp. 18-28, 2009. 10. Gupta R, and Somani A K, Game theory as a tool to strategize as well as predict node’s behavior in peer-to-peer networks , International conf. on PDS, 2005, pp. 244-249. 11. Roberto G Cascella, 2nd ENISA Workshop on Authentication Interoperability Languages held at the ENISA/EEMA European eIdentity conference, Paris, France, June 12-13, 2007. 12. C Wang, Li Chen, H Chen, and K Zhou, Incentive Mechanism Based on Game Theory in P2P Networks, ITCS 2010, pp. 190-193. 13. Sarraute, C., et al., Simulation of Computer Network Attacks, CoreLabs, Core Security Technologies, 2010. 14. http://www.metasploit.com/ 15. www.metasploit.com/modules/exploit/multi/browser/java_atomicreferencearray 16. www.metasploit.com/modules/auxiliary/dos/windows/rdp/ms12_020_maxchannelids 17. http://www.metasploit.com/modules/exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi 18. Quinlan, J. R, C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1993. 19. http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 20. http://pytbull.sourceforge.net/ 21. http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy 22. Massicotte, F. and Labiche, Y, An analysis of signature overlaps in Intrusion Detection Systems, Dependable Systems & Networks (DSN) IEEE/IFIP 41st International Conference, pp. 109-120, 2011. 23. Cheng-Yuan Ho, Yuan-Cheng Lai, I-Wei Chen, Fu-Yu Wang, and Wei-Hsuan Tai, Statistical analysis of false positives and false negatives from real traffic with intrusion detection/prevention systems, Communication Magazine, IEEE, pp.146-154, 2012. 24. Sardar Ali, Hassan Khan, and Syed Ali Khayam, What is the Impact of P2P Traffic on Anomaly Detection?, Proceeding of 13th International symposium, Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID) 2010, pp. 1-7, 2010.  25. Jeffrey Erman, et al. Identifying and Discriminating Between Web and Peer-to-Peer in the Network Core, WWW 2007, ACM, pp. 883-892. 26. Genevieve B, et al., Estimating P2P traffic volume at USC, Technical Report, USC, June 2007. 27. Alok Madhukar, Carey W, A Longitudinal Study of P2P Traffic Classification, IEEE International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation, CA, 2006, pp. 179-188. 28. Hongwei C, et al., A SVM method for P2P traffic identification based on multiple traffic mode, Journal of Networks, Nov 2010, pp. 1381-1388. 29. K Ilgun, et al, State transition analysis: A rule based intrusion detection approach, IEEE transactions on software engineering, Vol 21, 1995. 30. F Jemili, et al, A framework for an adaptive intrusion detection system using bayesian network, IEEE Intelligence and Security Informatics, May 2007, pp.66-70. 31. Soysal, Murat, and Ece Guran Schmidt. "Machine learning algorithms for accurate flow-based network traffic classification: Evaluation and comparison." Performance Evaluation 67.6 (2010): 451-467. 32. Williams, Nigel, Sebastian Zander, and Grenville Armitage. "A preliminary performance comparison of five machine learning algorithms for practical IP traffic flow classification." ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review36.5 (2006): 5-16. 33. Berg, Peter Ekstrand. "Behavior-based Classification of Botnet Malware." Thesis Report 2011, Gjovik University College, Norway. 34. Rahbarinia, Babak, Roberto Perdisci1 Andrea Lanzi, and Kang Li. "PeerRush: Mining for Unwanted P2P Traffic.“ DIMVA 2013 35. www.contagiodump.blogspot.in 36. Saad, Sherif, et al. "Detecting P2P botnets through network behavior analysis and machine learning." Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), 2011 Ninth Annual International Conference on. IEEE, 2011. 37. CAIDA, UCSD. "Network Telescope" Three Days Of Conficker“ 21st Nov. 2008."Paul Hick, Emile Aben, Dan Andersen and kcclaffy http://www. caida. org/data/passive/telescope-3days-conficker_dataset. xml. 38. Abbes, Tarek, Adel Bouhoula, and Michaël Rusinowitch. "Protocol analysis in intrusion detection using decision tree." Information Technology: Coding and Computing, 2004. Proceedings. ITCC 2004. International Conference on. Vol. 1. IEEE, 2004. 39. S. Chebrolu, A. Abraham, and J. P. Thomas. Feature deduction and ensemble design of intrusion detection systems. Computers & Security, 24(4):295–307, 2005. 40. A.H.Sung and S. Mukkamala. The feature selection and intrusion detection problems. In Advances in Computer Science-ASIAN 2004. Higher-Level Decision Making, pages 468–482. Springer, 2005. 41. McHugh, John. "Testing intrusion detection systems: a critique of the 1998 and 1999 DARPA intrusion detection system evaluations as performed by Lincoln Laboratory." ACM transactions on Information and system Security 3.4 (2000): 262-294.