1.
Unity Makes Strength“Why keep this valuable information in a corner?” hashdays 2012 - Xavier Mertens

2.
$ whoami• Xavier Mertens (@xme)• Consultant @ day• Blogger @ night• BruCON co-organizer 2

3.
$ cat disclaimer.txt“The opinions expressed in this presentationare those of the speaker and do not necessarilyreflect those of past, present employers,partners or customers.” 3

4.
Agenda• Some facts• Current situation• Toolbox• Examples 4

5.
Defense vs. Attack• Offensive security is funny (w00t! We break things)• Defensive security can also be fun! (proud to not be pwn3d ;-)• “Know your enemy!” 5

6.
Welcome to Belgium! 6

7.
Welcome to Belgium! 7

8.
Belgique, België, Belgien But with a very complicated political landscape! 8

9.
Belgian Motto “L’union fait la force” (“Unity Makes Strength”) 9

10.
And Infosec? Why not apply this to our security infrastructures? 10

11.
Agenda• Some facts• Current situation• Toolbox• Examples 11

12.
Initial Situation Malware Firewall IDS Proxy Analysis Action Action Action Action 12

13.
Then Came the god “SIEM” Malware Firewall IDS Proxy Analysis Logs Logs Logs Logs Centralized Logging Solutions / SIEM 13

14.
Weaknesses?• Independent solutions• Static configurations• Only logs are centralized• No global protection• Useful data not shared• Real-time protection not easy 14

15.
The Value of Data• IP addresses• User names• URLs• Domains• Digests (MD5, SHA1, etc) 15

16.
Multiple Sources• Online repositories• Internal resources• Automatic process 16

17.
Nothing New! Input Process Output 17

18.
Back to the Roots• REXX is a scripting language invented by IBM.• ARexx was implemented in AmigaOS in 1987.• Allow applications having an ARexx interface to communicate to exchange data. 18

19.
RTFM!• Security is a big market ($$$)• The “Microsoft Office” effect (<10% of features really used)• Invest time to learn how your products work.• Be a hacker: Learn how it work and make it work like you want. 19

20.
Backdoors...• CLI• WebAPI (JSON, XML)• Databases• Scripting languages• Serial console 20

21.
Protocols• HTTP(S)• TFTP• SSH• SNMP• IF-MAP• Proprietary tools (dbedit) 21

22.
Automation is the Key• We’re all lazy people!• Expect! use Expect; my $e = Expect->new(); my $c = “ssh $user@$host”; $e = Expect->spawn($c) or die “No SSH?”; $e->Expect($timeout, [ qr’password: $’, sub { my $fh = shift; print $fh $passwordn”; } ] 22

23.
A New Architecture Toolbox Firewall IDS Proxy Malware Analysis Action Action Action Action Logs Logs Logs Logs Centralized Logging Solutions / SIEM 23

24.
Agenda• Some facts• Current situation• Toolbox• Examples 24

25.
HTTPS• Generate an API key https://10.0.0.1/api/?type=keygen&user=foo&password=bar• Submit XML requests https://10.0.0.1/api/?type=config&key=xxx&action=set&xpath=/ config/device/entry[@name=localhost]/vsys/ entry[@name=vsys1]/address/ entry[@name=NewHost]&element=<ip- netmask>192.168.0.1</ip-netmask><description>Test</ description> 25

26.
Snort-Rules Generator• Lot of Security tools accept Snort rules use Snort::Rule my $rule = Snort::Rule->new( -action => ‘alert’, -proto => ‘tcp’, -src => ‘10.0.0.1’, -sport => ‘any’, -dst => ‘any’, -dport => ‘any’, ); $rule->opts(‘msg’, ‘Detect traffic from 10.0.1’); $rule->opts(‘sid’, ‘666666’); 26

27.
IF-MAP• Open standard to allow authorized devices to publish/search relevant information• Information could be • IP • Login • Location (devices) • Domain 27

28.
IF-MAPuse Ifmap;use Ifmap::Util;my $r=Ifmap::Request::NewSession->new();my $ip=Ifmap::Identifier::IpAddress->new(ip_address, ‘10.0.0.1’);my $mac=Ifmap::Identifier::MacAddress->new(mac_address, ‘aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff’);my $id = Ifmap::Identifier::Identity->new(name=> ‘john’, type=>‘username’);my $meta=Ifmap::Metadata::Element->new(name=>‘name’, value=‘employee’); 28

29.
SNMP• SNMP can be used to push configuration changes• Example: $ snmpset 10.0.1 Pr1v4t3 .1.3.6.1.4.1.9.2.1.53.10.0.2 acl.tmp• Router 10.0.0.1 will pull the access-list “acm.tmp” from TFTP server 10.0.0.2 29

30.
TCL• Cisco devices have a framework called EEM: “Embedded Event Manager”• Example: event manager applet Interface_Event event syslog pattern “.*UPDOWN.*FastEthernet0/1.* changed state to .*” event 1.0 cli command “tclsh flash:notify.tcl”• The router may communicate information based on its status 30

31.
The Conductor• OSSEC• Log Management• Active-Response• Powerful alerts engine 31

32.
Action? Reaction!• Example of OSSEC rule <rule id=”100101” level=”5” frequency=”5” timeframe=”60”> <match>access denied</match> <group>invalid_login,</group> </rule> <active-response> <command>ad-block-user</command> <location>local</location> <rules_id>100101</rules_id> </active-response> 32

33.
Agenda• Some facts• Current situation• Toolbox• Examples 33

34.
$ cat disclaimer2.txt <warning> Some slides contain examples basedon open source as well as v€ndor$ solutions. I’m not affiliated with any of them! </warning> 34

35.
Online Resources• DNS-BH $ wget -N http://dns-bh.sagadc.org/domains.txt• Google SafeBrowsing use Net::Google::SafeBrowsing2; use Net::Google::SafeBrowsing2:::Sqlite; my gsb = Net::Google::SafeBrowsing2->new( key => “xxx”, storage => Net::Google::SafeBrowsing2::Sqlite->new(file => “google.db”) ); $gsb->update(); my $match = $gsb->lookup(url => “http://evil.com”); if ($match eq MALWARE) { ... } 35

36.
Dynamic Firewall Config• FireEye malware analysis box• Firewalls • Checkpoint • PaloAlto • IPtables • <insert your preferred fw $VENDOR here>• OSSEC 36

37.
Dynamic Firewall Config CheckpointFireEye OSSEC PaloAlto IPtables 37

38.
Dynamic User Blacklist• Syslog Concentrator• OSSEC• SSL VPN• LDAP directory 38

39.
Dynamic User Blacklist sshd sshd OSSEC LDAP $ ldapmodify -D ‘cn=admin’ -w ‘pass’ sshd dn:uid=jdoe,o=acme.org changetype: modify replace:userpassword userpassword:newpass 39

40.
SMTP Malware Analysis• Postfix MTA• Cuckoo• CuckooMX (Perl) 40

41.
SMTP Malware AnalysisPostfix CuckooMX Cuckoo 41

42.
MySQL Self-Defense• MySQL Server• MySQL Proxy• lib_mysqludf_log 42

43.
MySQL Self-Defense error.logclient mysql-proxy mysqld 43

44.
Controls• Security first!• Strong controls must be implemented• Authentication/Authorization• Could break your compliance• Use an OoB network• Risk of DoS! 44

45.
Conclusions• Don’t buy just “a box”• RTFM• Control• It’s up to you! 45

46.
Thank You!Questions?Beers! 46