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Mobile Security

“Bring war material with you from home but
      forage on the enemy” - Sun Tzu

             Xavier Mertens
      Beltug SIG Security - Jan 2013
Disclaimer

“The opinions expressed in this presentation
are those of the speaker and do not necessarily
reflect those of past, present employers,
partners or customers.”
Agenda

• Introduction: Top-10 mobile risks
• Company owned devices
• Employee owned device (BYOD)
• Risks inherent in mobile devices
• Mobile applications development
Top-10 Mobile Risks
•   Insecure data storage

•   Weak server side controls

•   Insufficient transport layer protection

•   Client side injection

•   Poor authentication & authorization

•   Improper session handling

•   Secure decision via untrusted input

•   Side channel data leakage

•   Broken cryptography

•   Sensitive information disclosure
                                             (Source: OWASP)
Top-10 Mobile Risks
•   Insecure data storage

•   Weak server side controls

•   Insufficient transport layer protection
                                             Mobile devices
•   Client side injection
                                                  are
•   Poor authentication & authorization
                                              Computers!
•   Improper session handling

•   Secure decision via untrusted input

•   Side channel data leakage

•   Broken cryptography

•   Sensitive information disclosure
                                                    (Source: OWASP)
Company Owned
   Devices
Easy? Really?

• Limited set of manufacturers/OS
• Full control of hell?
• People try to evade from jail (like laptops)
• Need procedures (backups, helpdesk)
Corporate Policy
• Must be communicated & approved before
  the device provisioning
• Communication channels: addendum to a
  contract, Intranet, a “check box”?
• Restrictions (SD cards, Bluetooth, camera)
• What about private data? (pictures, MP3,
  downloaded (paid!) apps?
Examples
• Document already available on beltug.be
  (Members section)
• Simple policy:
  http://www.security-marathon.be/?p=1466
  (Jean-Sébastien Opdebeeck)
Data Classification
• Another approach is implementing data
  classification
• Implementation of the “least privileges”
  principle
• Access to data is based on profiles
• Work with any device! (benefit broader
  than the scope of mobile devices)
Data Classification
     Data            Company Owned Personal Devices
 Classification          Devices
   Top-Secret              No             No

Highly Confidential         No             No

   Proprietary             Yes            No

Internal Use Only          Yes            Yes

      Public               Yes            Yes
Employed Owned
    Devices
Why do people BTOD?

 • Devices became cheaper and powerful
 • The “Generation Y”
 • Always online everywhere!
First Question?
• Are you ready to accept personal devices
   on your network?
• It’s a question of ... risk!
• Examples:
 • Data loss
 • Network intrusion
 • Data ex-filtration
“MDM”?

• Do you need a MDM solution? (Mobile
  Device Management)
• Can you trust $VENDORS?
• Microsoft Exchange include ActiveSync for
  free
• Most security $VENDORS propose (basic)
  tools to handle mobile devices
Minimum Requirements

• Automatic lock + password
• No jailbroken devices
• Remote wipe
• Backups (who’s responsible?)
Risks Inherent In
Mobile Devices
Personal Hotspots

• Tethering allows mobile devices to be used
  as hotspots
• Corporate devices (laptops) could bypass
  Internet access controls
• Risks of rogue routers (if IP-forwarding is
  enabled
Rogue App Stores
• Mobile devices without apps is less useful
• Owners tend to install any apps
• Some apps may require much more rights
  than required
• People trust Apps stores and developers
• Developers must write good code
QR Codes
Geolocalization
NFC
Home & Cars
Mobile Application
 Development
OWASP Mobile
      Security Project

• Mobile testing guide
• Secure mobile development guide
• Top-10 mobile controls and design
  principles



               https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project
Lack of/Bad Encryption

• Developers re-invent the wheel: do not
  write a new encryption algorithm
• Encrypt everything (data at rest, data in
  move)
Local VS. Remote
      Storage
               Pros               Cons


          No network costs     Risk of loss
 Local         Speed            Outdated

           Always updated
                             Data network ($)
Central    No risk of loss
                                  Speed
Geolocalization

• Again! But this time for good purposes
• Do not allow some actions or apps (ex:
  opening a wallet) if GPS data shows the
  phone outside Europe
• Combine with passwords for stronger
  authentication/authorization
Enterprise Appstores

• Goal: Distribute, secure and manage mobile
  apps through your own company branded
  appstore.
• Application available in the appstore have
  been approved by a strong validation
  process.
Thank You!

Xavier Mertens
xavier@rootshell.be
@xme
http://blog.rootshell.be

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Mobile Security

  • 1. Mobile Security “Bring war material with you from home but forage on the enemy” - Sun Tzu Xavier Mertens Beltug SIG Security - Jan 2013
  • 2. Disclaimer “The opinions expressed in this presentation are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of past, present employers, partners or customers.”
  • 3. Agenda • Introduction: Top-10 mobile risks • Company owned devices • Employee owned device (BYOD) • Risks inherent in mobile devices • Mobile applications development
  • 4. Top-10 Mobile Risks • Insecure data storage • Weak server side controls • Insufficient transport layer protection • Client side injection • Poor authentication & authorization • Improper session handling • Secure decision via untrusted input • Side channel data leakage • Broken cryptography • Sensitive information disclosure (Source: OWASP)
  • 5. Top-10 Mobile Risks • Insecure data storage • Weak server side controls • Insufficient transport layer protection Mobile devices • Client side injection are • Poor authentication & authorization Computers! • Improper session handling • Secure decision via untrusted input • Side channel data leakage • Broken cryptography • Sensitive information disclosure (Source: OWASP)
  • 6. Company Owned Devices
  • 7. Easy? Really? • Limited set of manufacturers/OS • Full control of hell? • People try to evade from jail (like laptops) • Need procedures (backups, helpdesk)
  • 8. Corporate Policy • Must be communicated & approved before the device provisioning • Communication channels: addendum to a contract, Intranet, a “check box”? • Restrictions (SD cards, Bluetooth, camera) • What about private data? (pictures, MP3, downloaded (paid!) apps?
  • 9. Examples • Document already available on beltug.be (Members section) • Simple policy: http://www.security-marathon.be/?p=1466 (Jean-Sébastien Opdebeeck)
  • 10. Data Classification • Another approach is implementing data classification • Implementation of the “least privileges” principle • Access to data is based on profiles • Work with any device! (benefit broader than the scope of mobile devices)
  • 11. Data Classification Data Company Owned Personal Devices Classification Devices Top-Secret No No Highly Confidential No No Proprietary Yes No Internal Use Only Yes Yes Public Yes Yes
  • 12. Employed Owned Devices
  • 13. Why do people BTOD? • Devices became cheaper and powerful • The “Generation Y” • Always online everywhere!
  • 14. First Question? • Are you ready to accept personal devices on your network? • It’s a question of ... risk! • Examples: • Data loss • Network intrusion • Data ex-filtration
  • 15. “MDM”? • Do you need a MDM solution? (Mobile Device Management) • Can you trust $VENDORS? • Microsoft Exchange include ActiveSync for free • Most security $VENDORS propose (basic) tools to handle mobile devices
  • 16. Minimum Requirements • Automatic lock + password • No jailbroken devices • Remote wipe • Backups (who’s responsible?)
  • 18. Personal Hotspots • Tethering allows mobile devices to be used as hotspots • Corporate devices (laptops) could bypass Internet access controls • Risks of rogue routers (if IP-forwarding is enabled
  • 19. Rogue App Stores • Mobile devices without apps is less useful • Owners tend to install any apps • Some apps may require much more rights than required • People trust Apps stores and developers • Developers must write good code
  • 22. NFC
  • 25. OWASP Mobile Security Project • Mobile testing guide • Secure mobile development guide • Top-10 mobile controls and design principles https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project
  • 26. Lack of/Bad Encryption • Developers re-invent the wheel: do not write a new encryption algorithm • Encrypt everything (data at rest, data in move)
  • 27. Local VS. Remote Storage Pros Cons No network costs Risk of loss Local Speed Outdated Always updated Data network ($) Central No risk of loss Speed
  • 28. Geolocalization • Again! But this time for good purposes • Do not allow some actions or apps (ex: opening a wallet) if GPS data shows the phone outside Europe • Combine with passwords for stronger authentication/authorization
  • 29. Enterprise Appstores • Goal: Distribute, secure and manage mobile apps through your own company branded appstore. • Application available in the appstore have been approved by a strong validation process.