1. SOCIAL GAMES:
Matching and the Play of Finitely
Repeated Games
Matthew O. Jackson and Alison Watts
Draft: January 31, 2005
Abstract: We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where
players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of
players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and
play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play
depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, among other things.
We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to rematch
in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as
equilibria in a repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social)
equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilib