171 war india pakistan.liberation of bangladesh

1. INDO PAK WAR 1971

2. PHASE-I INTRODUCTION
PHASE-II PREP AND PLANNING AND TRN
PHASE-III MAJ BATTLES
PHASE-IV AIR, NAVAL OPS AND LESSONS
LEARNT

3. INTRODUCTION

4. INTRODUCTION
 IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN HISTORY.
 PAK CUT TO SIZE & HUMILIATED.
 INDIA ACCUSED AS AN AGGRESSOR.
 CONFLICT ENRICHED CORE VALUES.

5. BACKGROUND
 RACIAL SUPREMACY
 NEGLECT OF EAST PAKISTAN & BENGALIS.
 MARSHAL AYUB KHAN’S REGIME.
 POL & ECONOMIC EXPLOTATION.
 REGIONAL & SECTIONAL INTERSTS.

6. • NEGLECT OF EDN
• NO OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS DECREASED IN 20
YRS
• SCHOOLS INCREASED FOUR TIMES IN WEST
PAKISTAN
• GOVT POLICY WAS AIMED AT KEEPING EAST
PAKIS INTELECTUALLY INFERIOR
• ALL GOVT AS WELL ARMED FORCES OFFICES
LOC IN WEST
• VAC NOT ADVERTISED OR IT WAS DIFFICULT
TO GO TO WEST FOR INTERVIEWS

7. BACKGROUND
• THE SIX POINT PROGRAMME .
• CYCLONE IN EAST-PAKISTAN.
• ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS (07 DEC 1970)
• HIJACKING OF IA AIRCRAFT ON 31ST JAN 1971 BY
KASHMIRIS AND BURNT IN LAHORE
• POLITICAL UNREST. YAHYA KHAN COLLUDED WITH
BHUTTO

8. • MARTIAL LAW.
•23 FEB 71 YAHYA KHAN DISSOLVED CIV CABINET
•REPLACED IT WITH MIL GOVERNER
•DELAYED CONVENING OF ASSY AND BLAMED IT
ON INDIA
•THIS RESULTED IN AWAMI LEAGUE LAUNCHING
CIV DISOBEDIENCE MOV
•STRIKES ALL OVER EAST PAK
•OP BLITZ LAUNCHED TO PUMP MORE TPS INTO
EAST BY ARMY
• MIL CRACKDOWN.
•26/27 MARCH MIL CRACKDOWN ON DACCA
•SM REHMAN ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO WEST PAK
•

9. AYUB KHAN STEPPED DOWN ON 25 MARCH 1969
YAHYA KHAN TOOK OVER AND PROMISED TO HOLD
ELECTIONS AND HAND OVER THE POWER TO ELECTED
REPS BY 1970, ELECTIONS COULD BE HELD ONLY ON
07 DEC 1970

AUG 1969 FLOODS HIT EAST
CYCLONE IN 13 NOV 1970
YAHYA KHAN INSTR TIKKA KHAN “TO SORT OUT THE
BENGALIS”.
26 MAR 71, ‘OP SEARCHLIGHT’ LAUNCHED.
MIL CARRIED OUT GENOCIDE, RAPE AND LOOTING.
26 MAR 71, MUJIB DECLARED INDEP & PROVISIONAL
GOVT OF BANGLADESH.

10.  ARMY BRUTALITY CAUSED MASS EXODUS OF
REFUGEES TO INDIA.
 REFUGEES ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT 10 MILLION BY
OCT 71.
• GENOCIDE BY PAK ARMY
•BY TIKKA KHAN
•CIVIL WAR IN EAST-PAK.
• A DAY AFTER CRACKDOWN EAST PAK DECLARED ITS INDEP
•SM REHMAN BECAME PRESIDENT
•MUKTI BAHINI AND COMMON PEOPLE ROSE IN REVOLT
•EBR, EAST PAK RIFLES AND ENTIRE BENGALI FORCE SP
REHMAN
• THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

11. • ON 27TH MARCH MAJ ZIAUR RAHMAN DECLARED
INDEP OF EAST PAK ON BEHALF OF MUJIBUR
•IN APRIL AWAMI LEAGUE LDRS FORMED GOVT IN EXILE
AT MEHARPUR
•BY THIS TIME WEST PAK POLITICIANS AND PEOPLE
MARCHED IN LAHORE CALLING FOR PAK TO CRUSH
INDIA
•ON 23RD NOV YAHAYA KHAN HAD DECLARED
EMERGENCY AND CALLED HIS NATION FOR
PREPARATION FOR WAR
•3RD DEC AT 1740 HR PAF LAUNCHED PRE-EMPTIVE
STRIKES ON 11 INDIAN AIR BASES
•OP CODE NAMED OP CHENGIZ KHAN

12. POL AND MIL EVENTS
 SIX POINT FORMULA:-
 NEW CONSITITUTION TO PROVIDE FOR FRDERAL STATE OF
PAK.
 FEDERAL GOVT TO DEAL WITH DEF AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
 PREVENT INTERWING FLIGHT OF CAPITAL BY HAVING
TWO SEPARATE CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY
 REMOVAL OF ECONOMIC DISPARITIES BETWEEN TWO WINGS
BY ECO REFORMS.
 SHARE INCOME TO MEET FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE
 MILITIA OR PARAMIL FORCE FOR EAST PAK.

13. PREP, PLANNING AND TRN

14. THREE PRONGED COURSE OF ACTION
 ARM AND TRAIN MUKTI BAHINI IN INDIA AND EXTEND COVERT
SP TO BANGLADESH PROVISIONAL GOVT.
 DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO MOB INTERNATIONAL SP.
 PREP MIL SOLN AS A LAST RESORT.

15. MOBILISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL OPINION

16. WORLD OPINION
USSR PLAYED A TOTALLY SP ROLE IN FORM OF:-
 USE OF VETO IN UN TO THWART ATTEMPTS BY
CHINA AND USA.
 PROVN OF EXTENSIVE MIL HARDWARE.
 TO OPEN A FRONT IN SINKIANG, SHOULD CHINA
ATTACK IN SP OF PAK.
 INDIA-SOVIET TREATY PROVED TO BE A
DETERRENT.
 PROMISED TO RECOG BANGLADESH

17. WORLD OPINION
 USA SP PAK’S CAUSE.
 CHINA‘S AMBIVALENT STAND.
 CHOW IN LAI SAID CHINA WOULD SP PAK
 PM VIS TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES BUT NOTHING
CONCRETE ENSUED.

18. PREPARATION & PLANING
“WAR REQUIRED AN EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED
PLANNING AND PREPARATION.”
SITUATION IN EAST-PAKISTAN
• RUTHLESS EXPLOITATION OF EAST-
PAKISTAN.
• ARRIVAL OF LT GEN TIKKA KHAN.
• FLUX OF REFUGEES.
INDIA’S PROBLEM
• DILEMMA ON MIL ACTION.
• RESERVATIONS OF GEN MANEKSHAW.

19. OPTIONS FOR MIL ACTION
OPTIONS : TIME.
 OPTION 1. APR-MAY.
 OPTION 2. POST MONSOON IN DEC.
 OPTION 2 SELECTED
– ENOUGH TIME FOR MIL PREP
– LESS EFFECT OF MONSOON IN
RIVERINE TRN.
– CLOSURE OF MTN PASSES
NEGATING INFILT IN J&K AND
THREAT FROM CHINA.
OPTIONS : CHOICE OF THEATRES.
• OPTION 1. ATTACK ON BOTH FRONTS.
• OPTION 2. HOLDING ACTION IN WEST
& DECISIVE OPS IN EAST .
• OPTION 3. ENCOURAGE MUKTI
BAHINI IN GUER W TO DRAW ADDL
TPS IN EAST AND THEN HOLD IN THE
EAST & LAUNCH MAIN OFFN IN WEST.
• OPTION 2 SELECTED
- AIM TO DRIVE OUT PAK FROM
BANGLADESH.

20. PREPARATION AND PLANNING
• GEARING UP PRODUCTION.
• MAKING UP RESERVES.
• MAKE UNITS AND FMNS FIT FOR WAR.
• RATIONALIZATION OF EQPT.
• PLACEMENT OF AMN AT THE RIGHT
PLACE.
• REPAIR OF WPNS AND EQPT.

21. PREPARATION AND PLANNING
– MAKING UP OF MANPOWER SHORTAGE.
– CONSTR OF RDS AND BRIDGES.
– BUILD UP OF ADM INFRASTRUCTURE.
– CONC OF STRIKE AND HOLDING FMNS.
– UPLIFTMENT OF MORALE.

22. TRN
• INDIAS BORDER WITH WEST PAK IS 3400 KM
APPROX
• ALONG J&K, PB, RAJ AND GUJRAT
• ENTIRE AREA CAN BE DIVIDED INTO
– NORHERN MTN REGION
– THE PLAINS OF INDUS R
– CHOLISTAN – ROHRI DESERT(FAZILKA TO SURATGARH IN
INDIA AND FORT ABBAS TO AHAMADPUR IN PAK)
– RUNN OF KUTCH
THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRN

23. WESTERN SECTOR
• OPS BY WESTERN COMD.
• OPS BY SOUTHERN COMD.
• J&K, HP,HARYANA AND GANGANAGAR
EASTERN SECTOR
• CAPTURE/BLOCKADING OF MAJ PORTS .
• PREVENT INTER SECT MOV.
• DISINTEGRATE PAK FMN.
• CAPTURE OF DACCA.
AREA FOR OPS : INDIA

24. WETERN COMMAND
•LADAKH SECT
•KASHMIR SECT
•CHAMB SECT
•PB SECT
•SEMI DESERT REGION OF GANGANAGAR
SOUTHERN COMMAND
• SANDY DESERTS OF RAJASTHAN
• MARSHES OF KUTCH

25. MAJ BATTLES

26. BATTLES IN NORTHERN SECTOR

27. PARTAPUR SECTOR
• OWN FORCES
– HQ PARTAPUR SECT UNDER 3 INF DIV
– THREE COYS OF LADAKH SCOUTS.
– 500 NUBRA GAURDS
• EN
– No 3 Wg OF KARAKORUM SCOUTS, HQ AT
SKARDU.
• INDIAN TPS ADV 22 KMS.
• CAPTURED 804 SQ KM AREA.

28. KARGIL SECTOR

29. KARGIL SECTOR
• OWN FORCES
– 121 INF BDE GP
– 18 PUNJAB, 2/11 GR, 7 GAURDS, 9 J&K MILITIA
– HQ 3 INF DIV MOVED FROM LEH TO KARGIL.
• OUTCOME
– EN WAS EXPELLED FROM THE HEIGHTS DOMINATING THE
RD SRINAGAR - LEH .

30. TANGDHAR SECTOR

31. TANGDHAR SECTOR
• OWN FORCES
– 104 INF BDE
– 8 RAJRIF, 3 BIHAR, 9 SIKH
• RESP
– GAURD THE APCHS ALONG KISHANGANGA R
– PREVENT INFILT THROUGH TUTMARI GALI.
• OUTCOME
– EN THREAT WAS MINIMISED.
– SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE OPS CARRIED OUT

32. POONCH-RAJOURI-NAUSHARA SECTOR

33. POONCH-RAJOURI-NAUSHARA SECTOR
• OWN FORCES
– POONCH SUB SECT - 93 INF BDE
– RAJOURI SUB SECTOR - 120 INF BDE
– NAUSHERA SUB SECTOR - 80 INF BDE
• EN PLAN
– TO ISOLATE AND CAPTURE POONCH WITH A DIV AND
ISOLATE THE SECT WITH A BDE SIZED FORCE THROUGH
MENDHAR GAP
• OUTCOME
– PAK ATTEMPTS TO CAPTURE WAS FOILED.

34. BATTLE OF LONGEWALA

35. BATTLE OF LONGEWALA
• DEFENDED BY A COY 23 PUNJAB MAJ CHANDPURIA
• PAK TPS CROSSED IB AT 0100 HR 05 DEC.
• HEAVY SHELLING BY ARTY.
• OUR RCLS WENT INTO ACTION.
• FIRST ASLT WENT IN AT ABOUT 0430 HRS.
• 17 RAJRIF MOVED FOR REINFORCEMENT
• AT 0700HRS HUNTERS CAME INTO ACTION.
• FINAL ATTEMPT ALSO FAILED AT 1530 BY PAKIS.

36. BATTLE OF BASANTAR

37. BATTLE OF BASANTAR OR
THE BATTLE OF BARAPIND
• BATTLE TOOK PLACE IN SHAKARGARH SECTOR OR
THE SHAKARGARH BULGE THAT INCL JARPAL
• BULGE IS A PROTRUSION OF PAK BDY INTO IND
TERRITORY
• BOTH THE OPPOSING SIDES WERE LED BY THEIR
ARMY'S I CORPS
• AS IND TPS ADV THEY MET SERIES OF MINEFIELDS
AND STIFF PAK RESISTANCE
• A TROOP OF T-55 TANKS WITH TRAWLS TRAINED BY
CAPT JDS JIND OF THE 7th LI CAV WERE ATT FOR
TRAWLING WITH 54 INF DIV
• THIS ALLOWED TANKS TO MOVE AHEAD BEFORE ALL
VEHICLE SAFE LANE WAS CLEARED BY THE ENGRS

38. • 54 INF DIV WAS BOGGED DOWN AS ENGRS COULD
NOT CLEAR ALL MINES
• IN A DARING COUNTER ATTACK BY THE 17 POONA
HORSE 2nd LT ARUN KHETARPAL LED HIS 3 TANKS
INTO THE MINED AREA
• A FIERCE TANK BATTLE ENSUED WHERE A PAK
TANK WAS TAKEN DOWN
• AFTER SUFFERING INITIAL SETBACKS THE 8th
ARMOURED BDE OF PAK WAS CALLED INTO HELP
• HOWEVER, THE INDIAN ARMY CONTD ASSAULT
• LT ARUN KHETARPAL WITH HIS REMAINING TWO
TANKS FOUGHT OFF AND GUNNED DOWN 10
TANKS BEFORE HE WAS KILLED IN ACTION

39. EASTERN THEATRE
TERRAIN

40. MEGHALAYA
TRIPURA
WEST
BENGAL
BAY OF
BENGAL
TRN
ASSAM
MIZORAM
MYANMAR
R GANGA
R JAMUNA
R MEGHNA

41. SHERPUR
BAY OF BENGAL
KALIAKAIR
PADMA R
JAMALPUR
HARDINGE BR
MAGURA
MEHERPUR
JHENIDA
GOLUNDO
GHAT
COMN CENTRES
KHULNA
JESSORE
RAJSHAHI
PABNA
KUSHTIA
MYMENSINGH
DACCA
COMILLA
CHITTAGONG
TANGAIL
FARIDPUR
DINAJPUR
BOGRA
BARISAL
SYLHET

42. TO CALCUTTA
HILLI
HARDINGE BR
CALCUTTA
NW SECT
SW SECT
R JAMUNA
R GANGA
RAIL NETWORK
CHANDPUR
DACCA
CHITTAGONG
COMILLA
SYLHET
AKHAURA

43. DACCA
NW SECT
SW SECT
HADINGE BR
R JAMUNA
R GANGA
CENTRAL SECT
EASTERN SECT
BOGRA
MAGURA
CHANDPUR
ASHUGANJ
TANGAIL
SECTORS

44. INDIAN STRATEGY
• SOUTH WESTERN SECTOR. 2 CORPS TO CAPTURE
JESSORE AND JHENIDA.
• NORTH WESTERN SECTOR. 33 CORPS TO CUT LINE
HILLI-GAIBANDA AND CAPTURE BOGRA/RANGPUR.
• CENTRAL SECTOR. 101 COMN ZONE TO CAPTURE
JAMALPUR AND MYMENSINGH. ONE BN TO BE PARA
DROPPED ON TANGAIL.
• EASTERN SECTOR. 4 CORPS TO CAPTURE MAULAVI
BAZAR-SYLHET, DAUDKANDI-MAYANMATI AND LALMAI
HILLS-LAKSHAM. ALSO TO CAPTURE CHITTAGONG.

45. OPS IN EASTERN THEATRE

46. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF PAK TPS
9 Inf Div
16 Inf Div
36 Inf Div 14 Inf Div
39 Inf Div

47. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIAN TPS
2 CORPS
33 CORPS
101 COMN ZONE
4 CORPS

48. TRN:EASTERN THEATRE
EASTERN SECT
CENTRAL SECT
SW SECT
NW SECT
BOGRA
HILLI
JHENIDA
JESSORE
COMILLA
SYLHET
CHITTAGONGH
DACCA
MYMENSINGH

49. TRN:EASTERN THEATRE
LTD INTER SECT MOB
RIVERINE TRN WITH
WATER LOGGED
AREAS
APCH TO DHAKA
INF ORIENTED OPS

50. STRAT OF EAST PAK
STRAT
 DIDN’T GIVE IMP TO DEF OF EAST PAK.
 DPLY ALONG BORDERS & WITHDRAWL FOR DEF OF DHAKA.
 DEF OF DHAKA NOT PLANNED .
 ADOPT FORTRESS CONCEPT OF DEF.
NIAZI’S CONCEPT OF DEF
 DIFFERENT LAYERS OF DEF AUGMENTING EACH OTHER.
 MAX ATTRITION TO EN BEFORE HE ATTKS THE MAIN FORCE .
 FWD DEF POSTURE BASED ON STRONG PTs AND FORTRESSES.
 DEF OF EAST PAK DEPENDENT ON WEST PAK MSN.
 BATTLE OF EAST WILL BE FOUGHT IN THE WEST.

51. PAK FORTRESS CONCEPT
• ALL RD DEF IN IMP
TOWNSHIPS.
• FIGHT FWD & FALL BACK.
• SELF CONTAINED UPTO
30 DAYS.
• SUBSEQUENT DLs NOT
PREP.
• DEF OF DHAKA NOT
PLANNED.
MYMENSINGH
JESSORE
JHENIDA
BOGRA
RANGPUR
JAMALPUR
SYLHET
CHITTAGONG
COMILLA

52. INDIAN STRAT & TASKS OF EAST COMD
• AIM WAS LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH.
• MULTI PRONGED OFFN .
• CAPTURE DHAKA EARLIEST.
• ISOLATE FROM THE SEAWARD APCH.
• EARLIEST EST AIR SUPREMACY.
STRAT
TASKS OF EASTERN COMD
• OFFN OPS IN EAST PAK.
• DESTROY BULK OF PAK FORCES.
• OCCUPY MAJOR PORTION OF EAST PAK.

54. OPS IN SW SECTOR
Jessore
Jhenida
OWN
• OFFN BY 2 CORPS WITH
• 4 INF DIV TO CAPTURE JHENIDA
• 9 INF DIV TO CAPTURE JESSORE
Magura
Khulna
EN
9 INF DIV AT JESSORE
Khushtia

55. OPS IN NW SECTOR
OWN
33 CORPS WITH 20 MTN DIV
AND TWO BDE GPs
Hilli
Rangpur
Bogra
Pirganj
Phulbari
Pachagargh
PROG OF OPS
• BATTLE OF HILLI BY
202 MTN BDE
• CAPTURE OF BOGRA ON
16 DEC
Naogaon
EN
16 INF DIV AT BOGRA

56. OPS IN EASTERN SECTOR
SYLHET
COMILLA
MAULAVI BAZAR
COX’S BAZAR
CHITTAGONG
AKHURA
LALMAI
OWN
4 CORPS
• 8 MTN DIV - SYLHET SECT
• 57 MTN DIV - ASHUGANJ SECT
• 23 MTN DIV – CHANDPUR SECT
PROG OF OPS SYLHET SECT
• RESP OF 8 MTN DIV
• IMP OF MAULAVI BAZAR
• MAULAVI BAZAR CAPTURED-09 DEC
• HELI LIFTING OF TPS TO SYLHET
EN
• 14 INF DIV IN SYLHET SECT
• 39 INF DIV IN CHANDPUR SECT
ASHUGANJ
CHANDPUR

57. OPS IN CENTRAL SECTOR
OWN
101 COMN Z UNDER 33 CORPS
PROG OF OPS
• FIRST TO REACH DHAKA BOWL.
• DEF NOT GIVEN ANY PRIORITY.
• MYMENSINGH CAPTURED ON
11 DEC .
• SECURING TANGAIL ON 12 DEC
TANGAIL
MYMENSINGH
EN
36 INF DIV IN DHAKA
11 DEC 1971
12 DEC 1971
CAPTURE OF DHAKA
• 95 BDE TO CAPTURE TANGAIL
• PARA DROP AT TANGAIL
• ISOLATION OF DHAKA BOWL

58. BATTLE OF HILLI OR BOGRA
• REGARDED AS THE MOST PITCHED BATTLE THAT TOOK
PLACE IN EAST PAK FROM 23 NOV-11 DEC 1971
•THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE INDIAN ARMY WAS TO CUT OFF
PAK FORCES IN THE NORTH FROM THE REST OF EAST PAK
•THE BEST WAY OF GETTING TO BOGRA WAS THROUGH HILLI
•PAK DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WERE SITED IN DEPTH TO
COVER ALL ROUTES LEADING INTO EAST PAKISTAN.
•THEY FOUGHT THE ENTIRE INDIAN DIV AND THE MUKTI
BAHINI SOLDIERS UNTIL THE INDIANS DECIDED TO BYPASS
HILLI AND EST A BLOCK IN ITS REAR.

59. • BRIGADIER TAJAMMAL HUSSAIN MALIK THEN WITHDREW
THE FORCES IN HILLI TO AVOID BEING CUT OFF AND TO
DEFEND FOR THE BOGRA ITSELF.
• BOGRA WAS SURROUNDED FROM ALL SIDES BY THE
GREATER NUMBERS OF THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE MUKTI
BAHINI.
• BRIGADIER TAJAMMAL HUSSAIN MALIK'S RESISTANCE
CONTINUED EVEN AFTER THE PAKISTANI EASTERN
COMMAND SURRENDERED IN DHAKA ON 16 DECEMBER
• THE INDIAN ARMY HAD BY THEN SURROUNDED THE CITY
OF BOGRA

60. • MOUNTED ON 11 DEC 1971 BY THE 2ND PARA BN
• MAIN OBJ OF OP WAS TO CAPTURE OF POONGLI BRIDGE
ON JAMUNA WHICH WOULD CUT OFF 93 BDE OF PAK ARMY
RETREATING FROM NORTH TO DACCA
• 700 PARATROOPERS LED BY LT COL KS PANNU REINFORCED
BY ARTY BTY AND ENGR DET
• UNIT TOUCHED GROUND AT 1630 AND BY 1900 CAPTURED
OBJECTIVE
• CUTTING OFF THE PAK 93 BDE RETREATING FROM THE NORTH
TO DEFEND DACCA
•THE TANGAIL AIRDROP OPERATION INVOLVED AN-12,
C-119S AND DAKOTAS
•THE IAF ALSO CARRIED OUT FEINT DROPS USING DUMMIES
TANGAIL AIRDROP

61. AIR, NAVAL OPS AND
LESSONS LEARNT

62. NAVAL OPS

63. OWN STRAT:EASTERN THEATRE
•ATTK FROM THE SEA ON HARBOUR.
•ATTK FROM THE SEA ON COX’S BAZAR,CHALNA AND MONGLA.
•DESTRUCTION OF EN SHIPPING OFF THE PORTS AND IN THE
SEA.
•SINKING OF PNS GHAZI ON 04 DEC.
•CAPTURE OF PAK MERCHANT VESSEL ANWAR BAKSH ON 05
DEC.
•AIR RAIDS ON MONGLA, KHULNA, CHALNA BY INS VIKRANT ON
06 DEC.
•CHARTER SHIPS TO PAKISTAN GOVT WERE CAPTURED ON 07
DEC.
• CONT AIR STRIKES FROM VIKRANT ON TGTs IN EAST 08-12 DEC.
•LANDING OF TPS AT COX’S BAZAR ON 16 DEC.

64. • MOV FROM BOMBAY 2200H AND REACHED 150 MILES OFF
KARACHI AT1700H.
• 4/5 DEC
• VICE ADMIRAL KOHLI
• INITIAL BATTLE 30 KM OFF KARACHI.
• ENGAGED BOTH WARSHIPS AND COASTAL TGTS.
• SUMMARY OF DAMAGE AT KARACHI.
 DESTROYER PNS KHYBER – SUNK
 DESTROYER PNS SHAHJAHAN – DAMAGED
 TWO MINESWEEPERS – SUNK
 ONE MERCHANT SHIP – SUNK
 CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO HARBOUR AND OIL INSTLN
OP TRIDENT

65. •8-9 DEC
•NAVAL BLOCKADE OF BAY OF BENGAL
•VICE ADMIRAL KRISHNAN
•INS VIKRANT WAS DAMAGED
•ON 09 DEC BIGGEST MARTIME LOSS
•PNS HANGOR SANK INS KHUKRI IN ARABIAN SEA
•18 OFFR AND 176 SDR KILLED
•PAK LOST 35 OF ITS FORCES
OP PYTHON

66. AIR ASPECTS

67. AIR OPS
• PAK AFTER INITIAL PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES
ADOPTED DEFENSIVE STANCE
• 4000 SORTIES BY IAF INWEST AND 1978 IN EAST
•PAK LACKED TECH SP FROM EAST PAKIS
• SMALL AIR CONTINGENT OF PAF SQN 14 WAS
DESTR WHICH PUT DHAKA AIR FD WAS OUT OF
COMMISION RESULTING IN INDIAN AIR SUPERIORITY

68. AIR OPS
• SERVING WITH THE 18 SQUADRON
• FLYING GNAT FIGHTER AIRCRAFT BASED AT
SRINAGAR
• ON 14 DEC 1971, SRINAGAR AIRFIELD WAS ATTACKED
BY SIX PAKISTAN AIR FORCE F86 JETS FROM
PESHAWAR
• FLYING OFFICER SEKHON WAS ON READINESS DUTY
AT THAT TIME
• NO 2 IN A TWO-GNAT FORMATION WITH FLT LT
GHUMMAN WAS IN LEAD
•FLT LT GHUMAN, LOST VISUAL WITH HIS WINGMAN
JUST AFTER TAKE-OFF
•IN THE ENSUING AIR BATTLE, SEKHON SCORED A
DIRECT HIT ON ONE SABRE AND SET ANOTHER
ABLAZE
•SEKHON, AFTER BEING HIT, WAS ADVISED TO RETURN
TO THE BASE
•THE WRECKAGE OF THE GNAT WAS FOUND IN A
GORGE, NEAR SRINAGAR
•HIS CORPSE WAS NEVER FOUND DUE TO THE
MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

69. LESSONS LEARNT

70. 70
STRATEGIC LESSONS
• SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF AIM.
• AIM WAS CLEAR ,SPELT OUT UNAMBIGUOUSLY AND MAINT
THROUGHOUT.
• LIBERATE BANGLADESH AT THE EARLIEST.
• HOLDING ACTION IN WEST AND THE NORTH.
• MAKE LIMITED GAINS IN THE WEST AS A BARGAINING
POINT.
• IN THE EASTERN THEATRE, DHAKA WAS THE FINAL
OBJECTIVE AND ALL OPERATIONS DIRECTED
TOWARDS IT.

71. 71
• INDIAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE WESTERN THEATRE
WAS LACKING.
• IN EASTERN THEATRE, EFFICIENT INT NETWORK
DEVELOPED WITH THE HELP OF MUKTI BAHINI AND
LOCALS.
• GAPS STILL EXISTED.
• CENTRALISED CONTROL OF ALL OUR
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
• NEED TO ENHANCE OUR ELECTRONIC WARFARE
AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY.
INTELLIGENCE

72. 72
TRI SERVICES CO-OPERATION
• COORDINATED PLANNING AMONGST THE THREE
SERVICES WITH A CLEAR OBJECTIVE.
• TOTAL SYNERGY BETWEEN THE GOVT AND WAR
MACHINERY.
• EXCELLENT UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MRS
INDIRA GANDHI, DEFENCE MINISTER AND THE
SERVICE CHIEFS.
• FACILITATED QUICK DECISION MAKING AND CLEAR
CUT DIRECTIONS.
• RESOURCES OF THE ENTIRE NATION WERE USED
TO THE FULLEST EXTENT FOR THE FIRST TIME
SINCE INDEPENDENCE.

73. 73
MOBILISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL OPINION
• DIPLOMATS AND MEDIA DID EXCEPTIONALLY
WELL IN MOBILISING PUBLIC OPINION AT HOME
AND ABROAD.
• WITHSTOOD THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES
FROM THE US AND CHINA.

74. 74
MOBILISATION TIME
• MOBILISATION DONE WITH GREAT DELIBERATION.
• TIME USED TO TRAIN, CONCENTRATE THE FORCES IN
APPROPRIATE LAUNCH PADS AND BUILD UP THE
INFRASTRUCTURE.
• TO AVOID THE MONSOON SEASON WHEN
BANGLADESH IS INUNDATED.
• NULLIFY CHINESE THREAT FROM NORTH AND NORTH
EAST. WAITED FOR THE HIMALAYAN PASSES TO
CLOSE DUE TO WINTERS.
• SERVICE CHIEFS RESISTED POLITICAL PRESSURE
FOR AN EARLY OFFENSIVE.

75. 75
• COMPARATIVELY LESSER SURPRISE ACHIEVED AT
THE STRATEGIC LEVEL.
• OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL SURPRISE:
– NAVAL MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACHI HARBOUR.
– PARA ASSAULT ON TANGAIL .
– USE OF AN-12 AIRCRAFT FOR CARPET BOMBING
IN THE WESTERN THEATRE.
SURPRISE

76. 76
• FRONTAL ATTACKS AGAINST ENEMY DELIBERATE
DEFENCES PROVED COSTLY. HILLI WAS AN EXAMPLE.
• AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OF AN INF BN GROUP AT
COX’S BAZAR WAS A CLASSIC CASE OF BOLD
OFFENSIVE ACTION.
• IAF CARRIED OUT BOLD INTERDICTION MISSIONS
AND CHOKED VITAL MEANS OF ENEMY
COMMUNICATIONS.
• NECESSITY OF A HIGH STANDARD OF TRG FOR
NIGHT OPERATIONS.
OFFENSIVE ACTION

77. 77
NAVAL LESSONS
• INDIAN NAVY IN ACTION IN A MAJOR WAY FOR THE
FIRST TIME.
• INS VIKRANT PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE AND JUSTIFIED
THE INVESTMENT.
• SUBMARINE IS THE OFFENSIVE PLATFORM OF THE
FUTURE.
• DEVELOP SUBMARINE AND CONSEQUENT UNDER
WATER TECHNOLOGY.

78. 78
• KEEP THE INDIAN OCEAN UNDER CONSTANT
SURVEILLANCE.
• POSSESS ADEQUATE AERIAL MARITIME SURVEILLANCE
AND STRIKE ASSETS.
• DEVELOP CAPABILITIES FOR THE DEFENCE OF OUR
ISLAND TERRITORIES .
NAVAL LESSON

79. 79
• STRENGTHS OF IAF
– ABSORBED PAKISTANI FIRST STRIKE.
– CLOSE INTER SERVICES COOPERATION.
– ACHIEVED AIR SUPERIORITY.
– UNCONVENTIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS.
– SUCCESSFUL BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION, AIR
INTERDICTION AND PSY OPS.
AIR FORCE LESSONS

80. THE SURRENDER
• MAGNITUDE OF INDIAN VICTORY EVIDENT FROM THE SCALE OF
PW AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED.
• STRIKE BY IAF AT GOVERNOR’S HOUSE.
• PAKISTAN ASKED FOR A CEASE FIRE.
• CEASE FIRE POSSIBLE ONLY IF PAKISTAN SURRENDERS.
• SURRENDER BY PAKISTAN.
• INDIAN TROOPS ENTERED DHAKA EARLY AFTERNOON.
• MAJ GEN J F R JACOBS CONVEYED THE TERMS OF CEASE FIRE
TO GENERAL NIAZI WHICH WERE ACCEPTED.
•THE INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER WAS SIGNED BY GEN NIAZI
AT 1639 HRS ON 16 DEC 1971 AT DACCA RACE COURSE.

81. SURRENDER

82. THE SHIMLA AGREEMENT

83. THE SHIMLA AGREEMENT
• END CONFLICT, CONFRONTATIONS & ADV WELFARE OF THEIR
PEOPLE.
• ADHERE TO UN CHARTER GOVERNING RELNS BETN COUNTRIES.
• RESOLVE DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY.
• RESPECT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY & REFRAIN
FROM USE OF FORCE.
• PROMOTE TRADE, COMN, TRAVEL, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC
EXCHS.
• LC OF 17 DEC 1971 BE RESPECTED, WITHDRAW TO RESPECTIVE
SIDES OF IB IN OTHER AREAS.
• HOLD REGULAR MTGS AT HIGHEST LEVEL INCL BY HEADS OF
GOVTS.