1. Abenomics and the
Japanese wealth gap
Naomi Fink – CEO, Europacifica Consulting
November 2013
1

2. Intro: A framework to
examine Abenomics
In the early days of the Abe Administration, public
(and market) expectations appear to be riding high
What are the chances the public will be
disappointed?
Hint: in order to estimate this, we need to agree about
what we expect from Abe, as well as what we expect
from the rest of the world
What are the implications for the conduct of policy
given these expectations?
2
What are the implications for welfare (aggregate or
relative) if Abe’s policy succeeds or fails?
2

3. What can we expect from
public policy?
We assume that elected policy-makers attempt to maximise
the welfare of their electorate (or at least minimise the loss), if
only to remain in office.
Most OECD governments, even those with purported “free
market” platforms, not only care about aggregate welfare,
but also relative welfare (to some degree) and thus some
form of redistribution (transfers, national insurance, pensions,
tax progressivity, etc). Example: OECD notes that social
transfers allayed much of the shock to market income from
GFC
Devising a redistribution rule that leaves nobody worse-off is a
tough proposition.
3
The attractiveness of Reaganomics/Thatcherism came alongside
the image of the “rising tide” (aggregate growth) that “lifts all
boats”.
Did it? Possibly not, but it mattered more at the time whether we
believed it would.
3

4. Framework for examining
public policy
Setup of the policy problem:
To stay in office, governments will make policy promises to
minimise welfare losses (and thus stay in office)
Circumstances will often lead to temptation to shift policy to
gain a more optimal result, abandoning commitment
If the public perceives that temptation is greater than the
political cost of breaking promises given (a) particular
outcome(s), they shift their expectations such that the
implemented policy may no longer be optimal (enforcement)
Policy with commitment is more likely when the cost of
enforecement outweighs temptation to deviate
4
Incomplete markets mean there exists uncertainty…
4

5. A few sources of uncertainty
Economic cycles
Probabilities associated with welfare gains/losses
associated with economic fluctuations
Externalities
Natural disasters
Geopolitical risk
Economic crises
Overseas investment flows/foreign exchange
Asymmetries
5
“Disorderly” inflation risk is greater than welfare loss
associated with deflation
5

6. Source: http://www.kantei.go.jp/
What does this mean for Abe?
We need to estimate all of these factors if we want to answer
our initial questions on Abenomics!
We can use Reagan/Thatcher policy examples for qualitative
comparison/contrast(since we know outcomes) in doing so.
6

7. What can we expect from
Abenomics?
Expectations: So far, things look good for Abe: early
gauges – market signals (stock market, yen) show
positive expectations
Problem: Some probability for implementation to
diverge from expectations (no commitment), and if
potential divergence is too far, this means loss of
credibility. Is the cost to the Abe administration of
credibility loss (eventual regime change) greater
than the temptation to deviate from reform
promises?
Sources of Uncertainty:
7
Asymmetrical credibility risks (especially for the BOJ)
Externalities: e.g. US monetary policy, Chinese growth,
crises in the rest of the world
7

8. What do these possibilities
mean for the wealth gap?
Although cutting capital taxes are a fairly robust way to
maximise future aggregate consumption growth and thus
aggregate welfare (e.g. Chamley, Atkeson/Chari),
cutting capital taxes too radically can widen welfare
gaps (Conesa/Kitao/Kruger, Marcet/Mila/Ventura)
If implementation succeeds, it is possible that the wealth
gap widens, in the absence of income transfers (either
implicit or explicit)
This is one area in which comparing/contrasting
Abenomics with the policies of Reagan and Thatcher may
be useful
8
If implementation fails, it is possible that Japan continues
to “spread the disutility” – deflation is not only damaging
to debtors, it is regressive without fiscal adjustments
8

9. Japan’s wealth gap: “spreading
the disutility”
High income earners are
getting no richer… but poor
are getting poorer
..Yet deflation is regressive –
high-capital earning retirees
gain more in deflation years
2.7
2.6
3000000
2.5
P90/P50
disposable
income decile
ratio i
2.3
2.2
2.1
2
1.9
1.8
2900000
P50/P10
disposable
income decile
ratio i
2.4
2600000
2800000
Median disposable
income (constant
prices)
2700000
2500000
Mean disposable
income 65+ age
group
2400000
2300000
2009
2006
2003
2000
2200000
1985
1985 1995 2000 2003 2006 2009
1995
1.7
Source: http://www.oecd.org/
9

10. Post Crisis: Wealth gap shows
why OECD fears Japan-like
pattern
Japan is still in the disutilityspreading minority
But transgenerational gap is
growing across OECD
5. Poorer households tended to lose more or gain less
Annual percentage changes in disposable income between 2007 and 2010 1, by income group
5%
Total (↗ )
0%
Top 10%
-5%
-10%
Bottom
10%
Ic
el
M and
e
G xico
re
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Ire ce
Es land
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ga
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et rtu
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A u rwa
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ov ia
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Fr nia
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Sw stri
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ub
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O
EC
D
-3
3
-15%
Notes: See notes to Figure 1. Information on data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm)
Source: http://www.oecd.org/
10

11. 11
Identifying Policy
Parameters
First steps: we can identify Reagan/Thatcher
expectations and outcome and find policy
analogues for Abe
11

12. Commitment, under
Reagan and Thatcher
Reagan/Thatcher ideologies mostly comprised:
Rhetorical/ideological commitment to monetarist
policies, pressure for central bank to fight inflation
(not to monetise debt) and (in Thatcher’s case)
rejection of Keynesian policies
Reagan: Emphasis on capital tax cuts and
elimination of progressivity of inflation, reallocation of
spending to defence
Thatcher: Emphasis on deregulation of industry and
privatisation – “structural” reform
12
12

13. Use potential outcomes to
identify policy paths….
Actual outcomes for Reagan/Thatcher:
Perceived commitment to their respective policy paths,
independent of popularity of these policies.
Temptation<Enforcement
Reagan: capital tax cuts and reallocation of government
spending
Thatcher: deregulation of labour and numerous government
privatisations
Inflation, high at first in both areas decreased (possibly thanks
to the Volcker Fed’s commitment)
Economic growth (one measure of welfare), anemic at first,
picked up by the end of both administrations (no definitive
causality)
Fiscal, policy, structural consequences:
US government debt/GDP swelled, UK debt/GDP subsided
The “great moderation” in inflation continued
Greater wealth gap at the end of Reagan/Thatcher regimes
13
13

14. Plus lower-probability (now
0%)events, for example…
Stagflation: Volcker Fed fails to maintain credibility,
falls prey to asymmetric inflation expectations, fails
to subdue inflation, unemployment remains high and
real incomes drop within Reagan’s two terms; cost:
welfare loss, risk of regime change (for Reagan,
possibly for Thatcher)
Reagan: Capitalists show scepticism over Reagan’s
corporate tax cuts (perceiving
temptation>enforcement), fearing budgetbalancing hikes in the future (in actuality, Reagan
did hike 11 times). Growth fails to pick up; cost:
perceived welfare loss, risk of regime change
14
14

15. Plus lower-probability (now
0%)events, for example…
Thatcher: budget hike fails to quell investor concerns
over the UK government budget (clashes with BoE seen
as loss of central bank autonomy sabotaging inflationfighting credentials), UK sees flight of capital and forced
austerity is imposed; cost: perceived welfare loss (rise in
rates, drop in transfers), risk of regime change
Thatcher: deregulation of labour loses traction among
voting populace and reform is diluted (optimal, but
time inconsistent policy), companies fail to increase
hiring activity, unemployment remains high; cost: failure
of welfare improvement, regime change
Reagan: Failure to negotiate an increase in the debt
ceiling (raised 18 times under Reagan), compelling
renewed, unpopular tax hikes, forcing reversal of prior
cuts (time inconsistency). cost: perception of default,
regime change
15
15

16. Commitment, for Abe
Monetary: Rhetorical/ideological commitment to
monetarism (Deflation-fighting) without rejection of
Keynesian policies.
The above poses a time-consistency question for the
BOJ’s monetary policy in its willingness to reflate, then in its
ability to subdue eventual inflation
Fiscal: expectations for fiscal easing within the cycle,
expectations for eventual fiscal tightening (consumption
tax hikes, goal to halve the primary balance surplus). No
expectations either for aggressive moves either way
Structural: Expectations for reallocation of government
spending to create labour reallocation incentives; slight
expectations for prouctivity-enhancing capital
reallocation incentives (Japan Post privatisation, TPP,
SEZ’s) but potential for temptation>enforcement here
16
16

17. Use potential outcomes to
identify policy paths
Potential outcomes for Abe (examples):
“Good” Global markets continue their rally, driving
reflation in asset markets, spilling over to Japan. Yet
global inflation remains low enough for the Fed to
withdraw accommodation amid low inflation
expectations. The BOJ leaves stimulus in place until
2% is in sight, and slowly withdraws in an inflating
market, while reflation allows Abe’s regime to survive
long enough to embark upon structural reform while
inflating away existing debt.
17
17

18. Use potential outcomes to
identify policy paths
“Bad” The rally in global markets proves ephemeral and the
Fed leaves policy accommodation in place for longer than
originally expected. Japan remains mired in deflation, as BOJ’s
“commitment” to reflate the economy is not seen as strong
enough, in a situation of ongoing global stagnation. Without
reflation, Abe is unable to deliver on even the mild structural
reforms the market expects.
“Ugly” Markets lose confidence in the FOMC’s commitment to
keeping inflation under control, and inflation expectations
spiral uncontrollably. The BOJ, tarred by the same brush as the
Fed, fails to enforce its 2% target on the upside, and is left to
hike rates after prices have already zoomed. Failure to boost
productivity in the services sector results in lagging wage
inflation even as wage rigidities contribute to higher
unemployment; meanwhile consumer savings are inflated
away alongside government debt balances.
18
18

19. Potential outcomes for the
welfare gap (examples)
“Good/Good” The rally in global markets assists capitalists, who
redeploy profits and create jobs, while inflation enforces the
greater progressivity of income tax brackets even as
consumption tax increases are imposed. Tax receipts rise and
transfers are directed to reinforcing the social safety net,
facilitating implementation of labour reform and further
structural reform; aggregate growth improves the situation of
all and redistribution (via monetary and fiscal policy, transfers)
keeps the wealth gap in check
“Good/Bad” Global markets continue their rally and give rise to
modest inflation, yet the combination of higher income and
corporate tax revenues are insufficient to fund new transfers.
To appeal to capitalists (and reverse progressivity), the
government inflation-adjusts tax brackets. Interest rates rise,
forcing the government to inflate away existing debt balances
but reducing their capacity to establish a social safety net.
Support fails to crystallise either for labour reform, trade
liberalisation or other productivity-boosting measures. The
wealth gap widens without structural reform
19
19

20. Potential outcomes for the
welfare gap (examples) II
“Bad”/Good” Reflation persists for a period, but the BOJ reacts
too early or aggressively and its 2% target loses credibility.
However, due to a healthy global market abroad, the
government is able to inflate away a large enough portion of
debt to regain credibility in its efforts to regain primary balance.
The BOJ’s failure to monetise debt moreover reinforces
credibility in the government’s improved fiscal condition; while
Japanese growth under-performs, some productivityenhancing structural reform takes place. Aggressive cuts to
capital taxes do not take place, thus allowing mild reflation to
introduce a greater degree of tax progressivity.
“Bad/Bad” The global market rally falters and Japan falls back
into deflation. Structural reforms fail to be implemented, and
the government remains constrained in its fiscal maneuver;
while the BOJ’s policy is time-consistent with regard to fighting
inflation, it cannot be consistent in fighting deflation and it is
the government’s debt-monetisation pressures that suffer from
lack of credibility. The slow erosion of aggregate and relative
welfare (thanks to lack of adjustment of tax brackets)
continues.
20
20

21. Potential outcomes for the
welfare gap (examples) III
“Ugly”/Bad Inflation surges far above the BOJ’s 2%
target and despite the tax-progressiveness of inflation,
languishing productivity fails to keep wage growth in
line with inflation on aggregate. The ability for firms in
certain sectors to innovate (manufacturing, IT sectors)
and thus reduce costs contrasts starkly with those who
cannot (services, in which 70% of the labour force is
employed) and aggravates the two-speed economy,
widening the wealth gap along sector lines. The
services sector fails to maintain its function of absorbing
capacity spillover from the more productive
manufacturing sector. The government inflates away
debt but its credibility damaged, is unable to spend a
sufficient amount to establish an adequate
redistribution rule.
“Ugly/Ugly” inflation spirals out of control and depositors
dump the yen and capital flight ensues. Those who get
out in time retain a far greater part of lifetime wealth.
21
21

22. Assign probabilities to each
scenario, solve backward…
If we can do this in a manner that reflects public
opinion, we can estimate the distribution of risks (to
the upside and downside) to welfare that will
dictate the credibility of the Abe administration in its
ability to carry out its stated policy goals.
By setting relative wealth as the welfare measure,
we also estimate the risks to the welfare gap – to the
upside and downside, as a function of how the
public is likely to react in each scenario (weighted
by likelihood, of course).
22
22

23. Recovering First
Best
We want the optimal outcome, and if only to
remain in office, so does Abe. How do we get
it?
23

24. Back to the “Three Arrows”
Fiscal policy
The policy: Promising reflationary growth alongside
maintaining fiscal discipline is by nature a tough
proposition. With little room to ease, they are reliant
on the BOJ to offer monetary stimulus (which can be
time-inconsistent). Mentions of potential corporate
tax cuts gain a lukewarm reception. Consumption
tax hikes may reinforce fiscal credibility but are seen
by many (e.g. IMF) as insufficient.
Is it optimal? The risk of jeapordising the BOJ’s
credibility is not optimal. There remains “temptation”
either for the BOJ to give up its 2% target or for the
government to abandon goals to halve the primary
balance deficit by 2015
24
24

25. Back to the “Three Arrows”
Monetary policy
The policy: Stock and foreign exchange markets tell
us they rate the Kuroda BOJ’s 2% inflation target and
stepped up asset purchases, but to some extent, this
rally is driven by cyclical recovery in Japan and
abroad, supported by the Fed’s monetary policy.
Is it optimal? There is asymmetric risk of inflation
surging out of control. So long as everybody
believes the probability of this event is extremely low
this policy could be optimal.
25
25

26. Back to the “Three Arrows”
Structural reform
The policy: Carrying through a partial privatisaton of
Japan Post. Pursuing experimental labour and
capital reform through special economic zones, with
emphasis on specific sectors. Trade liberalisation
(TPP) seen as one avenue to bolster productivity.
Is it optimal? Most likely too early to tell and pathdependent. As the Koizumi administration learned,
reflation makes structural reform more palatable to
voters. For now, substantial risks remain in the timing,
as well as the temptation to deviate from promises
of more aggressive reforms.
26
26

27. Comparison to
Reagan/Thatcher
Platforms:
Monetary: Reagan reinforced inflation-fighting
activities from Volcker’s Fed while Thatcher used
fiscal policy to subvert BoE power to fight inflation.
Fiscal: Reagan voiced commitment to tax cuts;
Thatcher to spending cuts (alongside some income
tax cuts) - overall fiscal tightening.
Structural reform: Reagan’s fiscal reform credentials
overshadowed regulatory; Thatcher’s platform
focused around privatisations and labour
deregulation
27
27

28. Comparison to
Reagan/Thatcher
Commitment: perception of time-consistent policy
kept both in office
Was it optimal?
Monetary: The Fed’s ability to keep inflation in check
has been lauded, but there remains no proof that this
policy was by nature optimal (Primiceri paper)
Fiscal: Laffer curve dynamics (espoused by Reagan
especially in justifying supply-side policies) do not
actually differ so greatly in Japan and the US..
Corporate tax rates are comparable, bases are narrow
Structural: Thatcher’s reforms were credible – some
argue optimal on aggregate; many argue sub-optimal
when examined with respect to relative wealth.
28
28

29. Reagan Thatcher & inflation
cost: Too great to deviate?
Good luck: One massive difference is that the
US/UK were in an enviable position when in regard
to monetary policy – they were in a position to
tame the huge inflation created in the 1970’s by the
Oil shock.
High inflation risk also meant high cost of deviation:
the cost of losing credibility on inflation-fighting was
likely perceived as much greater than the
temptation to re-optimise policy to give rise to
interim growth
Would Fed policy have worked under different
conditions?
29
Primiceri results give rise to scepticism
29

30. Even Volcker’s activism is
questioned in retrospect
“Too loose” policy in 70’s &
80’s vs activist in 90’s
But Primeceri questions Fed
activism effect
Source: Cogley & Sargent (2003)
Source: Primeceri (2005)
30

31. For Abe, structural reform is
contingent upon…
Successful monetary policy – money is neutral long-term,
but reflation is a pre-requisite to structural reform
Credible fiscal policy – nobody expects the world from
Abe, given limited range of maneuver, so refraining from
aggressive fiscal tightening may be as much as we can
hope for. Still, Japanese debt holders perceive risk of
Japanese default, so “temptation” to deviate from
primary balance targets is substantial.
Good luck – “Goldilocks” growth in the US and “just right”
accommodation from the Fed, attenuation of Europe
crisis risks, etc
31
Structural reform will remain, in retrospect the true
measure of Abenomics’ success
31

32. Structural
Reform and
Productivity
Can Abe attain Japan’s post-bubble holy grail
of policy?
32

33. Potential for Structural
Reform in Japan
Via structural reform, we strive to maximise the contributions
of factors of production
Capital: Japan’s capital/output ratio rose in the 1990’s (as
did depreciation costs)
Labour: Labour hours dropped significantly over the 90’s
and have kept decreasing– labour’s share of income also
decreased
Labour “productivity” (output per worker) rose as labour hours
fell faster than output
Total Factor Productivity growth (highly correlated with per
capita output) has been on a downtrend since the
1990’s.
33
Technlological advancement
Efficiency gains in allocation of labour
Efficiency gains in allocation of capital
33

34. Drivers of Japanese Growth
Study by Hayashi & Prescott: TFP contributed
0.43% of the 3.95% decline in value-added
between pre and post lost decade (the periods
of 1983-1991 and 1992-1998).
Similar results from my own model (next slide).
34
34

35. Drivers of Japanese growth
Source: Naomi Fink, 2013
35

36. What is unusual about
Japan TFP?
Source: BIS, 2013
36

37. Why it is necessary to take a
closer look at deflation
Price declines are not only due to lack of demand
– some of them are thanks to technology!
37
Source: Naomi Fink, 2013
37

38. Deflation and “investment
specific technology”
An even better fit in simulation using IST!
Base case:
With investment-specific technology:
Detrended real GDP per working age person in Japan
130
base case model
Index (1989=100)
120
38
110
data
100
90
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Source: Naomi Fink, 2013
38

39. TFP: No surprise; gap in
sector growth accounting
39
Source: JIP, Naomi Fink, 2013
39

40. TFP: Results hold upon more
detailed sector examination
40
Source: JIP, Naomi Fink, 2013
40

41. Empirical Studies: Panel
Regression 1, Regulation &
Subsidies
Endogenous variables:
Exogenous variables (from the JIP database):
A = our own measure of productivity growth
(Solow residual), by industry
TFPDA: TFP growth rates (baseline case,
adjusted for quality of labour only)
TFPDB: TFP growth rates (ex- quality of labour)
TFPDC: TFP growth rates adjusted for capacity
utilization, intermediate inputs)
TFPDD: TFP growth rates adjusted for capacity
utilization, production indices).
REG1 : Regulation index with some relevant
categories subject to regulation
REG2: Regulation index with all relevant
categories subject to regulation
RDY: ratio of knowledge stock to value added
41
RDL: ratio of knowledge stock to vaue added, lag
of 3 years
ITY: ratio of IT capital stock to value added
LK: capital/labour ratio (input measure)
SI: log value of real value added
SUB (included in 2nd round of regressions):
Subsidies, at 5y intervals
TT = Time trend
41

42. Empirical Studies: Panel
Regression 2, Capital
Allocation
Endogenous variables:
A = our own measure of
productivity growth(Solow
residual), by industry
TFPD = JIP labour and capital
quality adjusted measure of TFP
growth
Exogenous variables (from the JIP
database):
QL: Quality of labour index
QK: Quality of capital index
INTAY: Stock of intangibles (ratio to
output)
ECOC: Investment stock of ‘economic
competencies’ (ratio to output) 42
INNY: Stock of innovative property
(ratio to output)
LK: capital/labour ratio (input measure)
SI: log value of real value added
TT = Time trend
42

43. Key results, for policy
guidance
Deregulation correlated positively with most
measures of productivity in highly-regulated
industries (Non-IT, Non-manufacturing) but
negatively in deregulated industries (IT,
Manufacturing). Could this mean an optimum lies
in between?
Subsidies may be necessary for other reasons than
boosting productivity but their ability to boost or
damage productivity looks weak
Allocation of capital matters broadly to productivity
(even in the services sector); the tiny stock of
innovative capital, scaled by output, correlated
positively to total factor productivity
43
43

44. Recommendations:
Excessive focus on improving productivity in the
manufacturing sector – focus on fixing the laggards
Look at how non-IT businesses, above and beyond nonmanufacturing alone, can improve productivity
Innovation capital is important in services, non-IT as well as in
IT/manufacturing. Create incentives for reallocation of capital
toward innovative capital within these lagging sectors
Subsidies might be necessary – while they do not show evidence of
damaging TFP too much, they do not improve it either. Use
subsidies as an interim measure in non-IT sectors.
There may be an optimal level of regulation between the
highly-regulated non-manufacturing/non-IT sectors and their
dereglated counterparts. Focus deregulations on these
sectors, particularly partial regulations that might damage
competitiveness among substitutible goods/services.
44
Could there be a message for postal privatisation here?
44

45. R&D expenditures rise alongside
trade, financial openness
R&D expenditures have
risen with trade/financial
openness across the OECD
Rise in quality of labour
across IT/Non IT but
stagnation of Non-IT quality
of capital
…higher relative wages for
skilled workers in traded
industries
Source: JIP, Naomi Fink, 2013
45

46. References
Amador & Coimbra, 2008. Total Factor Productivity in G7 Countries, IFC Bulletin No 28 (BIS)
Atkeson, A., Chari, V.V. and P.J. Kehoe, 1999. Taxing Capital Income: A Bad Idea. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review, Vol. 23, 3-17.
Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary
Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
Roberto M. Billi & Klaus Adam, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 67, Society for Computational Economics
T. Cogley and T.J. Sargent, (2002). ”Evolving Post-World War II U.S. Inflation Dynamics,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001,
Volume 16, pages 331-388
Juan Carlos Conesa & Sagiri Kitao & Dirk Krueger, 2009. "Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea after All!," American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 25-48, March
Teresa Garcia-Milà & Albert Marcet & Eva Ventura, 1995. "Supply side interventions and redistribution," Economics Working
Papers 115, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Fumio Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, 2002. "The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the
Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(1), pages 206-235, January.
Inui, Tomohiko, 2006. “Regulation and Productivity” http://www.eco.nihonu.ac.jp/center/economic/publication/journal/pdf/36/36inui.pdf
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Growing Income Inequality in OECD Countries: What Drives it and How Can Policy Tackle it ? Forum, Paris, 2 May 2011
G. Primiceri ”Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary Policy”, The Review of Economic Studies, 72, July
2005, pp. 821-852
RIETI/ESRI/HISTAT JIP data bases: http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database;
http://www.esri.go.jp/en/archive/bun/abstract/bun170index-e.html
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47. Thank you!
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