Joint Special Operation Command Job Analysis

Joint Special Operation Command Job Analysis
Joint Special Operation Command requires individuals who are self–reliant, adaptable, and
competent in assigned tasks and responsibilities. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass
produced and rely heavily on human assets for mission success. The ideal candidate for JSOC is a
well–rounded individual capable of adapting to challenges in new environments while completing
the mission at hand.
This position will allow me to develop the skills I already have and acquire new ones. As the Deputy
Disbursing Officer in Korea I have been exposed to some of the capabilities of military finance
organization. I work diligently to ensure the functioning of daily financial operations in country as
well as provide support for contingency operations planning. I see this as an opportunity for me to
progress my career development. The challenge that the job presents, is something that I will enjoy
tackling. I am at my best when faced with problems that need to be solved with tact and timeliness. I
am certain that I can make an impact and bring benefit to the JSOC organization.
It is imperative to adapt to your ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
I was awarded a 2–year ROTC Scholarship at Western Kentucky University in Bowling Green, KY
in 2014. I served as the Battalion Executive Officer (2016), Treasurer of the Cadet Budget Council
(2015), and Senior Military Student Advisor at the Cadet Leadership Course in Ft. Knox, KY
(2015). I earned my commission on December 9th, 2016 with a degree in Business Economics from
the Gordon Ford College of Business. I am a graduate of the WKU Dynamic Leadership Institute a
four–phase critical thinking, leadership for outstanding students. Additionally, I held a full–time
position with Spalding, an entity of Berkshire and Hathaway, as the Product Management Analyst
Intern for basketball equipment and supply for the
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Operation Anaconda Essay
Operation Anaconda: Questionable Joint Planning Success Operation Anaconda, although a win for
the US and Coalition Forces, was seen by many as a joint planning nightmare. Throughout history,
the military has closely examined engagements through case studies to improve the planning
process. Operation Anaconda's case studies displayed mistakes, power struggles, and lack of
credible Intel while planning the execution of Operation Anaconda causing question about the
success of the operation. Mistakes during planning Once 911 happened and the US started gathering
intel from the Middle East, the proper authorities inside Washington saw the potential for military
action; this initiated the planning step. In 2001, Central Command (CENTCOM) ... Show more
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Howard, E. 2003). CENTCOM wanted to keep as little of a footprint in Afghanistan as it could, and,
therefore, tasked JSOFT DAGGER, known through the case study as TF DAGGER, to develop a
plan to clear out the Shahi Kot Valley (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003). There are several key
components necessary when planning such as "task organization, mission statement, commander's
intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions and control
measures" (ADRP 5–0, para 2–69). During COA development, the mistakes in planning became
apparent. In the case study there are missing elements "Initially Task Force Mountain was not
designated a joint task force which led to joint planning problems" (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003).
Some commands were not communicating with other commands they should have been
communicating with, while some commands were leaving commands out of the communication;
therefore, information was not going up or coming back down the proper channels, which led to
confusion and a struggle for

The Challenges Of Command Structure In Operation Anaconda
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces
assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by
General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command
(CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a
conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the
10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical
commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck's command authority, CENTCOM named his
headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control
authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck
would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were
due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces,
the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These
misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command
relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and
positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation
Anaconda.
Multiple

Operation Anaconda Research Paper
Operation Anaconda Command Structure Many Americans make a choice to serve in the military,
knowing they could have to make the ultimate sacrifice for our country. During Operation
Anaconda, many great Soldiers paid this ultimate sacrifice. Further review many experts have
deemed this as an unnecessary loss of life due to a multitude of factors we will explore. This
Operation has been viewed as a great success in times of uncertainty and challenges. Ultimately, the
enemy was defeated but what could have been done differently? The higher headquarters command
structure for Operation Anaconda faced challenges planning, making timely decisions, and
communicating which lead to mission gaps while developing lessons learned for future joint
operations. ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) did not align under
CENTCOM and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Initially, JFSOCC was detached
from the theater command structure. JFSOCC operated on specific mission for the theater
Commander, rather than included in the Command Structure. JFSOCC's delay caused issues in the
development of the command structure. Furthermore, the mission requirements changed by the time
the CFLCC and JFSOCC took control of their respected requirements, unity of command was still
developing. External to the JFOCC structure, additional SOF units were operating across
Afghanistan conducting their own individual missions with no JFOCC over sight. When SOF units
request air support, it was send directly to CFACC and then forwarded to the CAOC dislocated from
the ground force headquarters. Command Structure during Operation Anaconda As stated earlier, the
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was subordinate to CFLCC. The CJTF was the senior
Commander for Operation Anaconda and the Shahikot Valley Area of Operations (AO). The senior
command, CFTF had critical gaps. CJTF only had one infantry battalion, and half of the normal
division

Command Structure Of Operation Anaconda
The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi–headed and lacked unity due to the U.S.
military presence not being fully established prior to, or during, execution which adversely effected
the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by
CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands,
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component
Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was
led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where
they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th
Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan.
MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the
theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley,
based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF)
Dagger headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF
Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski
based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord.
TF–K Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed
by CPT Robert H
Operation

Research Paper On Operation Anconda Joint Planning
Operation Anaconda: Joint Planning
SFC Guillermo Martinez Quintana
MLC 01–018
MSG Gina R. Aceves
OPERATION ANACONDA: JOINT OPERATION PLANNING ERRORS
Joint Operations After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, the United
States (US) declared a global war on terrorism. Afghanistan was the first battleground with
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; US forces engaged enemy combatants in effort to deter, isolate
and destroy, terrorist networks. In the early stages, unified land operations consisted mostly of
special operation forces (SOF) with support of the US Airforce, US Navy, allies and Afghan
Security Forces (ASF). This early collation was a joint effort that proved successful during the early
phases of the operation. Engagement of enemy forces successfully deterred their operational
capabilities and efforts that pushed enemy forces into Shahi Kot Valley. This concentration of enemy
forces in Shahi Kot Valley fostered the development of Operation ANACONDA, a joint,
interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) operation. The joint operations planning
process (JOPP), employed during the operational design failed to achieve the desired combat power
necessary for successful shaping operations and decisive action.
Challenges Gathering Accurate Intelligence The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain (10th
Mountain Division), was assigned command and control (C2) of Operation Anaconda. In early
2002, CJTF Mountain initiated the joint

Military Cyber: An Evolution In Command Relationships...
United States Cyber Command is less than four years old. The merger and stand down of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC–NW) and the Joint task Force for
Global Network Operations (JTF–GNO) formed the bulk of the new organization. 9 This new
construct integrated offensive and defensive cyber capabilities in one organization resulting in
efficient and effective planning and execution of cyberspace operations. United States Cyber
Command is tasked with operations to defend DOD information networks and to conduct full
spectrum military cyberspace operations across all domains. 10 United States Cyber Command is
also tasked with ensuring US freedom of action in cyberspace and denying freedom of actions to our
... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Trying to fit global assets into a regional or geographic operational framework is not an easy task.
War gaming and C2 exercises will help with this evolution of thought and military theory.
USCYBERCOM's centralized control of cyberspace operations does not give GCCs the desired
seamless integration of military cyber capabilities into theater planning and can adversely impact the
synchronizations of actions across the area of responsibility. Cyber forces OPCON is retained by the
supporting commander, but the GCCs control the pace of cyberspace operations within their area of
responsibility (AOR). USCYBERCOM has the responsibility for determining priority in the
application of forces. In other words GCCs may be competing for the same resources. A regional
commander needs at least shared control of enough combat power to get the job done.
USCYBERCOM recognizes the complexity and importance of command relationships concerning
GCC cyber requirements. COCOMs are responsible for fighting wars. They determine what training
services must be conducted to provide the specialized and general purpose forces needed in theater.
Cyber support should not be treated differently. An alternative to the current relationship would be
the establishment of a Joint Functional Cyber Component Command. The JFCCC could be the next
iteration of USCYBERCOM in the next Unified Command Plan or the JFCCC

Essay About Adam Brown
Adam Brown achieved his American Dream. He always wanted to be close to his family, he was
always selfless, and he always wanted to be proud of what he did. Adam Brown had all of these
things. Even though he went through a hard time and lost respect with his family, he got it back.
After his dark times, another door opened, he wanted to join the Navy. Then since his parents were
such good parents and they also raised him right, they taught him how to be a selfless person. All
this made Adam Brown who he was, and he was a man who achieved his American Dream. Adam
Brown had such an amazing connection with his family. His dad and mom raised him really well.
They told him that he should always be selfless and that he should always do the right thing. These
things made Adam Brown who he was. It worked for the that he was in high school, but once he
went to college they couldn't really help him anymore. One day, the family was going on a vacation,
and Adam asked if he could stay behind and study for college. Well, while the family was out, Adam
Brown decided to throw a party at his house. Apparently his party was pretty well heard of. A ton of
people came to his party, including his future girlfriend, Cindy. Cindy was a pretty bad mistake. She
lead Adam down the wrong path. Cindy did crack, and she got Adam hooked on crack also.
According to the author, Adam stated "I'm really addicted to crack,' he told Ryan 'I can't stop doing
it". The crack was making the true Adam become very

Chris Kyle Should Be Inducted
Christopher, or Chris, Kyle. If this name is not familiar, I soon hope it should be. After a career
ending injury as a professional rodeo participant, Kyle joined the Navy, earned his SEAL trident,
and became a sniper. His contributions to the United States demonstrated by his career proves,
without a doubt that Chris Kyle ought to be inducted into the U.S. Military Hall of Fame. Kyle
protected U.S. lives, is highly decorated, and helped veterans.
"It was my duty to shoot the enemy and I don't regret it. My regrets are for the people I couldn't
save: Marines, soldiers, buddies. I'm not naïve, I don't romanticize war. The Worst moments of my
life have come as a SEAL. But I can stand before God with a clear conscience about doing my job"
("Chris Kyle Quotes"). The first reason for why Chris Kyle should be inducted in the U.S. Military
Hall of Fame is for his undying desire to protect not only his country, but his fellow countrymen as
well. Kyle served over four tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan during the war on terror ("Chris
Kyle Navy Seal"). Kyle also continued to protect people indirectly after he retired from the armed
services. According to a Chris Kyle information website, "...he (Kyle) became chief instructor for
training Naval Special Warfare Sniper and counter sniper teams and he authored the Naval Special
Warfare Sniper Doctrine, the first Navy SEAL sniper manual" ("Chris Kyle Navy Seal"). Kyle also
started a company in the U.S. with the idea of

Operation Eagle Claw : A Learning Experience
Operation Eagle Claw – A Learning Experience In order to gain a thorough understanding of
Operation Eagle Claw, it is imperative to account for the historical context which governed the
military at the time. Induced by public opinion and the economic state of the United States
proceeding the Vietnam War, dramatic reductions in appropriations and personnel plagued the
Department of Defense. Consequently, in the midst of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the United States
military was labeled as a "hollow force;" the cuts made to federal defense spending compromised
the capabilities of most components of the military including the Special Operation Force, which
proved to be critical to the rescue mission. Considering the unsatisfactory state of readiness, the
disastrous conclusion of Operation Eagle Claw was inevitable. However, despite its tactical
shortcomings, the operation has left a reclusive legacy as a constructive failure that catalyzed
improvements to future implementations of Joint Task Forces in special operations. Planning and
Execution Unfortunately, a suitable team was not readily available to the disposal of the Chairman
of Joint Chiefs of Staff due to the condition of the Department of Defense at the time. Furthermore,
President Carter and his cabinet insisted on maintaining operational security, significantly
complicating the process of procuring a proper Joint Task Force planning staff. Eventually, an
improvised staff was commissioned to develop a plan for the

Operation Of Operation Eagle Claw
Many American hostage lives were on the line with just one military operation to save and bring
them home. Yet, the failure of Operation Eagle Claw brought death to military personnel and shame
to America. Operation Eagle Claw was a mission to end the hostage crisis in Iran which was in a
political upraise against the United States. The planning of Operation Eagle Claw was too complex
and planners over looked military aviation doctrine to hastily get the hostages safe. Operation Eagle
Claw's failure was due to prolonged American evacuation from Iran which led to a hasty complex
plan that did not keep aviation doctrine in consideration which helped us learn how we need to
rethink and conduct large scale military aviation operations. The ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
For days, military flights brought thousands of Americans out of Iran and into safe countries until on
February 10th 1979, Iranians closed the Mehrahad Airport putting a halt on the evacuation of
Americans. In response, the Joint Chief of Staffs were planning and organizing a rescue and support
mission to the U.S. Embassy in Iran. Before the rescue and evacuation mission could begin, armed
Iranians took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 102 Americans hostage. Khomeini security
returned the hostages and embassy while also getting the airport to be reopened.2 On November 4th
1979, Iranian revolutionary students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and took 52 Americans
and some military personnel hostage. The students would only release the hostages if America
would hand over the Shah to receive trial and most likely execution along with no more interfering
in Iranian affairs.3 Many rescue mission attempts, blocking resources, and compromising with Iran
gave little to no hope to retrieve the hostages and bring piece. "Under enormous political pressure,
on November 12th, President Jimmy Carter ordered the pentagon to begin drawing up plans for a
daring – read: foolhardy – rescue mission codenamed "Operation Eagle Claw".3 The President and
Joint Chiefs of Staff needed to come up with a tentative plan fast for the American population who
were upset with the hostage crisis not being

Operation Anaconda Afghanistan
Michael A. Difuntorum
25W Class: 502
Abstract
Operation Anaconda was fought in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan in March of 2002 and lasted
17 days, thought it was initially planned as a 3 day battle. During the months leading up to
Operation Anaconda there were many drawbacks, including lack of accurate and reliable
intelligence. Due to the lack of intelligence regarding the enemy and their weapons there was not a
unity of command and instead it was multi headed by General Hagenbeck and Task Force Mountain
headquarters but did not include command of the air forces or the friendly Afghan units that were to
be used as the main axis of attack in the battle plan. Though the battle was not carried out as planned
General Hagenbeck receives his Intel from the U.S Official. Reports stated that enemy forces
including Al Qaeda were assembling in Shahikot Valley. U.S Official did not have a good
intelligence on how many enemy forces there where and what types of equipment they have. Before
the battle of operation anaconda Genera Hagenbeck and his forces underestimated the enemy forces
and defense. U.S forces lack the man power and fire power to and air support to complete the
mission due to Afghanistan forces withdrawing and requesting air support from another commander
thus General Hegenbeck and his forces did not accept the prudent risk with the

Operation Of Operation Eagle Claw
Many American hostage lives were on the line with just one military operation to save and bring
them home. Yet, the failure of Operation Eagle Claw brought death to military personnel and shame
to America. Operation Eagle Claw was a mission to end the hostage crisis in Iran which was in a
political upraise against the United States. The planning of Operation Eagle Claw was too complex
and planners over looked the military aviation doctrine to hastily get the hostages to safety.
Operation Eagle Claw's failure was due to prolonged American evacuation from Iran which led to a
hasty complex plan that did not keep aviation doctrine in consideration which helped us learn how
we need to rethink and conduct large scale military aviation ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
For days, military flights brought thousands of Americans out of Iran and into safe countries until on
February 10th 1979, Iranians closed the Mehrahad Airport putting a halt on the evacuation of
Americans. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were planning and organizing a rescue and support
mission to the U.S. Embassy in Iran. Before the rescue and evacuation mission could begin, armed
Iranians took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 102 Americans hostage. Khomeini security
returned the hostages and embassy while also getting the airport to be reopened.2 On November 4th
1979, Iranian revolutionary students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and took 52 Americans
and some military personnel hostage. The students would only release the hostages if America
would hand over the Shah to receive trial and most likely execution along with no more interfering
in Iranian affairs.3 Many rescue mission attempts, blocking resources, and compromising with Iran
gave little to no hope to retrieve the hostages and bring piece. "Under enormous political pressure,
on November 12th, President Jimmy Carter ordered the pentagon to begin drawing up plans for a
daring – read: foolhardy – rescue mission codenamed "Operation Eagle Claw".4 The President and
Joint Chiefs of Staff needed to come up with a tentative plan fast for the American population who
were upset with the hostage crisis

Summary: Mission Command Professional Experience
Mission Command Professional Experience Analysis Paper According to the Mission Command
White Paper, "mission command must be institutionalized and operationalized [sic] into all aspects
of the joint force" (Dempsey, 2012). Instilling mission command throughout an organization is a
command team task (JSOFSEA, n.d.). As a member of the command team, the senior enlisted leader
is in a unique position to offer something company grade officers or noncommissioned officers may
have only in limited supply. That something is years of professional experience and reflection. This
paper will analyze a professional experience from the author that occurred over the past 10 years.
The experience will focus on mission command key attributes. Additionally, the author will use
reflection to explain why the professional experience was an organizational success as it pertains to
mission command. Discussion Air Force flying operations incorporates the three key attributes for
mission command. The first key attribute, ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
According to Joint Publication 3–30, "joint air operations are normally conducted using centralized
control and decentralized execution" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. I–3). Joint Force Air
Component Commanders can disseminate commander's intent through mission–type orders, such as
air tasking orders, special instructions, and rules of engagement (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. I–4).
The third key attribute is trust. According to General Dempsey, "mission command for Joint Force
2020 requires trust at every echelon of the force" (Dempsey, 2012). The inherent trust the Air Force
instills in its aviation corps is best depicted in the Pilot in Command position. According to Air
Force Instruction 11–202 Volume 3, "the Pilot In Command, regardless of rank, is responsible for,
and is the final authority for the operation of the aircraft" (Department of Air Force,

Causes Of Operation Anaaconda
Lack of Planning during Operation Anaconda
It has been 16 years since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon
which resulted in thousands dead, thousands injured and millions affected across the globe. In the
wake of these terrorist attacks, the Nation had been rocked at its core, as symbols of our freedom lay
in rubble and ash. These acts of terrorism aimed to tear the country apart but much to the terrorists'
surprise, their acts brought the Nation together with one common goal in mind. As Americans, there
was no choice but to expeditiously act with force and make clear statement that America will not
bow, surrender or cower to terrorists. Zimmerman (2012) On March 2, 2002 Operation Anaconda,
the largest battle in Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan was executed. Operation Anaconda
was designed from its inception with one objective in mind, destruction of Taliban and Al Qaeda
terrorist networks that had created a strong hold in the Shah–i–Kot Valley in the Paktia province,
Afghanistan. Overall, Operation Anaconda was a success, General Tommy Franks, the commander
of CENTCOM in 2002 said that the operation's plan "didn't survive first contact with the enemy."
Although Operation Anaconda was successful, with its rapid planning, lack of a unified command
with an established joint force command structure over the prepositioning of air assets, ground
assets, and SOF assets early in the fight it led to an ill–prepared wartime fighting

Process For Implementing X Stat Gauze Into The Individual...
Process for Implementing X–STAT gauze into the Individual Operator Blowout Kits
Marine Raider Regiment will be implementing a change to the Individual Operator Blowout kit. The
addition to the kit will be the X–STAT gauze device developed by REVMEDX for use in treating
junctional hemorrhage. The key players involved in instituting the change will be the Special
Operations Independent Duty Corpsman (SOIDC) and Special Amphibious Reconnaissance
Corpsman (SARC). They will be responsible for the training and instituting the device into TCCC
training packages prior to deployment.
Warning Order
The U.S. Military has been conducting combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last 14
years, over this time the medical treatments developed ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Communicate Based on the ongoing conflict in Iraq and Syria with potential for Marine Raider
Regiment personnel to be engaged in combat operations or injured by indirect fire on Iraqi bases
while conducting training to build the partner nation capability to combat the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL). The need for this hemorrhage control device is vital to mission success
arguably more now than at the height of fight in either Iraq or Afghanistan as the theater support for
CASEVAC is limited with U.S. forces preparing to treat casualties at the point of injury for 12–48
hours or longer before EVAC. The X–STAT device could be the deference between life and death if
a casualty sustains an injury to the junctional areas of the body. Without the device U.S. medics and
corpsman have limited resources to manage junctional hemorrhage and these type injuries would
most likely lead to fatalities from potentially survivable wounds. The timeline to initial fielding of
the X–STAT syringe will in the next 30–90 days to outfit the next deploying company with each
individual receiving one per person and each corpsman receiving an additional 5 for aid bags and
resupply. This will require the open purchase of an initial 170 devices.

Pegasus Command (USPEGCOM) Area Of Responsibility?
The island nation of Neptune a longtime U.S. ally is in a current crisis with Saturn Neptune's
primary regional rival. Saturn has imposed three distinct efforts to improve its strategic position at
the expense of Neptune: Fomenting Insurgency, Naval Blockade, and occupation of Ringneck
Island. In response to this escalation by Saturn, the United States has decided to stand up a Joint
Task Force (JTF) with in the Pegasus Command (USPEGCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)
JTF–PANTHEON command and HQs has been assigned to the Navy by the CCDR "based on the
scope and scale of the operation and nature of the mission"1 being mainly Sea Operations. The JTF
command will also be designated the supported command from the lateral component commands for
The established CMOC "will integrate and synchronize interagency, intergovernmental organization
(IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities with joint force operations".6
TSOC defined by JP 3–05, is "the primary theater SOF organization capable of performing broad
continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities" USPEGCOM will retain COCOM
(inherent OPCON) of SOF, CDRTSOC will also be designated as the joint force special operations
component commander (JFSOCC) by the USPEGCOM.7
The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) an element of USPEGCOM staff is established to
assists with coordination of other USG departments and agencies at the operational level.
The JTF is based upon current doctrine, the scenario, and forces currently available. The command
and control and organization of the JTF explains the need for service and functional components as
well as the effectiveness of dual–hatting in certain situations, and where it could add additional
confusion in other situations. It also explains the multinational, civil–military, SOF, command

Key Communication Failures That Were Exposed During...
Freeman Teague Jr. effectively expresses the importance and complexity of communication. At one
time the U.S. Army defined communication as the exchange and flow of information and ideas from
one person to another; it involves a sender transmitting an idea, information, or feeling to a receiver
(Clark, 2015). Throughout this paper we will expound on key communication failures that were
exposed during Operation Anaconda. The overall verdict is that Anaconda's outcome was a success,
but its original plan was a resounding failure. Many things contributed to the failure, but this paper
will focus on the communication aspect.
"Effective communication occurs only if the receiver understands the exact information or idea that
the sender intended to transmit. Many of the problems that occur in an organization are: the direct
result of people failing to communicate and processes that leads to confusion and can cause good
plans to fail" (Clark, 2015). To understand how some of the soon to be discussed failures arose, all
of the key commanders need to be identified. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began
General Tommy Franks was the CENTCOM Combatant Commander in Tampa, Florida. Events on
9/11 lead to us having forces in Afghanistan soon after. From the beginning of the war Special
Forces (SOF) were the primary assets utilized. As time went on conventional units were joining the
forces in theatre. This caused the need for the Command and Control (C2) structure to adapt to the

The Military Installation Of America 's 21st Century Wars
This is not what war is supposed to look like. That is my first thought upon arriving at MacDill Air
Force Base, Florida, on March 11, 2010. We stop at a small red–roofed gatehouse with a single–
beamed electric post. The quiet entrance of this base, with its red–leafed palms, towering oaks, and
rows of citrus trees, set on a 6,000–acre peninsula, has the appearance of an idyllic beach resort. The
wooden gatehouse is neither substantial nor imposing. It does not hint of Fortress America–nor
would it pass the minimum post–9/11 standards of perimeter security. Its diminutive scale is far out
of proportion to the consequential institutions on the other side. For me, the disparity is jarring.
Small dark lettering at the checkpoint, ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Two participants are American expats, traveling long distances, one from Beijing, the head of Intel's
China operations, and another from Dubai, an infrastructure financier. Two (fc) are military
veterans, one from Naval Special Warfare, and the other, an Army reservist (add detail). I am the one
academic, traveling from Columbia University, to explore research in 9/11 coalition warfare. This is
my first Council trip, and I do not know what to expect. Having completed the membership process
just the year prior, I am (only slowly) acclimating to the wide–ranging company that the Council
keeps. Gatherings at its grand Manhattan house include diverse visitors. From dictator Libyan
President Muammar Gaddafi to human–rights leader South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, it is
a distinctly (alt: distinct? I prefer distinctly though) big–tent approach in keeping with the Council 's
realist principles of international security. Petraeus, then more than two decades as a Council
member, is well–known for a similar broad–ideas stance. More than once described as having the
appearance of a bookworm, rather than and not that of a warrior, Petraeus made the unusual choice
as a young U.S. Army infantry officer to pursue a doctorate (alt: Ph.D.) in international relations at
Princeton University. He credits the move to the advice of an Army superior: Raise your intellectual
sights beyond the maximum effective

Lessons from Operation Eagle Claw
The execution of military operations requires the application of certain fundamental principles, and
tenets that have been the keystone of strategy development and conflict planning, since the
appearance of organized forces. In addition to these tenets and principles, the military relies on the
experience of front line leaders, and lessons learned to ensure operations evolve to focus on current
and emerging threats. Currently, the United States military is waging wars on two fronts, Iraq and
Afghanistan. To be successful, these operations require the coordinated efforts of all branches of
service, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. Unfortunately, joint and special operations haven't
always been executed as smoothly as the current ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Getting the helicopters staged at Desert One proved more difficult than initially imagined. Even
before the initial wave of the helicopters reached Desert One, the mission experienced a loss due to
pilot unfamiliarity with the warning signals of the Navy helicopter. This incident reduced the
available helicopters for the mission, from eight to seven. The weather dealt the mission its second
blow. As the helicopters continued toward Desert One, they encountered severe sandstorms. The
sandstorms proved difficult for the pilots. One pilot became disoriented and turned back, once again
reducing the number of available helicopters, which now stood at six. Once the remaining six
helicopters arrived at Desert One, the operation was ready to proceed. As aircraft and Delta Force
operators were positioned in the final stages for execution, one of the final six helicopters
experienced a hydraulic problem that caused the safety of the craft to be called into question.
Ultimately, this malfunction issued the final blow to the troubled mission. After the order to abort
was confirmed and evacuation initiated, as if to add insult to injury, the already failed mission
received one final fatal blow. While repositioning for departure, one of the five remaining
helicopters passed too closely to a parked C–130 cargo plane. The rotors of the helicopter clipped
the C–130 and sparked an explosion that ultimately killed eight military members. It was later

Anaconda Analysis
Operation Anaconda: Lessons of Unsound Planning
For the first eighteen days of March in the spring of 2002, coalition forces fought Al Qaeda and the
Taliban for the Shah–i–Kot Valley. The operation was named Anaconda because the intent of the
coalition forces was to surround and squeeze the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Shah–i–Kot
Valley into suppression and destroy them. Operation Anaconda was the most aggressive plan of
Operation Enduring Freedom to that point, and ultimately, was a decisive coalition victory that
resulted in fragmented enemy forces in the area for years. However, during Operation Anaconda, the
Coalition Joint Task Force Commander and his staff made fundamental errors in the Joint Operation
Planning Process (JOPP) through assumptions, command relations, and unity of command.
Assumptions
The United States Army 10th Mountain Division Commander (CJTF Mountain) accepted the
command and planning of Operation Anaconda in early February. The overall plan, originally
devised and designed by Special Operation Forces Command, called for coalition forces led by
Afghan Soldiers to drive into the Shah–i–Kot Valley while other U.S. forces and Afghan troops held
a blocking position. Based on intelligence estimates, CJTF Mountain and his staff planned for the Al
Qaeda and Taliban forces to flee into the mountains where U.S. forces were waiting to capture them.
Unfortunately, CJTF Mountain and his staff made many assumptions based on unverified data in
regards

Persuasive Essay On National Service
"Judge a leader by their level of service not their level of privilege," (US Army Ranger). National
service is the big idea of this generation. Citizens should have the opportunity and the responsibility
to serve for their country. National service involves people more with their community by allowing
them to have a voice and participate more with their communities. Citizens will come together
stronger after serving together. General Stanley McChrystal wrote a democracy journal explaining
that it would be in the best interest for everyone to join the service for one year. General Stanley
McChrystal is a retired four–star general and the former commander of the U.S and International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and of the Joint Special Operations Command.
McChrystal talks about how the government is run by the citizens and how the citizens give the
government its voice. Also how the problems that are starting to arise is history itself repeating.
Joining the service for a year gives off opportunity and confidence to the citizens. After the service
these citizens gain a sense of responsibility and hard work needed to pursue their dreams.
Democracy is a system of government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a
state. Joining the military for one year gives many benefits of the citizens because it creates a better
government, it makes a more peaceful community and it gives off a better education. Joining the
military for one year gives many

Anaconda Joint Command Structure
U.S. intelligence underestimated the enemy threat, including its size, location, and brutality. They
also overestimated the reliability of friendly Afghanistan forces no full joint command structure in
the Afghanistan area of responsibility and joint coalition operations had no plan to guide force
operations. In Afghanistan, there was confusion about who was in charge with unity of command.
The Army Task force 10th Mountain was the lead organization during planning and execution of
Anaconda, but it did not yet have full Combined Joint Task Force authority to plan a joint battle
Many of its integrated assets were deployed in different other countries. It had a recently established
a combined Air liaison cell but no fully developed air support ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
The Army had only two infantry companies in tactical reserve in a fluid battle where the withdrawal
of friendly Afghan forces compromised the situation. The air component was not involved in joint
planning far enough to be aware of the Army's branch plans and therefore did not develop unique
branch plans of its own. Essentially, on–call airstrikes against targets of opportunity were Task Force
Mountain's branch plans for the air component. Targets developed by the Task Force daily targeting
board to Combined Force Air Component Commander for consideration and inclusion in the air
tasking order. The air component did not develop a more detailed understanding of the battle on its
own initiative, thus resulting in the Task Force Mountain plan becoming the in fact air campaign
plan. In addition, of being assign to the upcoming operation and coordinated with the different
ground Units per standard doctrine. Time was short, and Task Force Mountain steadily focused on
integrating the complex actions of ground units from the 10th and 101st Divisions, friendly
Afghanistan forces, and Special Forces, including other allied units that were to help block exit
routes along the outer circles of the battlefield. During the battle, Special Operation Forces from
Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, and Norway were expected to help

Critical Functions Of Joint Operations
Joint operations have certain critical functions that help utilize all the tools necessary to operate and
fight jointly. Use of joint operations and joint functions is imperative at operational and strategic
levels of military operations. During all joint missions, Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP)
and Joint Intelligence Planning of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) are critical. Each function
within JOPP and each step within JIPOE help the commander make critical decisions. These
decisions eliminate confusion and assist subordinate commanders in their mission planning. It also
ensures all elements are aware of each other, their mission as well as the overall mission and the
commander's intent.
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Dagger originally developed the mission to rid Shah–
i–Kot Valley of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces by using Afghan forces as the main element with
preparatory air attacks and Close Air Support (CAS). Within a week, it became a joint operation
with Task Force (TF) Mountain is taking the lead, becoming Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)
Mountain. This joint force consists of elements of the 10th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne
Division, U.S. SOF, Australian SOF, U.S. Marines, plus local militias.
On 13 February, CJTF Mountain moves from Uzbekistan to Bagram. This move plus the fact that
CJTF Mountain was only a portion of the necessary staff caused several issues that would plague the
operation. The operation is due to begin six

Anaacond Unity Of Command During Operation Anaconda
Unity of Command during Operation Anaconda "Unity of command is defined as all forces operate
under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a common
purpose." (Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2013, p. V–1). Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) Mountain only had tactical control of some of the organizations involved and due to
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) not being centrally located this caused delays in
decision making. Even though lessons learned from Operation Anaconda has help facilitate unity of
command for future operations; unity of command was a newer concept that the Armed Forces had
not fully operated under.
Leading up to Operation Anaconda Prior to the building up of forces for Operation Anaconda, the
command structure was set up that CENTCOM was working with two subordinate commands.
Those commands were Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition
Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFLCC and CFACC were both staged in the Persian
Gulf and were set to offer support to any operation in Afghanistan from there. Task Force (TF)
Dagger was the only ground force located in Afghanistan. (TF) Dagger consisted of 5th Special
Operation Forces (SOF) and Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) operations. During the build–up and
planning of Operation Anaconda, elements of the 10th Mountain Division Staff were deployed into
the CENTCOM's area of responsibility. While doing their

Operation Eagle Claw, And It Was A Failure
November 4th 1979American personnel at the US embassy are taken hostage in Teheran, Iran. The
United States had never faced a hostage situation like this before. It did not have the Joint Special
Operations Task Force trained in planning the mission or the resources for low visibility clandestine
missions. The mission to save the hostages is called Operation Eagle Claw, and it was a failure. This
mission on the other hand highlighted areas in the military that need tobe improved, and when the
country required to carry out special operation missions in the future those resources would be there
and ready.
Militant student, followers of the Ayatollah stormed the Embassy and took all personnel hostage.
This was the second time in 1979 the embassy was taken and only a few people remained behind its
gates. The students only planned to take the hostages for a few days, hopping that the United States
would return the ousted Shah, to face trial. When the US refused, to return the Shah, the stalemate
began, and the students held the hostages for 444 days.
The US realized that the hostages are not being released as before, and a rescue mission was needed
to secure their freedom. A group was quickly put together to plan the rescue. Dubbed Operation Rice
Bowl, flag officers from every branch of the military, began to plan the mission and gather
intelligence. The officers of the planning, operations ensured that every branch of the military would
have a piece of the mission; no

Running head: OPERATION ANACONDA JOINT PLANNING 1 OPERATION ANACONDA
JOINT PLANNING 7 Operation Anaconda Joint Planning SFC Durham, Joshua B. Master Leader
Course Operation Anaconda Joint Planning Enemy combatants, in familiar terrain, chose to stand
and fight from fortified positions; forcing commanders to improvise and adapt quickly to unforeseen
circumstances. Support elements received the operational order within just one week of the expected
execution date. Staff elements created analysis and plans on poor intelligence estimates and recent
experience. Strategic planners also failed to establish command and control of the assault force.
Lack of forethought for an integrated joint operation, although ultimately successful, led to the death
of U.S. service members. Joint planning for Operation Anaconda, with its complex variables
requiring integrated skills, failed to account for enemy variables, withheld information from support
elements, and failed to establish effective command and control. Enemy Initial planning to execute
Operation Anaconda was to employ the ?hammer and anvil? technique. This technique uses a
primary assault force, ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Commanders assigned U.S. Special Forces, the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Airborne
Division, U.S. Air Force aircraft, and Afghan military forces as significant contributors to the overall
mission accomplishment. With the amount of subordinate units, information must be detailed and
specific for those involved. In early February, intelligence identified large concentrations of enemy
forces in the target area. However, preparation for the mission did not include allied forces
personnel. Planning for Operation Anaconda finalized 13 February without the Combined Forces
Air Component Commander, LTG Mosley. LTG Mosley finally learned of plans on 23 February,
five days before the intended start date of 28

Structure Of Operation Anaconda
Command Structure
Command structure is the organizational hierarchy through which administrative leadership or
operational authority is exercised (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2017). The
United States' armed forces and other coalition forces encountered an estimated 1,000 enemy troops
and killed hundreds during Operation Anaconda. However, defeating these enemy forces required
commanders and staff members to scramble to coordinate and rush reinforcements into battle after
the shooting begun. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain headquarters failure to
establish and maintain tactical control, operational control, or situational awareness (SA) of special
operations forces and other inter–agencies led to unity of command confusion during the execution
of Operation Anaconda.
Command Structure before Operation Anaconda
The United States and its allies responded against Al Qaida members and their Taliban sponsors in
Afghanistan after their 11 September 2001 (commonly referred to as 9/11) attack on New York City
and Washington D.C. The initial crisis action planning, developed with limited intelligence and
without a well–defined end state, had a significant impact on the overall mission and the concept of
operations in Afghanistan and the region, specifically U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command
(MARCENT) was located in Hawaii and maintained small support staffs in Tampa and Bahrain. The
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) did not have a standing

Anaconda Command Structure
Command Structure Operation Anaconda
Introduction
The command structure in United States Military is vital to the success of missions carried out in or
outside the country. The Department of Defense is responsible for overseeing the establishment of
command hierarchies that work for specific units. The commands, guidelines, and orders are passed
from the highest–ranking personnel to lowest ranking officers who must perform the directive or
pass it to subordinates with the same instructions. The principles that establish the command
structure in the military evaluates the performance of each command and the officers involved in the
various missions. The key principles that affected the execution of Operation Anaconda resulting in
mission deficiencies are organizational structure, decision–making, and collaboration. Operation
Anaconda The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) aimed at destroying terror groups
Taliban and al–Qaeda carried out operation Anaconda. The operation was executed in March 2002
outside the valley of Shahi–Kot in Zormat area, Afghanistan (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, Searle, 2003).
The task included forces that required direct command and instruction from their Commanders. The
mission was in direct link with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office and CENTCOM with
the General Tommy R. Franks as the officer in charge that received, analyzed and provided real–
time intelligence. Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, of the 10th

Special Operations Research Paper
JP 3–05 states: "Special Operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques,
procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or
diplomatically sensitive environments." It also explains that they: "may differ from conventional
operations in degree of strategic, physical, and political and/or diplomatic risk; operational
techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets." The U.S.
Marine Corps performed special operations from its inception: The 1776 raid on New Providence in
the Bahamas provides an early example. In the twentieth century's "Banana Wars," Marines battled
insurgents, advised and led friendly local forces, and provided civil governance ... Show more
content on Helpwriting.net ...
Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command were no longer institutionally

J4 Logistics Department
As Senior Civilian Executive and Deputy to the Director of Logistics (J4) participates with the
Directorate and staff in planning and supporting all operations and provides continuity rotation of
Director of Logistics. Serves as principal advisor the Director of Logistics, Senior Civilian in the J4,
and serves as the acting Director in the Director's absence and for matters not requiring the personal
attention of the Director. Provides logistics support and advice to the Director and four logistics
Division Chiefs; synchronizes logistics planning amongst four logistics divisions; and facilitates
long range logistics planning for prospective changes in functions and programs. Utilizes knowledge
about US Africa Command, DoD, Service, and Joint ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Southern Command, and the Property Book/Accountable Officer. The functional areas are complex,
diverse, and unique in scope and mission and provide support to SOCSOUTH component units. The
functional areas include: Warehouse Operations Section, Plans & Exercises Section, Motor Pool
Operations Section, Arms Room Operations, Supply Operations Section, Property
Book/Accountability, Joint Operational Stock, and Sustainment Asset Visibility and Information
Exchange. The Deputy J–4 is the principal consultant to the directorate, providing advice and
assistance in mission accomplishment over the wide spectrum of Logistics Standard Operating
Procedures (LOG SOPs) responsibilities, which include: war planning, strategic planning, peacetime
engagement, command relationships, organization, equipment modernization, acquisition processes,
training accomplishment, exercises, logistics command and control, logistics readiness, special
operations, nuclear/chemical personnel equipment management, operational security, strategy and
policy, programming/budgeting, combat logistics development, research and development, reserve
components, readiness, and combating terrorism. As the Property Book/Accountable Officer, the
incumbent functions as the technical advisor and authority on all matters relating to property and
regulatory requirements effecting property administration. Responsible for all proposals, data

Joint Warfare Research Paper
What are the advantages and disadvantages of joint warfare? Discuss with reference to a specific
campaign.
Joint Warfare
According to the United States, joint warfare is 'team warfare'. (DTIC, 2017) Joint warfare is a
military action by an Armed Forces that is either conducted by Joint Task Forces or the employment
of the different services to work under command relationship. Joint warfare requires coordination of
the respective services through their domain proficiencies and field of expertise. Civilian partner
agencies can also be engaged to enhance joint operations (DTIC, 2013).
Despite the risk of having unclear command relationship and the over–reliance on technology that
might lead to a defeat, Joint Warfare is the key to victory because it allows harnessing of technology,
integration and synchronisation of forces and exercises the creativity in warfighting as seen by the
British in the Falklands War.
Importance of Clear Command Relationship
Joint warfare is characterised by the presence of several distinct forces working in concerted effort
to accomplish a mission. These forces are likely to have been raised under ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
Regarding the Falklands war, the presence of the Task Force Commander on the 'ground' can
significantly increase the confidence in executing the proposed plans and accomplishing the
objectives. As seen when Admiral Fieldhouse "moved forward" and flew to Ascensions Islands for a
planning meeting where he briefed his team on the current political climate, the plans that derived
from his assessment and the subordinates in turn could give their views. This resulted in the team of
commanders having clear objectives and aware of the political situation (Oakley, 1989). Besides the
aforementioned approach, another alternative was to appoint a senior ground commander, such as
Rear Admiral Woodward, as the Superior Ground Commander with command responsibilities over
the rest of the task group

USAFRICOM, ETF-TS
INFORMATION PAPER
1. SUBJECT: Information on the command relationships within USAFRICOM, CTF–T, and
CJSOTF, CFLCC, CFMCC, CFACC, and CCMOTF.
2. PURPOSE: Explain to the J–3 'Who works for who?' and 'What are various commanders
allowed/not allowed to do given the prescribed command relationships?'.
5. KEY POINTS:
USAFRICOM – Geographic Combatant Command for most of the continent of Africa.
CTF–T – Combined Task Force Tunisia. A task force stood up by USAFRICOM commander in
order to address the ongoing crisis in Tunisia.
USAFRICOM is COCOM to CTF–T
o USAFRICOM has a COCOM with command authority and, based upon the COCOM designation
and the referenced wire diagram, can exercise command authority over CTF–T. Commander CTF–T
The US Joint Force is optimized to conduct operations against the DPRK. They are manned, trained,
and equipped to adequately respond to any real or perceived threat. With more than 20,000
American troops ready to respond at any given moment and more than four million ROK soldiers
ready to take arms in the event of conflict, the Joint Force will have enough time to 'hold the line'
until further reinforcements arrive, as necessary. Additionally, with no less than two formal joint
exercises held on the peninsula annually with the aim of defending the ROK from attack, the current
forces based on the peninsula are trained and prepared to fight. Finally, the current lay–down of
forces includes troops from every major service within the United States. This lay–down gives the
CFC the flexibility he needs to conduct any scope of military operations necessary to protect the
ROK and defend its people. Conversely, if/when both peace and de–nuclearization occur between
the DPRK and ROK then it would likely be prudent to re–address the force structure, including the
possibility of troop drawdown and US Joint Force

How To Be A Navy Seal
I conducted my research about 3 days on my topic. Each day I found a new website to study and use
for my research paper. I found many results for my question; What are the steps to be a Navy Seal?
When I was researching the first day I remember an easier way to find my topic, and help me to find
good sites to use. Before my real research I just needed to look up Navy Seals in the Google search
bar with no quotes to see how many hits I would get. Than I looked up Navy Seals using quotes to
see what if it gets better results for my research. I found that using the quotes shorten the hits from
about 3 million to 8 hundred thousand. This made my time even easier, because if I did not use the
quotes trick it would be harder to find legitimate ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The website also talked about how Navy Seals recruits have to be prepared for training, the website
talked about how first hand reports of what the recruits went through and eyewitnesses. One of the
training week is called Hell week where there's intense training for a whole week. When I was
looking up Hell week on the Third day I wanted to learn more about their boot camp and how it was
important for a Navy Seal to go through this. My Final topic was How hard is "Navy Seal" Boot
Camp? This brought me to a website called FutureNavySeals.com and the website gave me a some
background on how the training was and it was given by a real Navy Seal military expert, and he
talked about how training was one of the important steps to be a Navy Seal. This is one of the many
important steps of my research. The End of Day three I had all my sources, but I wanted to add one
more, A video, I was thinking of adding a YouTube video on the Navy seal hell week but I found
most of it was biased and

Operation Anaconda Case Study
Task Organization during Operation Anaconda
SFC Albert G. Davis
MLC 02–18
MSG Gina R. Aceves Task Organization during Operation Anaconda
The war in the Middle East was in full effect and the United States Central Command (CENTCOM)
already had forces in the Afghanistan area of responsibility (AOR). These pre–positioned troops
were the result of intelligence reports that showed the Taliban and al Qaeda were hiding out in the
Shahi–Khot valley in Afghanistan. CENTCOM'S poor task organization for the multiple coalition
forces on the ground and air contributed to the breakdown of Task Force Mountain's battle plan.
Available Assets Task organization is creating an operating force, support staff, or sustainment
package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (Department of the ...
Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The lack of tactical control (TACON) with the amount of different forces engaged in the operation
made command authority an issue. (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2013)
The Joint Task Force (JTF) did not have the TACON it should have had with the SOF. Prior to the
start of the JTF Mountain, the SOF operated under the control of the Joint Special Operations Task
Force and bypassed the Joint Commander. SOF groups needed to be inserted at a time when the air
support was not bombing the valley.
Task force command and control (C2) was a major issue when key staff elements were not present.
The continuing air support need for the attack on the valley required more air controllers than
CENTCOM would allow the JTF to have in the AOR. Without enough air liaisons for each group
they began to us the air control elements of the Airforce.

Personal Statement: Joint Special Operations Command
I believe that I am ideally suited for an assignment at the Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) because of my eclectic experience throughout my United States (U.S.) Army career ranging
from special operations forces (SOF) units and conventional units both tactical and force generation.
I have worked at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This experience runs from team
medic through battalion senior operations sergeant major. These positions include working out of
the United States Embassies in Mali and Mauritania to being the J3IO Senior Enlisted Leader in
Afghanistan. Additionally, I have worked with 5th Special Forces group in Iraq and 3rd Special
Forces Group in Afghanistan. Furthermore, I have experience working with U.S. Army Europe and
U.S. European Command developing some of the current crisis contingency plans to include the
strategic engagement strategy for Civil Affairs and the U.S. Country teams in that area of operations.
Army Medical Department and Medical Command (AMEDD/MEDCOM) senior enlisted leadership
on multiple initiatives like manning, training, and force structure. Additionally, I continue to work
on furthering the SOF and AMEDD/MEDCOM relationship. Furthermore, I currently maintain a
seat on the Joint Medical Enlisted Advisor Committee (JMEAC) and the Curriculum Evaluation
Board (CEB) for United States Special Operations Command. As a member of the JMEAC I assist
in making decisions that directly impact all of the SOF Medics to include those currently assigned to
JSOC. As a member of the CEB I am directly responsible for reviewing and writing different
portions of the final evaluation and certification exam, Advanced Tactical Paramedic (ATP), for all
SOF medics. Furthermore, I have intimate knowledge of the Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee (IACUC) and protocols of each

General Mcchrystal Research Paper
General McChrystal's Impact on the United States Military Our nation's military continuously
evolves to ensure success in future operations. This change is only be possible if our top leaders
work in concert towards a common goal. The purpose of this document is to highlight how General
Stanley McChrystal changed the manner in which the U.S. Military operates and communicates in
an ever–changing environment. General McChrystal was born in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1954
to a military family. Embracing the family tradition, McChrystal enrolled in the United States
Military Academy at West Point in 1972. Following graduation from West Point, McChrystal served
in the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division until 1979, when he completed his Special Forces at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina and was assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group. ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
After commanding in 75th Ranger Regiment, he completed the Command and Staff Course at the
Naval War College and in 1990 he was assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command.
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, McChrystal served both in Desert Shield and Desert Storm
and later returned to Fort Bragg to command the 504th Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division.
Following his command at Fort Bragg, McChrystal led the 75th Ranger Regiment and later became
the commander of the Joint Special Operation Command. In May 2009 General McChrystal became
the top commander in Afghanistan due to his experience in Special Operations and counter
insurgency operations. Although he was the top commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal
made his biggest impact earlier in Iraq by changing how our nation's military conducted mission

Operation Anaconda Case Study
Introduction Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation
Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern
Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2–16
March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, "The largest
concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan". Operation Anaconda Case Study
(2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove
critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets.
Operation Anaconda lacked unity ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
However; MG Hagenbeck was only given operational control of certain ground elements that were
slated to be involved in the mission. He was not given command of the U.S air component from the
Air Force, Navy or Marines, who were slated to support Anaconda ground operations. MG
Hagenbeck also did not have command authority of the friendly Afghan forces who were to play a
major role in the operation. Afghan forces coupled with U.S. Army Special Operations Forces were
the "Hammer" that would drive al Qaeda and Taliban fighters toward the "Anvil" composed of U.S.
forces and Afghan forces. Anaconda nearly became a crushing defeat for the U.S forces, because of
the number of competing commands that were assigned major roles of responsibility in the
operation.
Competing Command Structures
As Operation Anaconda took shape the command structure became very convoluted. MG
Hagenbeck had command and control (C2) of the majority of the U.S. ground force elements, but
not all of them. There was a separate chain of command for black Special Operations Forces (SOF)
and inter–agency operations. These forces reported directly to CENTCOM, and had different
priorities and the authority to request and receive support from a variety of the same assets needed
for Operation Anaconda, to include AC 130 gunships. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003)
U.S. air forces were under the command of the Combined Force Air Component Commander
(CFACC) and its Combined Air Operations

Global Comprehensive Security Transformation
Global Comprehensive Security Transformation (GCST) made a proposal based on three specific
objectives, planning and methodology of operational activities, collection and unifying intelligence,
and construction of operational capabilities. GCST offered advice in the following areas,
implementation of research methodology, recollection of intelligence with technological
capabilities, and the creation of three hierarchical levels of task like National Planning Group,
National Planning team, and Implementation. Advance efforts aimed to lead the collection of
intelligence on targets of high strategic value, structure the Joint Operation Center, and establish an
office for Command and Control Center. Within the proposal specified that in its content, ... Show
more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The first strategic result was in September 2007, when Tomas Medina Caracas, Known as El Negro
Acacio leader of the 16th terrorist front was killed in development of Military operation; this
terrorist was one of the high value targets, which the Joint Special Operation Command selected
during the analysis of the principal leaders of the terrorist from Colombia FARC. The action took
place in the village of Buenos Aires, jurisdiction of the municipality of San Jose del Guaviare. More
over the Unites States wanted this terrorist in order to take to the court for his shipping of cocaine to
its country. The effectivity of the governmental organization finally was gave its operational result,
with a precise intelligence information and the support of the Air Force.
As a result of the accuracy intelligence information of the Joint Special Operation Command, in
October 2007 one more time the COESE, operative level of this organization killed in development
of Military Operation the terrorist Gustavo Rueda known as Martin Caballero. He was the leader of
the 37th front of the terrorist Armed Forces. The mentioned terrorist was on the list of targets of high
strategic value. This operation was a Joint action between the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in
the Department of Bolivar.

Joint Special Operation Command Job Analysis

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